

SOCIAL FORCES

October, 1937

THE HISTORIC PATTERN OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE SOUTH*

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ONE thing we must never forget about the early history of sociology in the South, as well as elsewhere, is that it was not originally developed primarily in the institutions of higher education, but as a private interest and predilection.¹ There were no chairs in the subject, and few courses, in our colleges before the late eighteen-eighties. Although the South produced the first treatise in the world in sociology, it was not the production of a teacher of the science. The curricula of the colleges of the ante-bellum period were too straight-jacketed by the classics and by other traditional subjects to admit of the inclusion of such an upstart modern discipline as sociology. The nearest academic approach to

it was to be found in certain phases of the course in moral philosophy, and sometimes, in the larger institutions, in courses in political ethics (itself an outgrowth of moral philosophy) and in the philosophy of history. Sociology thus had to depend upon the private initiative of a few intellectual lights, perhaps all the more inclined to this subject because they were freed from the academic and professorial straight-jacket of the times. These men, accustomed to observe the trends of events in their communities and in the world as a whole, sometimes possessed of leisure in which to think about the deeper meaning of social trends of the times, often pressed in their public life to find solutions for problems that would be more than superficial and stereotyped, and animated by a deep concern for a favorable issue of the new civilization that had been planted here in America; these men, I say, first produced some sort of systematic organization of the principal data of society and of social relationships which was worthy the name sociology.

It may strike the uninitiated as strange that the South before the war between the states should have been the first to create something approaching a scientific sociology. But our wonder tends to disappear

* Presented at the meeting of the Southern Sociological Society in Birmingham, Alabama, April 2, 1937.

¹ The paper here presented treats more specifically of trends than of men and institutions, using the latter to illustrate and make concrete the more abstract events that were taking place in the days when the serious intellectual life of the South was in all its glory, as well as in the more recent period of its renaissance. The more concrete details of the subject have already been treated in part by the author in other connections. See, for example, L. L. Bernard, "The Teaching of Sociology in the United States," *Amer. Jour. Sociology*, XV: 164-213 (Sept. 1909). See also other later citations in this paper.

when we come to know the causes and conditions that were at work to that end. It is true that sociological thinking and writing in Europe goes back much further in point of time—even to Plato and Aristotle in Greece, to the Stoics and Epicureans, to Dante, to the Utopists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to Hobbes and to Locke, to the Scotch moral philosophers, and to the social contractualists and the philosophers of history of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and to Comte who gave to it its name. But nearly all of this earlier sociologizing was highly theoretical and not infrequently decidedly "up in the air." Its producers were seeking, for the most part, to make generalizations and to arrive at general principles before they collected their facts. It is true that Aristotle was a student of contemporary society, that Vico ransacked classical literature, that Montesquieu read what recorded history there was, and that Comte passed in review the history of ideas as well as of men—each in his effort to draw sound conclusions. But it remained for the men of the South to build a pragmatic sociology on the basis of contemporary social life as they saw it passing in review before them. I do not mean to say that all southern sociology before the Civil War had this highly characteristic pragmatic profile, but that such certainly was its general tone and its dominant trend.

First then among the causes of the modern and realistic development of sociology in the South was its frontier location. It was a new civilization which had grown up literally in a wilderness. The problems of life and social adjustment were essentially its own. It was not so much that the South had broken with all of the traditions of the past—for it had not—but that they did not apply here with any very great force of conviction. This was a new

world and a new life, and however much its people might pay lip-service and homage to the philosophy of the past, they rarely allowed mere a priori philosophy to interfere with a posteriori conduct and its regulation.

Yet men living so ardently and absorbedly in the present would not quickly arrive at a philosophy of their own by unaided effort. Philosophy building—whether religious, legal, political, or social—when it grows immediately out of experience matures but slowly, unless catalyzed and crystallized by some external intellectual or moral impulse. Some have said that the South, cut off more than the rest of America from the general leavening influences of Europe, was slow to develop an active intellectual life. It lagged behind the North in poetry, the novel, even in essays and history, and perhaps in sermons. All this is in large measure true, as far as the interests of the masses were concerned, and for the more pioneer parts of the lower South. But in social thinkers the South was particularly prominent. A few men like Jefferson, John Taylor, Dew, Lieber, and that brilliant group of intellectual and political leaders, who dominated the nation as well as their own states in the early history of the Republic, were thoroughly conversant with the best thought of Europe. They took what they could use from European sources, treated it critically, and applied it to their own problems; but above all, having been trained to think, they thought about their own problems pretty much in their own way.

Although New England had even closer intellectual contacts with Europe than the South enjoyed, at least when numbers of the population are considered, it was largely the victim of a historical inversion in its thinking. Founded by highly intolerant groups or factions and for the first

two centuries of its existence firmly attached to the Biblical traditions of moral and social behavior, it did not free itself for independent thinking about general social relationships until late in the nineteenth century. Even today there is a lingering Brahmanistic distrust of so secular a subject as sociology in New England, based partly upon their traditional opposition to an experiential basis for conduct as contrasted with a scriptural and traditional basis, and partly upon the stronger hold which the classical snobbery gained over New England educational institutions. New England, as a consequence of its origins and upbringing, retained its social inversion and adopted transcendentalism and other forms of social mysticism from its contacts with Europe at a time when southern intellectual leaders were examining Europe's newest sociological and political theories.

The essentially agrarian character of the South was another strong factor in its greater pragmatism and realism of sociological development. It was not alone that life in the open, where frank contacts and direct dealing in the concrete affairs of life dominated, made for a superior democracy in the south, even in the face of latifundia and a slave system; but the relative absence of cities and the greater difficulty of communication discouraged the growth of a compact self-centered aristocracy of wealth and an atmosphere of intrigue and political and social intimidation. Even until the last the South remained essentially hospitable, democratic, and open to social and political initiative, at least on its public side, after New England and the Middle states had become absorbed in the narrow commercial spirit and permeated with political and economic intrigue and coercion. All this promoted a greater interest in general social ideas and systems

in the South on an essentially concrete humanitarian and cosmopolitan basis.

It is true that there was more radicalism in New England, and even in the Middle States, than in the South. This was partly due to the greater social and economic restraint in the North, and partly to the growing absorption in the defense of the slave institution in the South. With the exception of the one institution of slavery, the North was always more conservative than the ante-bellum South. In religion, in economic theories, in the regulation of personal conduct, in political theory, in the theory of property rights, the North was much more hide-bound than the South. The South of Jefferson, of Thomas Cooper, of Clay and Calhoun, of Dew and Lieber, was liberal, but not radical. In the North, the marked extreme of rigid conservatism gave rise to a minority revolt of radicalism. This trend manifested itself in such movements as Shakerism, Spiritualism, Transcendentalism, Unitarianism, Universalism, Fourierism, free love agitation, and the anti-slavery movement. These were more or less sporadic movements which never condensed into any well defined or broadly based social theory. They were protest movements; and a sociology can be built only on the level of a fairly well adjusted and equitable social life; not on protest alone. It was the progressive liberalism of the Jeffersonian philosophy, so long regnant in the South, cross-fertilized by the agrarian open life and relatively free competition of southern institutions, that made the early development of sociology there possible.

It is true that after the war between the states the North lost much of her conservatism and the South lost much of her liberalism. As a consequence, for a period of some forty or fifty years, the relative positions of the two sections intellectually were largely reversed. Sociology declined

in the South almost to the point of its disappearance. Although it had produced the first treatise in the world bearing the name sociology, even the title of this first book and the name of its author had slipped entirely from human memory until I called public attention to it in 1928, seventy-four years after its publication.²

Sociology in the South, much as in our own day everywhere, early took on several different forms or patterns. I shall attempt to deal with the more important of these in somewhat their historic order. The first pattern of sociology to be developed in the South was one that imposed itself upon all the countries of America, earlier in the English colonies of the North and somewhat later—as late in fact as 1800 to 1810—in the Latin American countries to the south. This is generally known as the revolutionary pattern, and by some it is thought to have originated in France and to have been imposed upon the colonial societies of America from that source. But as a matter of fact it was of English, French, and indigenous origin, and each of these countries borrowed it from the other. It had its exponents in Rhode Island and Providence Plantations as early as the middle of the seventeenth century, who drew their inspiration from the Anabaptists and other communists of central Europe, from the radical theories of Holland and from the revolutionary movement in England of the age of Cromwell. Its chief exponents in America of the revolutionary period and during the fifty years that followed were undoubtedly that brilliant group of Virginia middle class planters who founded the Jeffersonian Democracy.

² See L. L. Bernard, "Some Historical and Recent Trends of Sociology in the United States," *S. W. Polit. Sci. Quart.*, IX: 267 (Dec., 1928). See also L. L. Bernard, "Henry Hughes, First American Sociologist," *Social Forces*, XV: 154-174 (Dec., 1936).

The Jeffersonian Democracy had both its political and its economic aspects, but as a movement it was primarily sociological. Its brand of sociology was, if you please, chiefly, political sociology, but it was sociology, and not political science, none the less. That man of transcendent genius, Thomas Jefferson, was not the author merely of a system of government, he was the sponsor of a theory of society. His work on the political constitution of the United States was relatively minor; and he developed no system of political economy at all, but accepted with some minor modifications the contributions of Adam Smith and Destutt de Tracy. But in the matter of the discussion of fundamental human rights and human relations he led all other Americans and set the mode, at least nominally, for another hundred years. So profound was the impression that he made upon the thinking of those who were democratically inclined that even to this day his name is invoked by myriads of men who know next to nothing of his theories. No less profound was the impression that he made upon the conservative elements of the population, who uttered his name with execration. Samuel G. Goodrich has borne testimony to the horror with which he was regarded in rural New England at the dawn of the nineteenth century, where he was considered to be as radical and as subversive of established opinions as a communist of our day and his name was spoken with that degree of horror which is now applied by the politically saintly to the names of Lenin or Trotsky or Stalin.³

It is of course not possible to present here an adequate outline of the sociological theory of Jefferson. He left no treatise on sociology, for he was not a writer, but a man of action. He agitated, legislated,

³ S. G. Goodrich, *Personal Recollections of Poets, Philosophers and Statesmen*, 1856, pp. 63-64, 109-110, 114-120.

and enforced administratively his sociological ideas. Their chief written embodiment is to be found in the Declaration of Independence, in his autobiography, and especially in his voluminous correspondence. In general, he stood for personal and social democracy in the fullest degree consistent with social order, and many of his political opponents believed that his principles led him beyond the bounds of social security and order. He believed in the essential goodness of human nature, and that an intelligent pursuit of the self-interest motive leads to social solidarity, which in turn will provide the necessary social constraint over the individual, and he looked with a jealous eye upon the encroachments of legal tradition in the name of constitutionalism and of the power of the courts upon the right of each generation to remake human society to meet the needs of its own times. Property he held to be less important than human welfare and social progress, and he succeeded in abolishing the law of entail in Virginia. He advocated the abolition of human slavery. He espoused the principle of frequent revolutions—preferably of a peaceful order—as a means to untying the hard knots with which political intrigue and the courts tended to bind the liberties of the people. In the same interest of freedom of individuals to govern themselves he stood for localism in government as over against centralization of political power. He regarded agriculture as the basic industry of a people upon which the prosperity of all classes depend, and he sought by a system of the distribution of power to keep the control of government in the hands of the agrarian interests rather than allow it to gravitate into an exploiting, subsidy hunting, usurious, price-fixing oligarchy of trade and finance, such as has gradually resulted in our more recent political devel-

opment. He was essentially a pacifist, and contemplated war as a deplorable calamity to be entered upon only as a necessary evil. He sought to replace the use of force from above in government by teaching all classes, including even the poor, to be self-governing by means of education. His plan for a system of free public education, leading up from the elementary school through the state university, made of him our first educational sociologist. In these schools he would have the socially useful subjects stressed, and especially in the university the study of politics, political economy, law (with an emphasis upon human rights), and moral philosophy. He was for the widest tolerance in all matters of opinion, political and religious, and he led in the abolition of the established church in Virginia.

Although the term sociology was not known in Jefferson's day, he was unquestionably our first great American sociologist, ranking in this respect above his great contemporary Franklin, and standing as the chief representative of this subject matter for a period of fifty years. His chief understudies, Madison, Monroe, and John Taylor, belong essentially to the same school, although the first two were more political in their outlook and the last of the three more economic in his interests. I have dwelt thus long upon the sociological theories of Thomas Jefferson because I wish to emphasize as strongly as I can a fact that has not been adequately grasped in our day—that he was primarily a sociologist who went into politics because in his time the only way in which one's sociological theories could be made effective was through government. Late in life he saw the necessity of finding a more subtle and pervasive method of making sociologists of the people and ultimately of erecting the ideal of a true democracy into a reality; and this was education. Always,

he was first and foremost a social reformer, pushing his advanced social programs as far and as fast as the condition of social intelligence would allow.

The pattern of political sociology was carried on and perpetuated in the South not only by Madison, Monroe, and John Taylor, Jefferson's close personal associates, but also by a family of brilliant scholars, the Tuckers. I can barely mention the names of St. George Tucker (1752-1828), who wrote to advocate the abolition of slavery (1795, 1796), on human geography (1795), and touched the subject of the sociology of jurisprudence in his large work on Blackstone's Commentaries (1803); Henry St. George Tucker (1780-1848); Nathaniel Beverley Tucker (1784-1851); and George Tucker (1775-1861), long a professor of moral philosophy in the University of Virginia, who was historian, economist, ethicist, geographer, and sociologist. Other early writers on political sociology in the south were David Hoffman (1784-1854), whose *Legal Outlines*, delivered as a course of lectures at the University of Maryland and published in Baltimore in 1829, dealt primarily with political origins and legal rights within the political system; William Mathers, whose *Rise, Progress and Downfall of Aristocracy* (Wheeling, 1831) mixed some erratic Biblical interpretations of prophecy with an interesting history and criticism of aristocratic orders; Francis Lieber (1800-1872), long a professor at the South Carolina College (now the University of South Carolina), and the author of a number of books and papers on political sociology and the sociology of jurisprudence; and Frederick Grimke (1791-1863), the author of *Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions* (1848), one of the ablest of early political sociologies. The work of Thomas Roderick Dew (1802-1846), professor and president of William

Mary College, must also be mentioned in this connection. Especially important are his Debates on Slavery and his address on "The Influence of the Federative Republican System of Government upon Literature and the Development of Character" (Richmond, 1836).

The pattern of rural sociology was early initiated by Jefferson and John Taylor, but the growth of slavery as a rural institution blocked, until fairly recently, the development of a permanent system of rural sociology in the South. It is now one of the most cultivated phases of sociology in the South. Jefferson's interest in agrarian problems was genuinely sociological and democratic. John Taylor emphasized the political and economic aspects of rural problems primarily. The southern leaders before the Civil War could not separate agricultural and rural social problems from the tariff and slavery. Only on the western edge of the South, under the leadership of Thomas Hart Benton, was there a more general and democratic approach to rural problems, in the form of homestead laws, and this also was primarily political. With the growth of the New South since reconstruction days, the agrarian interest has centered mainly upon better farming, better rural schools, agricultural and home economics extension, and rural community organization. Just now scientific research of a high order into problems of regional characteristics, race relations, rural population traits, and rural folk sociology have been carried on at the universities and state colleges of Virginia, North Carolina, Louisiana, Texas, and elsewhere.

One of the earliest approaches to sociology everywhere was that through moral philosophy, and even earlier than this through the theory of Natural Law, which was the predecessor of moral philosophy. There were two approaches to moral philosophy. One of these was through the

rather formal interpretation of the ten commandments. This method was theological rather than sociological and psycho-sociological. The other approach, developed especially by the Scotch moral philosophers, used the naturalistic instead of the theological method of developing the subject of moral philosophy. Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, William Paley, and George Combe, were among the many who developed this phase of the subject and it was mainly through the works of these men that moral philosophy came into the South. Since Presbyterianism was one of the chief denominational interests of the South, and since the Presbyterian Church encouraged an educated ministry, there was a steady stream of ministers pouring into the South before the Civil War from Edinburgh and other Scotch universities. Prominent among these were Thomas Smythe of Charleston and President Bishop of Miami University at Oxford, Ohio. They brought the teachings of the Scotch ethicists and of Chalmers into the South generally and into the southern colleges especially, for several of these immigrant Scotch ministers became college presidents and professors. As a consequence of this movement moral philosophy was early and much emphasized in the southern colleges. At Virginia, George Tucker not only taught the subject, but gave authorship to a volume of *Essays* which was decidedly sociological and psycho-sociological in character. At South Carolina College, a German immigrant, Francis Lieber, developed the political aspect of the subject of moral philosophy into a learned two volume treatise on *Political Ethics* (1838), as well as into other less important works on political and cultural sociology. An associate of President Bishop at Miami University, William H. McGuffey, became professor of moral

philosophy at the University of Virginia, and for several years, at the middle of the nineteenth century, had a course on The Philosophy of Social Relations, a title that he borrowed from Bishop, and which merely marked the transition to a major emphasis upon the sociological content of the old moral philosophy courses. Thus in a very concrete way, at Miami University and at the University of Virginia, sociology grew out of moral philosophy, to which in one pattern it was closely related.

Of the cultural and racial patterns of sociology in the South I should like very much to speak if time were not too much limited; but some of this material has already appeared in a recent book by Dr. Jenkins of the University of North Carolina.⁴

Of another pattern, however, I must speak more fully, although all too briefly. This I shall, for want of a better term, call the contemporary-statistical pattern. Two men especially stand out in this connection. One of these was the George Tucker of the University of Virginia whom we have already mentioned more than once. In 1842-1843 he published in Hunt's *Merchants' Magazine* a series of papers based largely on statistical analyses of contemporary life in the United States. Together these papers constituted a very important sociological study which antedated a somewhat fuller analysis of the same sort by Richmond Mayo Smith entitled *Statistics and Sociology* by approximately fifty years. The work of De Bow and his collaborators on his *Review* is of course well known, although I believe no adequate study of the use of statistical analysis of sociological data as employed

⁴ W. S. Jenkins. *Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935.

in this publication has ever been published.⁵

The pro-slavery pattern of sociology, already referred to in a few instances in connection with the theories of Jefferson, St. George Tucker, and Dew on slavery, I shall have to pass over for want of space. It is covered in much greater detail than I could give to it here in the volume by Dr. Jenkins already referred to. But I shall come back to this topic in touching upon the work of two southern sociologists who published in the decade immediately preceding the Civil War.

Our discussion so far has dealt with material that was sociological in fact although not so in name. The term sociology was not invented by Auguste Comte until about 1839 and it did not begin to get active circulation in American literary channels until the late eighteen-forties. We may now turn from what may be called the pre-sociologists⁶ to the sociologists professedly. However, we should not forget that the former dealt with as genuinely sociological subjects and in as legitimate a sociological manner as the later writers. They merely lacked the sociological label.

The leaven of the term sociology had produced its effect by the early eighteen-fifties, and there appeared in 1854 two works carrying the title sociology. One of these, by a Mississippi lawyer and planter, Henry Hughes, barely twenty-five years of age, was systematic in content and bore the title *Treatise on Sociology, Theoretical and Practical*.⁷ The other work, by

George Fitzhugh of Virginia, was not systematic, but rather a collection of essays, largely after the pattern of the new "Social Science" discipline which was beginning to appear at that time in Washington (where Fitzhugh was for some time a government official) and elsewhere, was entitled *Sociology for the South*.⁸

The backgrounds of these two men are much the same, thus testifying to the essential unity of the literary culture of the South at that time; for there is no reason to suppose that Hughes and Fitzhugh had any special connection with each other. Both were strongly influenced by the theories of Fourier and Comte, and especially by those of the latter philosopher. Hughes may be said to have been an ardent Comtist or positivist, while Fitzhugh had some definite reservations on that subject. But these antecedents merely gave the pattern to their thought, while the great issue of slavery gave the basic problem. It is on this theme that both of the men built their books, although Fitzhugh wandered away from the subject of slavery to such questions as those of free trade, women's rights, and the like. The result is an ensemble instead of a treatise. Hughes, on the other hand, stuck closely to his central theme and produced one of the most rigorously consistent treatises on essential human relationships that has appeared even to this day. That it is distorted by his excessive interest in the problem of slavery is merely an incident

⁵ Such a study has, however, been made by Dr. Jessie Bernard and awaits a publisher.

⁶ For some years I have been enlisting the cooperation of various colleagues and former students in making a cooperative study of these pre-sociologists, which I hope will be ready for the publisher within the next year or two. Some of the papers have already appeared in print.

⁷ See L. L. Bernard, "Henry Hughes, First American Sociologist," *Social Forces*, Dec., 1936, pp. 154-

174; also H. G. and Winnie Leach Duncan, "Henry Hughes, Sociologist of the Old South," *Sociology and Social Research*, Jan.-Feb., 1937, pp. 244-258.

⁸ See H. G. and Minnie Leach Duncan, "The Development of Sociology in the Old South," *Amer. Journal of Sociology*, xxxix: 649-656. The present writer of this paper first called Mrs. Duncan's attention to Fitzhugh and Hughes in a graduate course on American Sociology at the University of North Carolina and she undertook to prepare her doctor's dissertation on the work of Fitzhugh under his direction.

of the times in which he lived. It is only secondarily a treatise on slavery. It is primarily a treatise on sociology, well integrated and well ordered. That it is essentially an a prioristic treatment is also an incident of the times. Both men had become very doubtful of the justice and feasibility of the open democratic or "free labor" system of society, and they believed in a rigorous ordering of social relationships on the side of responsibility and duty which approaches pretty closely to what the principles of Fascism might be considered to be at their idealistic best. But they were not consciously motivated by any desire for exploitation, even of the slave population. Hughes especially emphasized over and over again the obligation of organized society to provide for every man the necessary means of subsistence. It is only in order that this may be successfully accomplished, he held, that a rigorous and paternalistic ordering of collective and individual behavior may properly be insisted upon.

The Civil War intervened and these two men disappeared from public life. Hughes died in the second year of the war. Fitzhugh lived to a ripe, but rather uneventful, old age at Huntsville, Texas. I have visited one of his descendants in Houston, Texas, and have seen a small remaining portion of his library, which consisted of the standard works of the old intellectual leaders of the South. Apparently he died (in 1881) without realizing how near he came to fame. His book was not quite forgotten, while that of Hughes, although the abler work, sank completely into oblivion until rescued in the manner described above. One of Hughes' relatives in Port Gibson, Mississippi actually burned some years ago his remaining publications as rubbish "in order to get them out of the way." When I visited the town in 1934 I found some of the family apprecia-

tive of his genius, and this was especially the case of an unrelated fellow townsman who lives in the house which Hughes last occupied on the west side of the town. Others were quite indifferent to his growing fame as the result of my efforts to bring his work again to public attention.

The return of sociology to the South after the war between the states was largely through the colleges and universities. Here, as in the North, the institutions of higher education gradually lost their exclusively classical character and ceased to be the monopoly of the ancient and modern languages. "Sociology arose as a protest against the spirit of classicism. It preached a crusade for the study of men and their affairs rather than merely the hypothetical men of books." But it had first to contest the field with classicism in the social sciences as well as in language and literature.⁹ Little by little the teaching of sociology edged its way, along with men of a wider mental and moral mold, into the colleges and universities of the South. At first it had to find its way under the protective shadow of moral philosophy and history. Then it grew bolder and asserted its mission under the aegis of a new discipline of the day known as "Social Science." Finally it achieved the courage and found sufficient tolerance to offer itself under the semi-proscribed title of sociology. I say it required some courage on the part of its promoters and some tolerance from the academic and ministerial professions to enable it to take this last step; for in a sense that we cannot realize now thumbs were down in the eighteen-seventies and the eighteen-eighties against the Comtean philosophy of positivism, and especially against any attempt to apply the scientific methods and scientific con-

⁹ See L. L. Bernard, "Some Historical and Recent Trends of Sociology in the United States," *Southwestern Polit. Sci. Quart.*, ix: 265 (Dec., 1928).

trols to the personal and social affairs of men. This was a realm which theology had reserved to herself, without being able to master it; with the result that political ignorance and corruption, economic exploitation, and the holocaust of the vices under a hypocritical mask of support of theological pretensions, were running riot, and society itself was threatened with dismemberment. Common sense and disillusionment finally partially prevailed over intolerance and dogmatism and sociology began to take its place as a phase of higher study and instruction.

Thus sociology made its entrance into the educational institutions of the South, as in the North, through the four avenues of moral philosophy, the philosophy of history, "Social Science," and sociology proper. If I touch on a few of the high lights in this connection, I can the better illuminate the progress of this new social science of sociology. In 1851-1852, as I have already indicated, William H. McGuffey, Professor of Moral Philosophy, in the University of Virginia, introduced his course entitled *The Philosophy of Social Relations, or the Ethics of Society*.¹⁰ In 1873-1881, Professor Noah K. Davis, of the same department and institution, announced the specific treatment of sociology in a course on political economy.¹¹ In 1881, Professor Holmes of the same institution introduced a course entitled "The Process of Historical Change."¹² Professor Holmes was also the author of a text book on Social Science, which was used as a syllabus in his course. President Laws, of the University of Missouri, offered in 1876-1877 a course on Social Science in which he used as texts Lieber's *Civil Liberty* and Spencer's *Sociology*. Two years later (1878) President William Preston Johns-

ton, son of Albert Sidney Johnston, introduced at Louisiana State University a course in the philosophy of history which was essentially sociology, and in 1886 he carried this course with him when he went as president to Tulane University.¹³ Colonel Johnston is one of the neglected figures of the South who would repay much more careful study as an educator and man of public affairs than it has been his fortune to receive. In 1887, Professor Charles Woodward Hutson, who died in New Orleans a few years ago, brought out a textbook on *The Beginnings of Civilization*, which embodied the sociological generalizations of his courses at the University of Mississippi.¹⁴

It was in the middle of the eighteenthies before sociology appeared under its own symbol in any university, north or south, and apparently the University of Arkansas beat Indiana University to the distinction by a single year. In 1884-1885 the former institution offered a course of lectures in this subject.¹⁵ In the year 1888-1889, President John Franklin Crowell of Trinity College, North Carolina, gave a course in Christian sociology.¹⁶ The march was now on. Tulane offered, in 1894-1895, what was probably the first straight and regular course in sociology in the South, and it was intended for advanced students.¹⁷ Asbury, Baylor, and Hendrix followed in 1896-1897.¹⁸ Center College of Kentucky, West Virginia University, and the Woman's College of Maryland crossed the line in 1897-1898.¹⁹ The University of Alabama and the Theological Seminary of Virginia entered the

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 270-271.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 271-272.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 277-278.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 278-279.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 269-270.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 270.

ranks in 1898-1899. Oxford, Roanoke, Vanderbilt, and Wofford followed in 1899-1900.²⁰ Florida State, Franklin and Marshall, and John B. Stetson unfurled the banner in 1900-1901.²¹

Sociology came later, on the whole, to the southern than to the northern college and university curricula. I have here records of only seventeen southern institutions offering courses by 1900 and no record of a separate department. Texas Christian University, then located in the same city as Baylor University (Waco), introduced a course in General Sociology in 1901, with W. L. Ross as teacher. Tulane University reestablished the subject after a lapse and Leland University (colored) and Ouachita College established it for the first time in this year. Millsaps College introduced a course in 1902, Louisiana State University and Wake Forest College followed in 1903. In 1904 George A. Bucklin taught two courses at the University of Oklahoma, one being "Elements of Sociology" and the other "Practical Social Problems." In this year a course was also introduced at the University of Chattanooga. In 1905 three southern state universities added sociology to their curricula. One of these was the University of South Carolina. Sociology, under another name, was probably first introduced at the University of Texas in 1905, when Dr. Lindley M. Keasbey became chairman of the School of Institutional History. Sociology has been taught at the University of Florida since the founding of that institution in 1905. In that year Dr. David Y. Thomas went to Florida from Hendrix College, where he had formerly taught the subject. In 1906 a separate department was established at the University of Oklahoma under the direction of Professor Dowd, who had been at Wisconsin. In this latter year a course on "Educational Sociology" was established at the University of Virginia, and was the first course in that institution to bear the name sociology, although the subject had been taught for several years. In the year 1908 sociology was added to the curriculum at the University of Mississippi and a separate department was established in 1927 under the chairmanship of N. B. Bond. Sociology was also introduced at the Mississippi A. and M. College in this year by Professor D. C. Hull, and at Carson and Newman College. Maryville College, and the State University of Kentucky. The University of Georgia followed in 1909.²²

Let us now skip a period of nearly twenty years and take a cross section view of the field in the year 1916-1917. We find an enormous growth of the subject in this period of sixteen years. There is now a total of 289 courses in 121 southern colleges and universities. It is interesting to see what these courses are like. Let me quote from a study I made of this subject now exactly twenty years ago.

The 289 courses in sociology listed by the 121 institutions offering the subject classify, with some slight variations of title, as follows: Sociology, 66; Principles of Sociology, 18; Elements of Sociology, 11; Introduction to Sociology, 5; Introduction to the Study of Sociology, 4; Advanced Sociology, 3; Sociology and Modern Social Problems, 3; Sociology and Social Welfare, 1; Outlines of Sociology, 2; Social Theories, 2; Social Problems, 12; Practical Sociology, 7; Applied Sociology, 6; Educational Sociology, 5; Rural Sociology, 23; Urban Sociology, 8; Criminology, 3; Social Pathology, 5; Social Amelioration, 4; Modern Charities, 4; Preventive Philanthropy, 2; Charities and Correction, 2; Socialism, 4; Race Problems, 3; Negro Life and Problems, 3; Christian Sociology, 3; Social Program of the Churches, 2; Family, 3; Problems of Child Welfare, 2; Social Statistics, 3; Social Investigation, 3; Social Psychology, 10; Social Evolution, 2; Anthropology, 6; Seminary, 4. One each of the following is classified: The Country Church, The Country School, Democracy, Descriptive Sociology, Elements of Institutional History, Ethnology, Growth of American Life and Character, History of Movements for Social Reform, History of Social Thought, The Juvenile Delinquent, Juvenile Sociology, Laboratory Course in Rural Sociology, Modern Social Conditions, Modern Social Prophets, Neighborhood Life in an Industrial Center, Penal and Charity Problems of South Carolina, Philosophy of Civilization, Playground and Recreation, Problems of Population, Problems of Industry, Progress and Reform, Science of Civilization, Social Philosophy, Social and Economic Surveys, Social Message of Jesus, Social Work, Social Maladjustment, Social Control, Social Organization, Social Welfare Activities, Social Relations of Women, Sociological Laboratory, Theories of Social Progress.²³

At the time of this study I made a comparison of sixteen institutions for which

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 282-283.

²³ L. L. Bernard, "The Teaching of Sociology in Southern Colleges and Universities", *Amer. Jour. Soc.*, xxiii: 507 (Jan., 1918).

there were sufficient data available and I found that, in these sixteen comparable institutions, 3,620 students were enrolled in courses in history, 1669 in economics, 977 in political science, and 929 in sociology. Thus sociology had almost as many academic devotees as political science, approximately three-fifths as many as economics, and a little more than one-fourth as many as history.²⁴

Within the last twenty years the progress of sociology in the South has been so rapid and so marked that it cannot even be summarized adequately here. There is now no higher educational institution where it does not have a place. At Virginia, Duke, North Carolina, Fisk, Vanderbilt, Louisiana State, Southern Methodist, and Texas there are departments of distinction, and in at least one of these institutions a department of the first rank for the country as a whole. At Virginia, North Carolina, Fisk, and perhaps at Louisiana State University, there are in

operation research programs of a high order of merit and achievement. At North Carolina regional and cultural trends are being emphasized, at Virginia community and social problem trends, at Fisk racial problems, at Texas the ecological emphasis obtains, and everywhere—and especially in the state colleges—research in rural problems goes on apace. Rural investigation dominates in the South, because generous governmental funds are available for this purpose. If the South could only awaken to its magnificent opportunity to place human science on a par with mechanical and agricultural science, there would soon be money available to finance such a program of sociological investigation as would announce to the world the arrival of a new era in the history of mankind, in which men had at last resolved to study and understand, and master their own problems as adequately as they had previously mastered those of physics, and crops and domesticated beasts.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 513.

ENVIRONMENT AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD

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THE relation between environment, on the one hand, and economic, social, and political development on the other is a subject which has for long vexed historians, geographers and sociologists. The problem is, however, a vital one in the interpretation of history. In order to understand properly the economic, social, and political history of any group of people, it is just as essential to consider the environment in which that group has lived, as the political, social or religious influences to which it has been

subjected from outside. By some writers the environment has been regarded as the determining cause of all history, as by others, race; but to place the emphasis upon one factor to the almost complete exclusion of others leads to a distorted picture. The environment which any group inhabits should be regarded as offering to it certain resources or ways of life from which it is free to choose. There may, indeed, be limits to those resources, but they are never absolute but relative to the culture or state of technical knowledge

which the group possesses. A new invention or discovery alters the value of some resource or brings to light one hitherto unknown, and thus the meaning of the environment is transformed for that group. Again, if a group of men migrate to some new environment, it may appear to them in quite a different light to that in which the former inhabitants viewed it. It is particularly in this latter aspect that the history of America, not only in the colonial period but also in later times, is interesting, because we can trace out the results of the transplanting of various groups of European peoples, English, Scotch, Scotch-Irish, Dutch, Germans, etc., each possessing its own cultural characteristics and we can watch the interaction that took place between the new environment and the older cultures which each group brought with it, and also between the various groups. We are fortunate, too, in that we have ample records of the story, such as are lacking for the earlier periods of European history.

The environment offered to the newcomers a variety of possibilities or resources, but what use was made of them depended upon the cultural characteristics of the different groups. Thus, the Scotch-Irish and Germans, finding themselves in the same environment, did not necessarily make the same use of the possibilities or react in the same way to the new conditions. Moreover, their development depended upon outside factors, as, for instance, the colonial system of Great Britain. As neither the environment was entirely homogeneous throughout the colonies nor were the cultures entirely alike, it was inevitable that distinctions should arise among the settlers, giving rise to more or less well marked sections or regions which were the product, not purely of the environment nor of a particular culture, but of the interaction be-

tween the two. Such a view-point is by no means new in American history and no student of the subject can fail to acknowledge his debt to Frederick Jackson Turner. But Turner would have been the last man to claim that he had exhausted this field of study, and, in view of the increasing interest now being taken in the idea of regionalism, it seems pertinent to enquire further into the problem of the relationship between environment and social development and into the earliest groups that appear in American history. It is the purpose of this paper, therefore, to set out some of the problems which arise and to suggest some means by which they may be solved.

At the outset, it is necessary to be clear as to the real nature of the environment into which the European immigrants came. We cannot regard it as a purely natural environment, meaning by "natural" the relief, the rivers, the soils, the climate, the fauna and the flora of the country. It is useless to project the study of the settlement of the country by the white man upon a set of theoretical "natural" regions, because for centuries the Indians had been slowly transforming the purely "natural" environment. The environment already had certain human elements which were to play an important part in the future development of the country. Maize, a product of Indian agriculture, supported the earliest colonists who learned from the Indians the method of its cultivation and made it one of their own staple crops in addition to those which they brought from Europe. Indian trails, as well as mountains, passes, and rivers, guided explorers, traders, and settlers. Nor was the Indian merely a passive part of the environment; as a friend, he aided the settlers in utilising the resources of the country, as for instance in the development of the fur trade which, in its turn,

had such an influence upon the growth of the colonies; as an enemy, he thwarted the development of the colonies on what might be termed natural lines and exerted an important psychological influence on the people themselves. The environment, therefore, into which the European settlers came was a human as well as a natural one, and it is important to take into account the former as well as the latter part.

Almost from the beginning, it was evident that the colonies were developing in certain groups, each with its own characteristics. In the middle of the eighteenth century, a proposal was made that the colonies be divided into three Unions, North, Middle and South, on the grounds that they were three distinct and different countries, separated from one another by natural boundaries, different in situation, climate, soil, products, etc., "while the several colonies included in these divisions which we look upon as separate are all one and the same country in these respects." F. J. Turner commented upon this suggestion, "This early recognition of these separate divisions while the settlements were still limited to the seaboard is significant of the fact that physical conditions and component stock have almost from the beginning produced three coastal sections, New England, the Middle Region, and the South."¹ It is interesting to observe that Turner recognised that these divisions are the products of "physical conditions and component stock."

We can now consider some of the manifold interactions that occurred between the different groups of settlers in America and the new environment in which they found themselves. We can use these three larger divisions for this purpose but we must remember that in any one of them we may

find it necessary to recognise smaller divisions, particularly where, as in New York and Pennsylvania, there were different groups of people settling in the same environment. It may, of course, be impossible to distinguish clearly the existence of well defined smaller regions, since the settlers may have mingled. In such cases, however, there is a fruitful field of study for observing how the different peoples reacted to the same environment and what was the interaction between the different groups, as for instance in Eastern Pennsylvania.

We can first examine the problems that arise in the case of New England. During the colonial period, settlement was largely confined to the southern portion of New England; i.e. the states of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and the coastal and southern part of New Hampshire. In Maine there were settlements only along the coast and, towards the close of the period, in what is now Vermont, the pioneers were beginning to make their way. The southern part of New England is, in general, a hilly rather than a mountainous region. Save for the Connecticut Valley there are no extensive stretches of comparatively level land, the soil is for the most part stony and infertile, while the whole land except for occasional Indian clearings was at the time of the first settlement a vast forest full of wild animals, many of them valuable for their fur. It is not possible to enter into a full consideration of the influence of climate but by way of illustration the following points may be noticed. From an agricultural point of view, the existence of a snow cover for a considerable period of each year made it necessary to keep cattle in barns and to provide fodder for them. The same snow cover probably increased the degree of isolation of the scattered farms, which must have had many important consequences for

¹ F. J. Turner, "Is Sectionalism in America Dying away?" *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 13, pp. 663-4.

the people. To this physical environment must be added the Indian who, for good or evil, has been so great an influence in American history.

Into this wild region came the settlers of New England. On the whole it was not an inviting land, particularly when compared with the more fertile and warmer lands further south. It is not unworthy of remark that after the first great rush of immigration, which lasted to about 1650, the population of New England grew by natural increase rather than by additions from outside. Whether this lack of immigration in the latter half of the seventeenth century was due to the unattractive nature of the land or, as it must have seemed to many, to the unattractive nature of the people, is a question which cannot be answered here, interesting though it may be. Readers of Bradford's *History of Plymouth Plantation* will remember that the shores of New England were not the choice of the Pilgrim Fathers. A number of them favoured a settlement in the West Indies, drawing a glowing picture of that region, but the majority preferred some spot near the Hudson and it was thither they first directed their course. Misfortune at sea and, possibly, treachery on the part of the Captain of the *Mayflower* brought them ashore near the site of the future Plymouth, where they laid the foundations of the first truly successful settlement in New England.

The thesis of this paper is that it is necessary to study the interaction between the environment and the settlers. What, then, was the character of the settlers of New England—not only of the Pilgrim Fathers but also of that body of men and women rather loosely described as "Puritans"—who settled around Massachusetts Bay, in Rhode Island, and in Connecticut? Were they men and women willing to work and work hard in this new world?

Were they all of intense religious convictions, devoted to "Puritanism"? How many had little but the labour of their hands? With what motives did they come to this new land? What were their occupations before they left home? Were they merchants, artisans, yeomen, labourers? These are questions that must be answered before the central one can be tackled. Some years ago one might have given a fairly confident answer to some of them, but the iconoclasts have been among us and there is less certainty about what might be called the orthodox view. One question has, it seems, never been properly tackled. It is this. What were the occupations of the settlers in the home land? Were they merchants, artisans, yeomen, labourers? This is a question that applies to all the colonies. How many "jail-birds" and men of poor character entered Virginia and the southern colonies? These are essential questions if we are to understand aright how these people adapted themselves to their new environment.

Other questions also press themselves upon our attention. The economic and social life of the settlers was closely related to the natural resources of the country. The great majority of the people in New England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were farmers, as were the colonists everywhere. Industrial development was retarded, if not prohibited, by the colonial system of England. Otherwise industry might have played a greater part than it actually did. Granted then that farming was the leading occupation, it is necessary to consider what facilities the country offered, what ability the people had for this pursuit, and what agricultural methods they brought with them. New England is not a land of wide expanses of fertile soil, nor is the climate suitable for the production of the great staple crops of tobacco, rice, and indigo

which prevailed further south. Amid the stony hillsides of New England the patches of good land were few and far between. The plantation system that developed farther south was here almost impossible. John Winthrop, first Governor of Massachusetts, endeavoured to start a plantation in the sense that he cultivated a large estate by means of a numerous body of workers but the experiment was a solitary one. The plantation system does indeed involve a considerable outlay of capital but capital was not wanting in New England. It found another outlet. Nor was labour necessarily more difficult to obtain in Massachusetts than in Virginia. Indentured white servants appear very early and the New Englanders in the eighteenth century were not opposed to the use of Negro slaves, as their participation in the slave trade shows. One is compelled to admit, therefore, that natural circumstances were unfavourable to the growth of a plantation system of agriculture. New England became a land of small farms whose owners engaged in a system of diversified farming, satisfying their own wants and having only a small surplus, if any, of agricultural products for sale.

In order to find some products for sale whereby these New England farmers might purchase such necessities and luxuries as they themselves could not produce, they turned to other resources and other occupations. Some of them exploited the forests that surrounded them, selling timber for ships and staves for casks to be used in the growing West Indian trade. Others became blacksmiths, wheel-wrights and such like. But this diversion of interest rendered them less capable as farmers. Agriculture demands close attention at certain times. Ploughing, sowing, hoeing, and reaping must be carried out when conditions are most favourable, if success is to be attained. But the side lines in which

the New England farmer engaged often withdrew his attention from his farming. It is a striking fact that the Yankee in the Middle West took less care of his land than did the German and there is considerable reason to suppose that he is the victim of an inherited carelessness which grew up in early colonial times. Dr. Schafer, Secretary of the Wisconsin Historical Society, has elaborated this point in his recent work "The Social History of American Agriculture."

We may also enquire into the way in which the natural conditions of the country directed the settlement of these farmers. In general, men in a new country seek what appears to them the best land for their purposes. "What appears to them the best land." This is important. Two different groups of settlers with different backgrounds will choose different kinds of land and this was particularly true of the Germans and Scotch-Irish in Pennsylvania. Moreover, their ability to choose is limited by the knowledge of the times, with the result that, as we see now with our greater knowledge, they often choose wrongly. It is strange that early settlers in the Middle West and in the Prairies of Canada avoided those very soils we now regard as the most fertile of all, simply because they did not believe a grass-land soil could be fertile. It is, therefore, an incorrect method to take a modern soil survey and attempt correlation of settlements with it. We must rather seek for statements made by the settlers themselves regarding the reasons for their choice. A recent writer, A. B. Hulbert, has suggested that the meadows of New England were often guiding points in settlement.² By meadows he meant the natural water meadows lacking or only sparsely covered in trees. Such sites were attractive for

² A. B. Hulbert, *Soil. Its influence on the History of the U. S.* Chap. 8.

two reasons. They provided ready fodder for the cattle which almost all the settlers possessed and the absence or paucity of trees obviated the weary and difficult task of clearing the land prior to ploughing. New England records do frequently contain references to such meadows as suitable sites.

One of the great characteristics of New England political development was the system of town government which the Yankees carried with them wherever they settled. The origins of this system have vexed American historians for a long time past and the question does not seem to be settled yet. Some geographers, seeking a geographical basis for all social phenomena, have set forward a theory which briefly is this. The absence of wide stretches of fertile land, as are supposed to exist in Virginia, compelled the settlers to live close together on such patches of good land as could be found. Living thus in close proximity, after the pattern of a nucleated English village, they naturally developed the system of town government. Very pretty! but what real historical or, indeed, geographical evidence can be adduced for it?

Historically, as Freeman first pointed out, there is a remarkable analogy between the old Teutonic "tun" and the New England town. Channing,³ without going so far as Freeman, showed that the New England town is directly traceable to certain institutions in the English parish. Certainly the resemblances between the early New England town and the mediaeval English parish are remarkable, both in social and agricultural arrangements. One might argue that similar conditions gave rise to similar institutions, but men

going to a new country do not leave behind all their old ideas. Actually they cling to them tenaciously and endeavour to make them work in conditions for which they are not truly suited. The typical New England town, as the unit of social, political, and religious life, is traceable to a variety of causes. It was, as Channing showed, an evolution of the English parish in the political sense, while the church organisation of the Puritans tended towards the growth of distinct groups of people and, moreover, the Indian danger may have aided the formation of close settlements as is evidenced by ordinances of Massachusetts in 1695 and 1700, recognising certain settlements as frontier towns. There are, then, ample historical reasons for the growth of the New England town and it seems almost unnecessary to invoke geographical circumstance. Indeed geographical circumstance, if it had any influence at all, may have operated in the reverse direction to what has been suggested. What in fact was a New England town?

The recently published Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States seems to be in error in printing on the same map the towns of New England and the towns of the Middle and Southern Colonies. In reality the town of the latter regions was one in our modern sense, a centre of a comparatively large population, while that of New England was more like the Anglo-Saxon "tun" or mediaeval "vill"—in modern terms, a village. Even the latter comparison is not strictly correct, since an English village calls up a picture of a more or less nucleated settlement or at least a parish with a definite centre of population. Now the New England town is primarily a legal or, perhaps better, a religio-legal corporation and does not necessarily involve close packed settlement. From another point of view, it is

³ E. Channing, *Town and County Government in the English Colonies of North America*. Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science. Vol. 2.

an area some square miles in extent. It does not connote a definite centre of population. There are, in New England, towns or rather townships (the latter is the better word) in existence to-day within twenty miles of Boston in which one may seek in vain for any obvious centre. The method of township government and of church organisation did not involve people living on each other's doorsteps. Many of the New England townships were in fact close settlements yet within twenty or thirty years of the founding of Boston one reads of people going many miles from their homes to church. At first, in a new land, faced by the Indians, the settlers naturally tended to keep together, but, as they grew more familiar with their environment, as the Indian peril grew less (at least for quite lengthy periods) and the influence of the church decreased, families began to settle where they chose, often in quite isolated spots. The meadows or more fertile patches could not in many cases have supported more than two or three families. New England became a land of scattered farms not of nucleated villages. This subject has been much discussed and it is one which shows how careful one must be in estimating the influence of any geographical factor.

It was suggested earlier in this paper that capital did not find a profitable outlet in agriculture in New England. It turned rather to the exploitation of a different kind of natural resource, viz., the sea. Here there were ample opportunities—numerous well protected harbours, fisheries, ample timber for ship-building. An energetic people made full use of these opportunities and built up a considerable sea-going commerce, extending their relations wider and wider.

As the eighteenth century wore on, there developed in New England two somewhat different types of society; the

one prosperous and cultured, living near the sea; the other, living among the hills and on the frontier, more primitive, consisting chiefly of farmers who were largely self-sufficing. This distinction was noticed as early as 1694 by a writer of New England who did not altogether relish the growth of this latter type. Cotton Mather wrote,⁴ "Again do our old people, any of them, go out from the Institutions of God, swarming into new settlements, where they and their untaught families are like to perish from lack of vision? They that have done so, heretofore, have to their cost found that they were got unto the wrong side of the hedge, in their doing so. Think here should this be done any more." In 1707, he wrote, that the pioneers dwell in a place of "tawny serpents," are inhabitants of the "Valley of Achor," and are "the poor of this world." And again, "It is remarkable to see that when the unchurched villages have been so many of them broken up, in the War . . . those that have had churches regularly formed in them have generally been under a more sensible protection of Heaven." Admittedly, Cotton Mather was in many ways a bigot, but it is evident that the people on the "Wrong side of the hedge," i.e. on the frontier, were no longer quite like those in the older settlements along the coast. The task of earning a living in the more elementary conditions of the frontier produced a different type of men and women. Space will not permit a lengthy discussion of this subject but it is evident that a group of men and women cannot go into a wilderness and remain quite the same people. It is not that they are the creatures of their environment. There is not the simple action of the forces of environment upon them, there is the active struggle to overcome the

⁴ Quoted by F. J. Turner in *The Frontier in American History*, p. 64.

environment. It is, perhaps, this struggle which is the most important part of the problem. The men and women who faced the Indian foe at Deerfield in 1704 or planted their lonely cabins far up the Connecticut Valley or up the Merrimac River in New Hampshire were different from the men and women who left the shores of England in 1620 and 1630. The struggle for life had left its mark upon them.

The Middle Colonies are of equal interest but of a different kind. Not only are the geographic surroundings altered but also the people who settled there were of different nationalities and brought with them varying cultures and habits of life. English, Dutch, Swedes, and Germans mingled on the shores of the Hudson River and Delaware Bay. Anglicans, Lutherans, Calvinists, Roman Catholics, Quakers lived more or less cheek by jowl. Such an area provides a great opportunity for studying the reactions of different groups to the same or similar environment.

The State of New York is one in which geographical advantages were neutralised by political and social circumstances. The valley of the Hudson and its tributary the Mohawk provide, as everybody knows, the finest line of communication between the Atlantic coast and the interior of the Continent south of the St. Lawrence. Moreover the soils that border those rivers are of undoubted fertility. Yet the earliest routes to the Middle West ran across the difficult country of the Appalachian mountains and plateaux and, during the colonial period, this fertile valley was but sparsely settled. If, on the one hand, the great confederacy of the Iroquois and the desire of the British government to maintain it as a buffer state between the English and French settlements, together with the jealous attitude of the fur traders of Albany, who feared any interlopers in their trade, so also did the land system of New

York, a heritage from the Dutch, render the colony less attractive to immigrants. The system of patroonships or large estates established by the Dutch was carried on and extended by the English. The great Livingstone manor, covering thousands of acres, is an example of this. The landowners appear, in most cases, to have been unwilling to sell but preferred to let their land. For this reason, among others, the great waves of German and Scotch-Irish immigration left New York practically untouched because in the other and more southerly colonies land could be obtained on payment of a small quit-rent, or purchased outright.

Pennsylvania, on the other hand, was a colony in which the geographical advantages were quickly seized upon by the settlers. Land was easy to obtain, there was little or no religious intolerance and parts of Eastern Pennsylvania contain what are perhaps the most fertile soils of eastern North America. During the middle of the eighteenth century large numbers of immigrants passed through Philadelphia and the neighbouring port of Baltimore, among them being many Germans and Scotch-Irish. By no means all these immigrants remained in Pennsylvania, for many went southward into Virginia and the Carolinas. The Germans were particularly numerous in Pennsylvania and overwhelmingly preponderant in certain districts. Turner pointed out long ago that the Germans appeared to settle on the limestone soils while the English and Scotch-Irish generally avoided them. His statement is well known but it has so important a relation to the problem under consideration that it is worth repeating at some length.

It is an interesting experiment to examine the geological maps of the counties in Pennsylvania where there were both German and Irish settlers, such as Berks. or Lancs. counties. The Germans are most

numerous where the limestone appears, while the Irish settled on the slate formations. The phenomenon is repeated so often that it might create the impression that the early settlers had some knowledge of Geology. It is more reasonable to suppose, however, that they studied the surface of the land in regard to its vegetation, the Irish taking the land well-watered near the big rivers and the Germans, with a better eye for good land, choosing that on which there grew the best trees, such as oaks, a sure sign of good land. Another guiding principle in their choice was the selection of land the natural features of which closely resembled those of the country which they had left. The Scotch-Irish would select well-watered meadows, such as they had been brought up on in Ulster. . . , the Germans would prefer an undulating country of forest growth, like that of the Rhenish Palatinate. Remarkable instances have occurred of families who have migrated farther and farther westward, generation after generation, in the choice of a farm or homestead almost identical with the one owned by them in their original locality. As for the Germans of the 18th century it happened that the best land they found that also was most similar to the Palatinate was included in the limestone areas.⁵

Whether or not Turner's presentation of the facts be entirely correct, the passage just quoted brings out clearly the necessity for studying the whole background of the various peoples who settled in the colonies and it shows as well that two groups of peoples with different backgrounds reacted differently to the new environment. Yet the differences go further than this. The methods of agriculture which the Germans brought with them, the type of agriculture which they established, were probably somewhat different from that established by other groups. The way in which they treated the land may, indeed, have had important effects at the present time. In South Carolina there are two areas of almost identical soil side by side, one settled by people of German origin, the other not. But while the surface of the latter (Fairfield county) is terribly

eroded that of the former (a region known as the Dutch Fork) is still in reasonably good condition. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the people who have farmed the Dutch Fork region have taken more care of the land than those who have farmed Fairfield County. In the nineteenth century, it seems that the Germans who entered Wisconsin had a different attitude to the land from that of the Yankees from New England.

The settlement of the southern colonies proceeded on different lines. Whatever may have been the true state of affairs in New England, it is incontestable that in Virginia settlement consisted of scattered farms. The existence of long navigable rivers tended to draw the settlers farther and farther inland and there was an almost complete absence of group settlement such as existed in New England in the early days. The early settlers of Virginia did not come as organised groups but as individuals and the influence of religion in binding them together was far less strong. Yet, as more modern research has shown, there was far less difference between them and their brethren of New England than was once supposed. Edward Channing wrote,

Historical writers have been altogether too prone to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between the settlers of these southern colonies and those who founded colonies north of the 40th parallel. For instance it is sometimes said that the Northern Colonists came to the New World for conscience sake and the southern planters sought wealth alone, but no such generalization can truthfully be made. Moreover, it is often the custom to point out some mysterious difference between the Virginian and the New Englander which can be expressed by the terms "Cavalier" and "Puritan", the latter term when thus used signifying a social condition below that of a Cavalier. No such characterisation is possible.⁶

As in the case of New England and the Middle Colonies we need to know a great

⁵ F. J. Turner, *Chicago Record-Herald*, Aug. 28th 1901, quoted by Faust, *German Element in the U. S.* Vol. 1, p. 265.

⁶ E. Channing, *History of the United States*, Vol. 1, p. 145, n. 3.

deal more about these settlers and their background before we can rightly interpret their relation to the environment.

The agricultural possibilities of the southern colonies varied from those of New England and the Middle Colonies. In Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas the climate permitted the growth of staple crops such as tobacco, rice, and indigo, which were valuable as a means of exchange with the mother country. As soon as the possibilities of the cultivation of tobacco were realised in Virginia, men rushed to partake in it. Tobacco, it has been said with a great degree of truth, is the key to the early history of Virginia. The reason for the importance of tobacco is economic rather than geographical. It is true that the climate and, to some extent the soils, favoured the growth of tobacco, but the compelling force was the need of having some staple crop to exchange for the goods needed from the mother country. Geographically, there was nothing to prevent the cultivation of a variety of crops. The devotion to tobacco and the neglect of other forms of agriculture had serious consequences in the later history of the Colony and the State. The soils of Virginia and of almost all the southern colonies were not so fertile as the early settlers supposed and the devotion to a single crop without proper rotation or manuring led to the speedy depletion of such fertility as the soil possessed, while the removal of the forest cover laid bare the surface to the heavy rains which rapidly washed away the soil. Yet in early days the rapid impoverishment of the soil worried few; was there not more land further west? Though one field might not grow tobacco for more than three or four years, another field might be cleared, or more land obtained when the first holding was exhausted. A few far-seeing men, like Washington, saw the foolishness of this waste of land and

advocated and practised other forms of agriculture which would preserve the soil. Their warnings, however, fell on deaf ears.

As the recent researches of T. J. Wertenbaker have shown the farms of seventeenth century Virginia were not of any great size.⁷ Indeed, the average was less than 500 acres in 1706, and most of them were cultivated by farmers and their families without any outside help, whether white or Negro. Wertenbaker speaks of these farmers as yeomen. The cultivation of tobacco did not in itself involve a large plantation, which was rather the result of the growth of capital and its use in the purchase of Negro slaves. Thus the man of substance gradually drove out the yeoman who seems to have passed westwards to the Piedmont and perhaps to the Great Valley of Virginia. Here he mingled with another stream of immigrants coming from Pennsylvania and the combined forces of these groups set up another form of agriculture and evolved a different social life.

The mention of Negro slavery leads to a short consideration of the climate of the South. It has been held that the climate more or less precluded the use of white labour and that as a consequence the Negro was introduced; yet such a view is open to grave criticism on several grounds. The number of Negroes in Virginia in the seventeenth century was very few. They were introduced by the more wealthy planters, not because whites were unable to work, but because Negro slaves were far cheaper in the long run than indentured servants. In the eighteenth century thousands of white farmers tilled the Piedmont by the labour of their own hands, in territory whence they were to be later driven by the advance of the plantation system. Even to-day, 60 per cent of the tenant farmers in the Cotton

⁷ T. J. Wertenbaker, *The Planters of Colonial Virginia*.

Belt are white. In the face of this it is difficult to say that the climate was responsible for the introduction of the Negro. Historically there is little evidence to support the idea. It may be objected that though whites continued to work in the South they became debilitated by the climate. But the debilitation of the white in the South seems to be as much a result of disease and insufficient or improper diet as of any direct influence of climate. Disease is, of course, connected with climate but it is remediable. It did, indeed, play havoc among the early settlers on the coast but there is less evidence that it affected those farther inland. In reality we know very little about the direct effect of climate and it is unwise to dogmatise upon it.

Some of the yeomen of Virginia, unable to compete with the planters of capital, moved westward and mingled with the stream coming from the north. A large number of the immigrants who entered Pennsylvania were unable to obtain land or to obtain it sufficiently cheaply. By 1730 Germans and Scotch-Irish were entering the Shenandoah Valley, attracted thither no doubt by the fertility of the land. By 1745 or 1750 they were passing back again over the Blue Ridge into the Piedmont of North Carolina. In Virginia they probably mingled with the men from Tidewater to some extent. In North Carolina it is not clear how many settlers from the coastal region entered the Piedmont, though it seems that in South Carolina a fair number of immigrants from Charleston met the northern stream. It has been suggested that the existence of the so-called Fall Line, where the navigation of the Tidewater ceases, held up penetration from the east but this is a theory which needs to be received with caution. In Virginia quite a number of settlers reached the Piedmont from the coast, and in the Carolinas the existence of a belt of

sand-hills, roughly coincident with the Fall Line, may have slowed up penetration and, by interposing a very thinly settled area, cut off the inland settlements from the older ones on Tidewater.

In North Carolina, at least, there is evidence that many of the settlers on the Piedmont entered it from the north, not because that was the easiest way but because it was far easier to take ship from the Old World to ports in the Middle Colonies than to the ports of North Carolina. Governor Dobbs argued that the effect of the colonial system was to deprive North Carolina of a fair share of the shipping between England and the Colonies and that, as a result, there were many immigrants who, although they intended to settle in that Colony, were compelled to come by way of Pennsylvania. "The trade from Ireland," he wrote, "being also limited to linnens and provisions, which we don't want, and to servants and Irish Protestants who choose to come to reside in this climate, the ships for want of returns carry them all generally to Pennsylvania from whence at a great expense they come by land in waggons to this Province, but their wealth being expended they are incapable of improving the lands they take up which is a great loss to this colony."⁸ Facts such as these should make us chary of attributing too much to apparent natural difficulties without full investigation of all the historical facts. The Piedmont seems to have been settled from the north because the pressure was greater from that direction rather than because it was less accessible from the East.

But, whatever the reasons, there grew up a section on the Piedmont different from that of the Tidewater. The population of which it was composed was dif-

⁸ Colonial Records of North Carolina, Vol. 5, p. 318.

ferent. In some respects the Piedmont differed geographically from the Coastal Plain, particularly in its relief and to some extent in its soils and climate. But, in endeavouring to trace the growth of the economic and social conditions, one must beware of attributing too much to these differences. On the Piedmont there grew up a frontier society, based on subsistence agriculture and owning few slaves. Life was more primitive in these backwoods, and luxuries were few and far between. Contact with Tidewater was slight and consisted in an annual drive of cattle, perhaps, or a journey to purchase salt and other necessities unobtainable in the wilderness. In this connection the Fall Line did have a not inconsiderable effect since it precluded the use of the rivers as a means of communication, which had therefore to be carried on by the bad roads of the time. Such a society fed by a fierce and strong Presbyterianism became more democratic and independent. Yet, we may ask, were there no differences within this society due to the different groups of people that composed it? Allusion has already been made to the differences observable to-day in the "Dutch Fork" and Fairfield counties in South Carolina. So, too, the records of the Moravians in North Carolina make clear that the settlement around Winston-

Salem was not quite like those in other parts of the Piedmont and that they supplied to the growing society elements that otherwise would have been lacking.

Tidewater, on the other hand, in the eighteenth century in all the Southern Colonies, especially Virginia and South Carolina, was turning to a system of large estates devoted to the raising of staple crops. Here there was a more cultured society with an ever growing dependence on slavery more in touch with Europe, more wealthy and more aristocratic. Conflict arose between this society and the more primitive society of the Piedmont, as the rise of the Regulators in South Carolina and the War of the Regulators in North Carolina show.

In some such ways as these there arose new groups among the colonists as a result of the interaction which took place between them and their environment. Such groups have not necessarily remained a permanent feature of the country since, as fresh settlers have appeared or as different resources have been utilised, giving to the environment a fresh value, new groupings have appeared. Yet each of these groups was a real and potent force in its own time, giving to the nation as a whole its contribution as part of the body corporate.

CUSTOM, GOSSIP, LEGISLATION

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LEGISLATION serves in a democracy to prescribe the tasks of public officials and to define the boundaries of actions open to citizens. It is by no means the only form, but it is the focal form, of social control. "There must be," observes Malinowski, "in all societies a class of rules too practical to be backed up by religious sanctions, too burdensome to be left to mere goodwill, too personally vital to individuals to be enforced by any abstract agency. This is the domain of legal rules." This domain of legislation, though ever on the grow, can cover but a margin of the possibility of action, and the part which it can cover is marked for its coverage by antecedent custom and prevailing gossip. That which is not sufficiently in the air to become the subject of gossip does not as a matter of psychological fact become an object of legislation. That which does not run sufficiently to the ground to have the support of some customary sector is not important enough often to suggest and never to support legislation. The degree of gossip there is measures the appositeness of legislation; and the depth of the customary measures the effectiveness of it. Legislation, which is here our major theme, may best be conceived, then, as the way in which gossip transforms the suggested into the customary.

This is a homely view of the legislative process. Whether it is a realistic view we can best judge after considering the whole matter in the light of our threefold division of the entire process of control. In this consideration, we shall ignore such pretentious notions as that statute law is formal articulation of natural rights, or is

particularized *ius naturale*, or is pure reason made practical, or that the divine will moves mysteriously, even if surreptitiously, through the legislative mind. If any or all of these notions be meritorious, their merit will in no way be depreciated by the positive and modest approach we here set ourselves. In beginning we do not even need to go beyond Mr. Justice Holmes' conviction that legislation is "a means by which a body, having the power, puts burdens which are disagreeable to them on the shoulders of somebody else."

CUSTOM

Custom we shall treat not historically but analytically. In general the customary is merely the presupposed.

What is *unquestioned* is indeed *unquestioned*. What is first questioned remains half questioned. What is fully questioned is from that fact a candidate for the discard. For to question is "to call in question," and to call in question is to impeach validity. Since a basic element in things social is the attitudes of men, to question custom is to begin the process of dissolution and recomposition.

Now there is little if anything left wholly unquestioned in the modern world. Change, like some filterable virus, is abroad in every land. Nothing is completely safe from its infection. The cinema, not to mention the radio and the press, reaches even the remotest parts to do what Julius Caesar said the Roman traders did to the Gauls—to tell stories of how it is all done elsewhere and to insinuate the wonder as to why it cannot be done that way or some other way here. Custom as the idyllic notion of a large area of life,

historic or individual, caked or isolated against change is largely gone, if indeed it ever prevailed. Custom operates pluralistically today, and even piecemeal; but operate it still does—operate as a segment of the very process of social change.

The presuppositions of a group which are never raised when the group debates policies or issues, these mark the dynamic domain of custom in any province of social life. And whatever unspoken agreements there are in a group among all or the leading members constitute the customs thereof. The Constitution is, for instance, our legalistic custom; but at times like these the only genuinely national custom indicated by the Constitution is the amending clause. Whether there are any attitudes sufficiently common to all nations today to rate as international "custom," is not entirely clear. The nineteenth century thought the world on the way to a good many things "that simply were not done," but the twentieth century wonders and waits to see what they are. The institution of private property once almost rated as something sacrosanct. But that was before Russia came to revolutionary life. Inviolability of the person, save for previously prescribed penal offence, once was generally customary; but that was before the castor oil complex struck Italy or the anti-Semitic phobia hit Germany. It is a large subject, this universally customary, so large that we may well confine ourselves to the American climate of opinion.

We have convenient linguistic signs always pointing toward the customary element in life. One who is sensitized to social presuppositions will watch with interest the use of terms like "of course," "indeed," "assuredly," "for a fact," "granted," etc. No words draw deeper water than these. They connote the inarticulate but all-covering and low-lying

realm of the consciously presupposed. Such terms always touch the fringe of the customary. "Of course," a man would not marry his mother. All men are "indeed" entitled to justice. Public contracts must "assuredly" be kept. "Granted that the Negro is a citizen," but. . . . Here begins the marginal equivocations which mark the collision of one custom with another. Men can "for a fact" do with their property as they will, maybe—if strikers do not "sit down" with the property in hand. We now enter the realm of the only half-supposed, and custom is on the way to dissolution and re-crystallization. We acknowledge the right of freedom of speech, but free men must speak the truth. Here lip service is rendered a custom-on-the-make in order to subvert it with an older custom so long ago made as now to be almost unconscious in its appeal.

What is *pre-supposed* is not *now* really supposed at all; it operates without our being conscious of it. The deepest and most influential of the customary does not even get into language, save when we set ourselves to irritate or to puzzle one another by stopping to drum up problems. Only philosophers are guilty of such provocation without a smile; and only sophists will often be guilty with a smile. Socrates argued, with apparent seriousness, that it is better to suffer than to inflict injustice. Some of the beatitudes credited to Jesus are of the same sort, if one take them conscientiously rather than calculatively. Against the customary assumption that there is such a thing as truth, that this thing can be discovered, and that the discovery can be expressed in language, Gorgias, the ancient sophist, is reputed to have argued—with how broad a smile I know not—that there is no truth, not even the truth that there is no truth; that if there were truth, it could not be

discovered; and that if it were discovered, it could not be communicated. The story of Epimenides, the Cretan, illustrates the same motif; and I suppose that the paradoxes of Zeno were meant also to irritate somebody by calling in question the extra-customary. In general, the paradoxical is the quizzical confrontation of the trustful with the deeply customary. And the procedure can be the more puzzling the more earnest the trustful are.

Now the customary must be called in question before other forms of social control can arise. The surest things not to be done are the things that "simply are not done." Nor is it enough for a sophist or a philosopher to question the customary in order to precipitate legislation. The too inquisitive philosopher usually has the effect of only legislating himself out of court; and in general the skeptic who seeks to influence legislation does well to keep both his whimsies and his doubts to himself. Custom is effectively and constructively called in question ordinarily only by custom. When men begin to feel in some important way the impingement of one of their presuppositions upon another of their presuppositions, then gossip buzzes and legislation may eventually be expected.

When, for instance, the custom of trade, the presupposition that everything is irrelevant save a desire to purchase and the possession of the price, runs with us crucially afoul of the custom of color, the presupposition that the Negro must be "treated justly but kept in his place," an interesting subject of conversation is generated on both sides of the color line. When it reaches the zoned sections of a city, manifests itself in restaurant or theatre, or thrusts itself alongside more intimate personal relations, then it approaches a resolution in the legislature. The legislator without a sixth social sense,—

involving a deep customary layer in his own personality formation—is sorely handicapped in knowing when matters are ripe for legislation, how far to legislate, and what not to undertake. Such decisions are always matters of risk rather than of rule.

GOSSIP

Gossip covers the whole territory lying between what is taken for granted and the domain of law. Gossip is conventionally confined to the "juicy," but the term legitimately covers all talk where the talker is out-talking his information. Thus conceived, it includes a wide field, and holds all that is of the greatest interest to human beings. It marks the realm of growth—growth from the all but unconscious field of emotion to the all but dismissed realm of action. It is equivocal, being streaked with custom and frequently clairvoyant of legislation. It has eddies of group practice made into by-laws and codes of ethics; it has rapids of personal idiosyncracies; it has the juice of passion and the rancor of malevolence. But most of all it has ambiguity, equivocality, ambivalence. It is the fact that one never knows all that gossip means that makes it so interesting. In its domain every man is king for a whisper, but only until somebody out-whispers him. "Where there is so much smoke there's bound to be some fire." In gossip, there is the fire of custom underneath, cracked to let out smoke, and the fire of legislation ahead, gathering gossip like a funnel and shunting it this way and that.

This realm of gossip covers not only the most interesting of the three stages of social control, but also by far the widest. Most of daily life, for instance, is gossip-grounded. We do not undertake to document our remarks to our intimates; and if we rely implicitly upon what one another

says when running along in high conversational gear, we find ourselves very quickly in hot water. We talk in no small measure "to see what we are going to say;" and anybody who credits anybody else otherwise will be forever in a jam; who even credits himself otherwise is either a harmless ass or a deadly bore. Even husbands and wives must watch each others' gestures, listen sagaciously to voice nuances, guess as to the mood from which remarks come, so as to know whether to assent, to retreat into silence, unobtrusively to change the subject, or to reply tentatively with a guarded, "I wonder whether. . . ."

Nearly all that passes in "the practice of law" is of the order of gossip—all that is not custom, precedent, ceremonies of address and rules of procedure. This is understandable in the legal field, where the foundation is customary (common law), the training traditional, the superstructure statutory, and the remainder personal finesse. Law is a game of skill—subtle, complicated, fascinating. Its science is so nearly all art that we do well to conceive the practice of law as gossip of counsel under the guidance of the judge and at the expense of plaintiff or defendant. The less of science claimed for law, the greater the element of justice dispensed in its administration; for justice is not an impersonal, objective, scientific thing; it is rather the individualization of the impersonal. Did we not manage somehow through this rigmarole of gossip to render less austere than the written statutes the so-called principles of law, we should have to follow the radical example of the Soviets and constitute common men as judges, without legal training at all. The more the law seeks formal objectivity, the less justice is strained out.

It is somewhat more surprising, in surveying life for the element of gossip, to

find how large a rôle is played in the practice of medicine by this same loose-jointed thing called gossip. A successful practitioner of medicine has to be a naïve person (usually he is this) or he has to have a large dash of quackery about him. A scientist in this field knows medicine; a quack knows men. A doctor is a combination of the quack and the scientist, the more successful perhaps the more unconscious (customary) his quackery. Few patients indeed want the doctor to go light on the quackery element. The simple truth seems to be that men want sympathy much more than they want health, and the doctor who understands that man's worst malady consists in not being understood is prepared, however little or much he knows about *materia medica*, to treat the worst sickness allopathically or homeopathically as the occasion may demand. Even his purest science must be strategically applied. It is easy to purge or cut, if I may modify Aristotle's famous remark; but to know when, where, why, how much, and to whom to do either—that is a job for a man much wiser than the science of medicine will ever understand, authorize, or reward.

I hardly need stop to generalize this delineation to the practice of religion; for the rôle claimed by religion for faith makes clear that here we are dealing, not with knowledge but gossip. Religion has been called by a great contemporary apologist, "the fairy-tale of morality." Historic religions are characteristically founded upon what somebody told somebody else about something that was heard from still somebody else; and personal religion, when not founded on historic considerations, is founded on some feeling quite as obscure.

Science, which usually takes itself to be exempt from all such vagueness, is nevertheless much like these other great human

concerns, when one analyzes its practitioners. The element of the conventional in it is very great and the element of the gossipy even greater. I do not deny that one can *define* science into accuracy; but so can one define law or medicine or theology. It is the realistic thing called science of which I speak, rather than of some cured thing connoted by definition. The only way in which definitions can bring science to the utterly precise is to promote it into irrelevance to practice. If we reduce the principles of science to *identity*—a thing is what it is—or to *contradiction*—a thing is not what it is not—we cease, I suppose, to outtalk our information. But we cease also to convey much information by such talk. Science thus escapes the charge of gossip, only to surrender to custom; for these so-called laws of thought are hardly more than our common presuppositions. If science is in any sense to be the principles of practice, it must somehow impinge upon the practical; and where it does impinge, it cannot escape the complexity and the imprecision of these other disciplines of practice.

Now this is notoriously true of our social sciences. If as sciences they formulate themselves so analytically and autonomously as to rise above both custom and gossip, they cease to be social. If they remain social, they will be so involved in the medley of life as no longer to be scientific in terms of the indicated precision.

More, surely, than in the natural sciences, we have here the peculiar phenomenon of a different social science for each age. I refer not to the grand difference, let us say, between Aristotelian and Ricardian economics; but to the nearer though hardly lesser difference between Adam Smith and Thorstein Veblen, or between Russian and American economics of the present time. It is notorious that each age must rewrite history in order to give it

any semblance of acceptable truth. But it is hardly less factual that sociology finds itself in the same predicament. The customary basis for conceiving custom itself shifts from time to time. Only yesterday, all primitive peoples were with Maine so custom-bound that primitivism was practically defined by means of this differentia; but today with Malinowski primitive peoples seem little less characterized by individualism than we, or we hardly less custom-bound than they. Nor is this relativity to be explained merely by the fact that science is a growing thing. Growth is continuous, whereas social science seems to shift base from time to time, rather than to grow from more to more upon the same trunk.

The truth seems to be that there is an over- or an under-thing in science which is of the first importance to the understanding of it. It has been vaguely referred to as "the climate of opinion." Sometimes it is so volatile as to suggest "weather of opinion." But whether weather or climate, we find it as a point of view coloring if not determining all our views. The idea of evolution has long constituted such a point of view, though that too appears rapidly to be passing, as it itself supplanted a more static presupposition. If this relativity is not confusing enough to the scientific devotee, let him survey the still more basic relativity in the over-thing called truth itself.

Men who preoccupy themselves with such recondite matters are in no sense agreed as to what stable meaning can be given to the very notion of truth. Every theory of truth is opposed, and has always been opposed, by another as plausible; and all of them together, if they could be got together, hardly get us further than the agreement that agreement itself is the test of truth, though all the while we know that men have at times agreed upon error.

We social scientists mostly kid ourselves in our imitation of natural scientists or in our efforts on foundation of our own to build an autonomous science out of our reflections upon social data or processes. Social things do not lend themselves to precision, and whatever principles we get that are precise do not lend themselves to social things.

LEGISLATION

But who is the politician to say all this? Well, the politician is exactly the man to say this, if a politician may say so. The legislator knows whereof he speaks, when he says that legislation based upon scientific knowledge is mostly myth. "But why not reform?" the scientist queries. "Why not build upon our knowledge instead of upon custom or gossip?" The legislator replies: "What knowledge?" And with this colloquy the issue is joined for better or worse.

The issue is not a simple one. Resorting to custom and gossip as the legislator does, not many legislators will be found who do not wish for a greater admixture of knowledge as base for their art. The legislator is not likely to deny, speculatively, that social knowledge is possible. Whether possible or not, he will continue to wish for it; but he is clear all the while that his is not a wishing game, but a game of action and of chance. Nor will his predicament likely strike the experienced legislator as due merely to a temporary lack of needed knowledge. He is likely to guess that there is not now and never will be enough knowledge available to give a sturdy base of rationality to collective action. He suspects with Mr. Justice Holmes that "Law is not a science." So suspecting, his wish for knowledge is likely to become fanciful, nostalgic of the impotent ideal, while his action goes on apace, audaciously if not cavalierly.

Deplorable as that attitude may strike a scientist, it is not as deplorable as it sounds. For in the first place, it is not quite as bad as it sounds. There will always be present in legislation some so-called facts, dependable enough as far as they go. The further fact that they are seldom at hand when the legislator needs them, need not trouble the scientist as much as it does the legislator. The absence of available facts is a practical problem to be met practically. We concern ourselves rather with the larger question as to the quantity and quality of facts that can ever be made available for the legislator. Let us write the problem concretely in terms of a practical predicament of a state legislator.

Here is a bill to outlaw from sale a patented product made of skimmed milk with a base of cocoanut oil. There is demurrer, on local patriotic ground, at the imported oil; but, passing that, the real opposition comes from the well organized dairy industry. This product can sell cheaper than theirs, and it is under-cutting their business. All *that* the legislator understands, however the competition be disguised under labels of the common good by either or both sides. Facts as to differential cost of production, utility of relative social inventiveness, comparative employment and displacement of labor, etc.—such facts are not plenteous nor easily available; but let that pass. What cannot be allowed to pass is the claim of the dairymen that the product in question is harmful to children and during the depression was being bought in larger and larger quantities by poor mothers because of its being cheaper.

The labels are inspected and this leads to the reassuring discovery that the ingredients are accurately advertised. It is ascertainable, moreover, from doctors—supported by court decisions from other

states—that the product is not in itself harmful, indeed is perfectly good for what it is good for. As food for adults the product is justified, and even for children where it is not used as a complete substitute for milk. It does remain plausible, however, though impossible to prove in detail, that because of its cheapness, its attractiveness to taste, and its handling being made more lucrative to retailers—plausible that many children are suffering in diet because mothers do not read the labels. This fact allowed, we have the conflict of two principles: against the desirability of minimum interference of government with private business stands required protection for future citizens. Though one might waive the latter principle in regard to adults, upon the theory that to save fools from the consequences of their folly is one sure way to fill the world with fools, how shall one justify the waiving of it in regard to helpless children?

What facts are there, indeed, to decide between these two principles, both of which are good? What facts there are, are either irrelevant to the decision, or are rendered relevant by extra-factual consideration, i.e. by one's philosophy of life. Who shall mediate this consideration—and how? Such a decision is anybody's, and that upon his own terms.

Indeed, I think it not too much to say that every legislative decision invokes considerations that no social science furnishes or can furnish facts to resolve. On the face of the matter, this is so because normative factors are more important than any and all facts when it comes time to decide issues; but beneath the surface there glints forth the suspicion that so-called facts are themselves phantoms of factors other than the factual. This suspicion we cannot, and need not, here pursue. But the inadequacy of the factual—even granting

it to be what it is supposed to be—is a matter for further comment.

The first comment must be to reaffirm that facts are of momentous even if not of crucial importance to the legislator. Social scientists need never falter out of any fear that what they discover will not be of great help to the process of intelligent government. Nor need their helpfulness be greater when researches are chosen in order to reveal material relevant to pressing decisions. Pure science has its indispensable place, but neither pure nor applied science can ever displace the customary and the gossipy in legislation, nor lift from decision the purely personal equation. Social science, like all science, is but a staggered strategy directed toward the citadel of life. And the social scientist, like every intelligent man, must learn to lean as much upon the unearned increment of his labor as upon the foreseeable results. Pure science is mostly waste, save for the fun the scientist gets out of it. The scientist is, for this reason, ordinarily wise in doing only what he wants to do—to have fun is the surest guarantee, here as elsewhere, against complete futility. But that small sector of scientific work which adds to the fun of the pure scientist a funded factuality for present or future utility is the capsule of ointment in the jar of amusing flies.

The wise legislator is always on the look-out for the solvent set of facts which will save him the appearance of surrendering to the pressure of interests or to the thinner appearance of arbitrarily following his own temperament. And most legislators are wise in this regard. Nothing is more noticeable to an inside view of the legislative process than the willingness of legislators to listen to facts and to utilize them when they can be made to appear relevant. But one need have little illusion as to the relevance of much that social

science is now doing to what legislators must do. High relevance will be established only when legislatures have their own research staffs who know the legislators as well as the social sciences and who will temper the whirlwind of facts and near-facts and would-be-facts to us hurried legislative lambs. That done, and the main thing then remains to be done.

The main thing is ordinarily put as character on the part of legislators. That formulation may be allowed to stand, if it first be understood. "Simple horse-and-buggy honesty" is good as far as it goes; but it goes in a legislative day only about as far as a buggy would go in a day of travel. Moreover, let it be remembered that buggies hauled roués as well as virtue and that horses were tricky as well as steadfast. Honesty that counts is much more than stupidity. The romanticizing of simplicity is no more rewarding than the romanticizing of the past. Honesty must be guileful in order to deal adequately with contemporary complexity. The predicament of the legislator is that every vote is a dozen votes upon as many issues all wrapped up together, tied in a verbal package, and given a single number of this bill or that. To decide what issue of the many hidden in each bill one wants to vote upon is delicate, but to make certain that the vote will be actually on that rather than upon another issue is indelicate presumption.

I have known an Illinois Senator to speak and vote against a legislative investigation of Illinois prisons. He was not opposed actually to the investigation. But would he vote for or against the governor in his struggle for re-nomination? For or against the committee the governor had already invited (in order to forestall a legislative investigation of *himself* under the guise of investigating prisons)? For or against the Chicago city machine? For

or against the man who introduced the resolution and would therefore presumably be chairman of the committee (the senator's best personal friend in the Senate but almost his worst political enemy)? For or against this expenditure of state money? For or against the Jews (to incite enmity against whom some wanted to do a general prison investigation around the pathetic Loeb murder)? To further or to retard the political ambitions of some of his constituents who had urged him to facilitate the investigation? Who could give a recipe for deciding what to vote upon in such a simple case? Who indeed could give a formula for the decision this state senator actually did make, as one must make them, upon the spur of the moment?

Some general sense of direction and a flair for rapidly shifting realities is a more important meaning to character under such shifting circumstances than is any inherited notion of honesty. There must be a sensitivity to and a joy in strategy if integrity is not to curdle in an atmosphere so acrimonious. Where is one to get such things—first the cues for strategy and second the will to it? Apart from the meagre help that science can give in knowing some facts and in guessing what facts will follow from these facts, the main reliance must be upon custom and gossip. But of these two, gossip is the more important.

Gossip is more in the tone of voice than in the words said. It is in the flash of the eye, the whisper of the syllable, the glance over the shoulder, the caution of confidence as provocation to publish—in a word, gossip informs the asides of life. The cloak rooms of congress, and legislatures, are more important than committee rooms. Over the cups is a strategic place, as Plato long ago prescribed, to get the low down upon the imponderables of men. One cannot be too intent upon any one

thing without missing the cues to many other things. All appearances must be watched as they pass, for they will not come back again just so for further observation. Moreover, they must be enjoyed in order to be caught. A regard for men, a genial tolerance for if not downright appreciation of the trivialities and vices of one's fellows—these are ingredients in the character of the effective legislator.

It will be remarked that I have departed from my subject, "legislation," in order to dissect the legislator. There is no avoidance of this departure. There is really no science of legislation, nor will there likely ever be. An art of legislation perhaps is possible; but hardly even that as yet or soon. Not that there are not "principles of legislation," with or without benefit of Bentham. But principles must have persons as carriers before they have any significance for practice, and the carriers of all relevant values, as well as the interpreters of all relevant facts, are men of flesh and blood, of passion and action, of night as well as day shifts. The impersonality which arises from such conflict and cooperation of persons is again the unearned increment of a process which had better be enjoyed as the surest guarantee against its probable futility. So much for gossip, which legislation chiefly is. What finally of custom as an ingredient of legislation?

I do not again refer to the obvious fact that what can be said in gossip is itself a function of the mores and the counter-mores; that what can be proposed practically as legislation is a function of the same; and that what can be enforced after enactment is severely determined within the lines of the customary. All this we know beyond the need of reminder. It is the very institution of legislation which I wish to remark upon as the distinguishing custom of our country and of our

Anglo-Saxon heritage. The custom of permitting gossip to play the leading rôle in our common life is a peculiar practice for a scientific society. It is so peculiar that Mussolini has led an attack, imitated by many campfollowers, with not a little show of reason against liberalism. What's the good of having science and of knowing things for certain if the beneficences thereof are to be dissipated in squabbles as to interpretation and application? Parliaments are pussillanimous purveyors of puerility! Away with them! If we know anything, let's apply it rather than squabble about it; if we want anything, let's get it rather than gabble over it; if we are men, let's act, not talk! And why not? To maintain our custom of gossip as basis for legislation, rather than to utilize our science for purposes of action, is the infamy of liberalism; it seems to advertise a failure of our science or a failure of our nerve.

We liberals had no doubt rather risk the first horn of the dilemma than the second. Our science *has* failed if the criterion of scientific success be the complete regulation of life by fact. We have facts to bolster up this or that interpretation of national or state direction; but no final facts to determine the interpretation of these facts. Nor are we alone in this. Mussolini has no such final facts, either. What he has that we lack, is nerve to govern by fiat when the facts are lacking. Now this difference may as well mark a presumption of nerve on his part as a failure of nerve on our part. Indeed it is precisely so.

The Anglo-Saxon world set out at Runnymede, or before, to do a job of extraordinary difficulty. Not that the end was foreseen from the beginning. There would perhaps have been no beginning if the length and roughness of the road could have been glimpsed. At Valley Forge and at Yorktown, the pledge of progress was

renewed, this time against the original pledgers. It was the pledge to liberalize liberty itself, by universalizing the right and by expanding the meaning of individualism. Americans wanted, and want, an individualism which applies alike to all individuals. It was that country of aspiration which Washington dared to become the father of. That country of the spirit Lincoln rededicated at Gettysburg by re-consecrating us to the task that then lay unfinished before our fathers, now lies unfinished before us, the task of guaranteeing a government for the people by making it of and by the people.

That is a task too hard for tyrants. Their nerve reaches only to such tasks as in civil life morons tackle. Coercion as social technique is the oldest and easiest of all human customs. Cooperation upon the basis of mutual consent is the new custom which Anglo-Saxons undertook to create. In this heroic enterprise, requiring men like gods in patience and understanding, only those who cower before the task tax us with cowardice. Our only loss of nerve would be to become like the cowards who tax us.

The only general alternative to coercion is compromise; and failures at this alternative are relative successes by as much as they prevent the complete return of man to coercion. Legislatures are the readiest exemplars of the process of compromise. This is a humble but honorable view of the democratic process. Nothing is to be gained by not being realistic. Legislation always has been and always will be compromise. Indeed as Justice Holmes once observed: "All that can be expected from modern improvements is that legislation should easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, modify itself in accordance with the will of the de facto supreme power in the community, and that the spread of an educated sympathy should reduce the

sacrifices of minorities to a minimum." Thus to settle peacefully conflicts of interest that might be fought to the death is civilization; to do it gracefully on the basis of equality is democracy; to do it with good humor and with mutual regard is magnanimity. When legislatures, the readiest guardians of these high virtues, cease to desire improvement from science and elsewhere, America is stagnant; when legislatures cease to function, with or without science, America is dead. So long as they remain alive they keep alive the best that has been achieved and light the path of hope to what may yet be brought to birth.

The legislative practice of freedom of speech illustrates, even if it does not enact and universally defend, the strategic liberty of liberalism—the right of men to find out what they mean by putting it to the test of talk, the enrichment of imagination through animated communication, the utility of sharing ideas until they lead to inventions, and the catharsis through expression of ideas that would otherwise lead to vengeful action. These are among the greatest goods which legislatures illustrate. But they do more than merely illustrate. They perpetrate this or that compromise between opposing interests and thus permit the flow of impulses to action through other channels than those of violence and suppression.

Their chief defect arises from their being not yet organized to pool their own best ideas and from their having as yet no adequate way of evaluating the results of legislative activity. With the administrative machinery of our public life as lacking or as rusty as it is, a good law has no effective way to work out its goodness and a poor bill may escape being taxed as the source of folly. Legislation is, as William James suggested of democracy as such, a business in which you do some-

thing, then wait to see who hollers, and then relieve the hollering as best you can to see who else hollers. When the volume of hollering manifests no discernible difference, because good and bad alike become bad through faulty administration, the guidance of political conduct by consequences is inhibited.

The legislator must do the best he can pending the success of the present efforts to cure this serious but curable fault. But in the meantime he may assure himself with all the smiles of heaven to emphasize the truth of it, that to be driven from his moorings by the tempests of contemporary dictatorships is to go morally mad. The poorest compromise is better than the best dictation. It is better not only because it leaves a larger area of freedom to both sides, but because of what it does to the spirit of man to engage in honest political accommodation. Such modest political action removes the stupidity of trusting immediate feeling or thought for what they advertise themselves to be; it removes

the chance of cupidity to exploit symbols of authority for the sake of subordinating others; it removes the fanaticism of a moral impetuosity which holds duty exhausted in doing what conscience commands before conscience has made certain that it is not the voice of an ass; it removes the illusion of certainty from simple action, and substitutes therefor a strategy of estimating what will follow what and of shrewd guessing what future events will feel like when they become present events.

The legislator who can compromise an issue without compromising himself and who in a pinch can give an issue away without giving himself away is public prototype to a nation of private citizens who will tolerate all save extreme intolerance and who in doing so develop souls that transcend conduct but that can nevertheless accommodate themselves to action when action is needed. To know how to command spirit for action without losing spirit in action—this is the final knowledge which constitutes political virtue.

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN RELATION TO THE PERSON

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THIS discussion attempts to analyze the way and the degree in which, if at all, the social and personal configurations coincide. The person, viewed in relation to a social structure, must be considered as internal to the given social system. By this we mean that what persons, as elements in a social organization, are and do, is, at least in various important ways, the counterpart of the system which they constitute; and, obversely, that their traits affect and set limits to the social system. The ego and the social are cor-relatives and the structure of each has an

equivalent in the other. By the term, structure, we refer to the constitution and order of arrangement in a system. While these observations have various theoretical and practical implications, our primary purpose in this discussion is to analyze a few of the theoretical considerations. These are presented in a general form as a suggested frame of reference for research, rather than as a body of verified conclusions.

The premise under consideration is the assertion that the social and the personality structures are essentially concur-

rent and equivalent in content. But because the social system is prior to its present constituent persons, it supplies the plan for personality patterning. This view affords a means of escape from the logical difficulties inhering in the traditional dichotomy of individual and society, notably the various renditions of the atomistic fallacy, which postulates individuals (even as objects of the social sciences) to be isolate, self-sufficient entities who are separate in their essential nature and whose cohesion must therefore be considered to be external and artificial—something apart from their own constitutions. This view has supplied the implicit or explicit point of departure for most of the theorizing on social subjects during recent centuries. Because individuals, according to this atomistic view, are considered external to one another, efforts to account for the observed fact that they do, nevertheless, form some sort of collective unity, have not been conclusive; for individuals premised to be isolate cannot be brought into unity by mere affirmation. Thus the contract theory of the origin of society premised that individuals, as formed by nature, were full-fledged, innately reasoning self-determiners; and that, inasmuch as they were observed to associate, they had deliberately entered into an agreement for this purpose. But this surmise still left them external to one another.

The instinct theories attempted to agglomerate similarly discrete agents by postulating a naturalistic mechanism which united them without choice or preference. Accordingly, gregariousness, parental care, superordination, and other forms of associating were ascribed to a physiological mechanism. To some hundreds of specific associative instincts the theory added an almost equal number of dissociative instincts, thereby splitting the organism into as many imaginary seg-

ments. Thus while the contract theory permitted the individual to remain a unity, the instinct theory implied a further severing of the agent himself.

The same atomistic illogicality was retained in the assertions that the bond is mental rather than instinctive. And, since the individuals were left external to society, as in the earlier views, some mechanism was required to combine them. This was discovered in interaction. But here again, in some of these deliberations, society was still regarded implicitly as a juxtaposition of disjunctive individuals and could be explained only by referring the facts back to these solipsistic self-determiners. Each agent was segmented and isolate as before, separate psychological units being substituted for the previously hypostatized physiological units.

The solution for such logical difficulties was indicated by J. M. Baldwin,¹ G. H. Mead,² C. H. Cooley³ and others. But the traditional individualistic presupposition long prevented a general acceptance of the implications of the thoughts expressed by these writers. More recently systematic efforts have been made to develop their views by such students as E. Jordan,⁴ F. Znaniecki,⁵ A. F. Bentley,⁶ F. C. Bartlett,⁷ and others who attempt to avoid the old logical impasse by accepting

¹ J. M. Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, Boston; Richard G. Badger, 1911.

² G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

³ C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922; *Social Organization*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912.

⁴ E. Jordan, *Forms of Individuality*. Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Company, 1927.

⁵ F. Znaniecki, *The Method of Sociology*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1934.

⁶ A. F. Bentley, *Behavior, Knowledge, Fact*. Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, 1935.

⁷ F. C. Bartlett, *Remembering*. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1932.

the social as given—as a datum existing in its own right, as institutionalized mind or culture; and as such, having meaning in and of itself, without reference to things outside of itself. The viewpoint developed by these writers holds to the humanistic coefficient, in contrast to the naturalistic, explanation as the proper basis for the social sciences.

Our introductory formula, that the ego and the social are correlatives, calls attention to the necessity for viewing the person in a social system as embodying the characteristics of the system he helps to constitute. If such a statement seems vague, this is not because it is lacking in support by ready observations but because it is contrary to our predilections for the dichotomous view of society and the individual. Under suitable circumstances maturation brings the given individual into essential identity with his society, which supplies both content and organization to the developing ego. The culture is objectified thought and the ego is an internalized phase, an active constitutive element, of the differentiated but integrated structure.

The individual so constituted is the person. He is united with others by virtue of sharing a common nature. He can speak because he incorporates societal facts (language, ideas) in himself. When he speaks he is behaving societally. Communication is an exchange by means of symbols and meanings which are internal to the interlocutors but which were essentially prior to them. They are particular forms of the social. They can converse because they are internal to objective mind. A similar social nature must be premised for the processes of reasoning and reflection. Internalization of culture is a condition of the subject's growth; and from the first his unfolding mind has a social content. His personality thus em-

bodies the modes of conduct that are prior to himself as he learns to act in ways constituting the given culture. Thereafter his thinking proceeds from the same premises and to the same conclusions as those channelled in his culture.

The difference between the atomistic view and the one here considered may be illustrated by contrasting the behavior of a feral case in captivity with the conduct of a person, as above defined. This is the difference between the externally combined versus the internally united subjects. The feral cases, as natural individuals, are external to each other, no matter how closely juxtaposed in space they may be. On the other hand, persons are united because they share a common content, and because, in so far, their life organizations overlap.

Such social unity, to be sure, assumes variations in its composition; and these variations constitute the structure of a group or a society. Accordingly, the social structure and the person may be considered to be internal to each other; and a description of the social organization should supply appropriate evidence for the organization of personality, and conversely. However, room must be left, methodologically, for changes in the social organization and for differences in individual participation in a given system. Such a procedure on the one hand, frees the social from the atomistic view, and on the other hand refuses to reduce the person to collectively derived habit mechanisms or to make him a mere incident as in the totalitarian state.

If, now, we regard the culture as having organization or integration, it follows that personality should also reflect a culturally derived organization. Further, if the social structure is, as we suppose, essentially cultural, it too should present an organization reflecting that of the given

culture integration. We shall consider in turn the patterning due to (1) the form of culture integration and (2) the character of the social structure.

Each culture contains some dominant motif which serves as a selective norm and as a center with reference to which conduct is directed and which supplies a general definition of the situation—an interpretation or point of view and eventually a policy regarding behavior. While every norm, opinion, and inuendo may serve as such a point of reference, a dominant motif supplies a construction and a general scheme of relative values which persons organize as elements in their mental life. Although cultures are not equally integrated, they have distinctive hierarchies of values. For instance, they differ in their emphasis upon individual success, technologies, ceremonialism, monetary values, the importance of life and death, the present and the hereafter. Each also has lesser constellations of culture complexes which do not reflect the dominant motif to an equal extent. But there is a general tendency for the elements to harmonize and cohere in their meaning—a fact which Sumner called the "strain toward consistency." Insofar as the culture achieves such integration it patterns conduct in a like manner by encouraging some, and inhibiting other, acts.

If, as has been reiterated, these culture values are internal to the members of the given society, the personality structure is, in so far, comparable to the culture configuration. These personal equivalents of a dominant culture motif, which may be designated the *ethos personality pattern*, are illustrated by the variations, not only in such matter-of-fact items as fashions, tastes, and technologies, but also in the fundamental processes of perception, memory, and the conclusions drawn from evidence. Equally certain are the culture

sources of social conduct, such as assertiveness, aggressiveness, competitiveness, egoism, cooperativeness, sympathy, revengefulness, stoicism, or other hierarchized values prevailing in different groups. These values and their relative priority or importance are given in a culture. They are reflected in the constituent persons as dominant motives and valid judgments, and supply the implicit or explicit presuppositions—in a word, the *ethos*. So much is this true that values which are demanded in one culture may be regarded as abnormal in another. Accordingly, human nature as we know it, is due to the culture integration which we know, whether implicitly or explicitly.

Such *ethos* type patterns are recognized by the observation concerning the variations in the personality of races. But the pattern is cultural, not biological, in origin, as is evidenced by the fact that different locality groups of a given race have unlike personality patterns; while different races constituting a nation-cultural society may have in common similar personality patterns.

The manner in which personality patterning occurs in the process of culture integration is suggested by the way the culture and the social organization facilitate memory and mediate preferences and choices. Thus, according to the experimental evidence supplied by F. C. Bartlett, people show reliable recall about those objects that stand high in the scale of the group values.⁸ Equally striking mental equivalents have been recorded as to the established relationship between persons and their recognition of similarities. Thus in culture groups in which certain persons stand in close relation to one another, physiognomic similarity is recognized as between father and sons but is not

⁸ F. C. Bartlett, *op. cit.*

perceived as between brothers and still less between brothers and sisters, between whom social distance is prescribed. In general, perception and experience, depend upon *prior* perception and mental organization; and these, like motivations, judgments, and reasonings, are fashioned by the patterning of ideas in the culture.

Thus on the one hand, the person is integrated by the culture structure; and on the other hand, the culture is integrated by the logico-meaningful responses of the person. Such an approach enables us to abandon unfruitful dichotomies and to dispense with the dissection of the mind into unreal psychological units. The culture elements, likewise, are seen as inter-related in a structural dependence.

In turning now to the second topic—the relation of the social structure to the patterning of personality—we postulate that the personality reflects the subject's place in the organization. Accordingly, it is necessary to describe briefly the nature of a social structure in order that we may observe its bearing on personality configuration.

Each group or society has its own distinctive placement of persons or groups of persons, which constitutes its structure. These elements reflect and react back upon the containing system. The fact that the structure is made explicit by behavior does not prevent our viewing it as a plan of placement or organization of the participants. So viewed, the structure consists of meaningful differentiations, expressed as conduct and reciprocations between the subjects. These meaningful acts are not random and inchoate, but are selective as to their meaning and as to the persons between whom they shall occur. Each such point of selective conduct (whether of a person or a group of persons) may be said to constitute a category or locus. The categories fall into two series: statuses and

positions. Each of these constitutes a distinguishable order in the structure, although the two may coincide or diverge in varying degrees.

By the statuses we mean the culturally prescribed categories of differentiation that are handed down by traditions, such as those involving men and women; young and old; nobility, gentry, or commoner, or other fixed orders of priority of reciprocations between the categories. The order of statuses of a theocracy, in which the gradations consist of nearness of contact with the supernatural, illustrates a purely conceptual system of loci. A closed caste system retains some of this purely conceptual scheme but adds some other forms of reciprocations. A political or familial hierarchy contains varying degrees of fixed, conceptual placements in a series of loci. The distinguishing trait of such statuses is that they are prescribed, definitive, and relatively continuous. They may differ in elevation or rank and in the prescribed functions and other exchanges.

By the categories called positions we refer to the competitively determined order of differentiations in the structure. In contrast to the order of statuses, which is relatively durable, the competitive order is unstable. If the first is prescribed and defined, the second is permissive and problematical. To the extent that statuses become indistinct, they merge into positional differentiation; and to the extent that positions become standardized and fixed, they approximate statuses. The positions, like the statuses, are further differentiated by variations in rank and function. Because the esteem attaching to functions is a cultural datum, the ranking order implicit in the functions reflects the culture organization. Also the categories described as positions involve unequal duties and advantages. This is illustrated by the fact that their occupants fare un-

equally in various respects. They have unlike birth-, morbidity-, and death-rates; and they differ in regard to their standard of living, objects of pursuit, and achievement ratios. Indeed, such facts might be made to serve as indexes of position in the social organization.

The occupants are assigned to a category in one of two ways. The statuses may either be ascribed or achieved. They are ascribed through the hereditary principle, as by parentage, sex, class, or race. They are achieved by means of some test or by competition, as determined or permitted by the given culture. Positions, by definition, are exclusively achieved. In whatever manner the assignment is made, the conduct implied in the occupancy of a status or position constitutes the person's rôle with reference to those in other statuses and positions. That is, occupancy of a given locus calls for an obligatory form of conduct toward those in other prescribed loci. But while the pattern of action is culturally given, the way in which the rôle is enacted reflects personal variabilities. If the variation is too great a social problem (a crisis) exists.

The significance of these categories is indicated by the fact that the norms apply, with varying degrees of compulsion, to all relations of a prescribed sort throughout the given culture and in successive generations, irrespective of the rotation of the personnel. That is, if obligatory, the norm attaches to the category, and a new occupant fills the requirement, irrespective of any personal attachments that may have developed between the previous occupants of the prescribed categories. This fact, which is familiar in our culture, is highly systematized in others, as illustrated by the substitution of captives in place of slain members of the family or the adoption of a child in place of a deceased own-child. In a similar way, a social institu-

tion continues to operate notwithstanding the rotation of the personnel involved. But such substitution can take place only if the newcomer is unified with the system, in the manner already discussed; otherwise he will change the structure or remain external to it.

If the announced principle of the concurrence between culture and personality integrations is valid, it should apply to the relation between the patterning of the social structure and personality. The statuses and positions in the social structure present themselves to each person as an array of values with reference to which certain meaningful conduct is required, from which services are to be derived, and to which prescribed or enforceable duties or obligations are owing. The varied modes of conduct toward different persons or categories are not different personalities of the subject. To assume such a view would imply the segmentation of the person and deny the principle of integration or unity which we seek. If the groups are not so large as to prevent direct reciprocations with persons in other categories, the subject plays the rôle of these others imaginatively, and in so far integrates the categories into a mental structure, somewhat after the manner already described as to the integration of culture. Thus the part which the person plays results from the meaningful harmonizing of the various rôles of the other selves; and his response toward each is a resultant of all the rôles in the range of his participation. Or, stated otherwise, the content to be organized by the different persons is similar and their life organizations are thus in so far alike.

This manner of integrating values (content, objects) and harmonizing them with a rôle may also be illustrated by any such familiar events as a commercial transaction. The way a prospective buyer views

an object is not separable from his rôle and his relation among dependents and among a large or small circle of associates, observers, and emulators. Objects of consumption have meanings with reference to the person's rank, duties, rights, and aims, along with his imaginary and coveted rôle, and the life organization he is in process of effecting. The advertiser attempts to manipulate such cultural data. Meanings characterize behavior systems and depend on the frame of observations. The meanings are these behavior plans spread out before the subject. He does not act on the basis of psychological units; and the content of his acts comprises objects or values, including his personal relations and the social norms. His acts are, one may say, determined by the way these objects fit into his life-organization-in-the-making. In such a manner, we may suppose, an integration of the social structure is effected and the personality integrated as a necessary corollary. Failures in this process may be a source both of conflict and of personality pathologies.

In view of these observations, we infer that each rank and function will tend to be reflected in the personal organization. This is the clue to the traits associated with ranking and functional differences—the personality of the superordinated and subordinated and of the representatives of various vocations. Such differences in social types are due to the fact that the place in the organization supplies distinctive traditions, values, and problems and imposes characteristic demands from other categories. So long as these data remain constant the personality pattern tends to persist (save as other elements may enter to disturb its organization); and it tends to be modified when the data so integrated change. This is illustrated by the way the personality integration is altered when the status or position is modified.

Assignment to, or removal from, an office—a change in an ascribed or achieved rank or function—is accompanied by a change not only in the rôle but also in the selection and manner of integrating the values. For instance the pupil, who this year assumes one view regarding discipline, will next year, as a teacher, assume the opposite view. In like manner, a wage-earner changes his integration of values when he becomes an employer. Other transitions are equally marked, such as those prescribed by culture for the person in the recognized chronological stages in the transition from infancy to senility. The rôle prescribed for each stage is assumed at quite different ages in different cultures, apparently with equal readiness; for the pattern is prior to, and accepted by, the person. Thus in one culture men retire from active life at an age when in another culture they for the first time assume a fully responsible adult rôle. In brief, social maturity is not necessarily coincident with age. This principle of the equivalence between conduct and place-in-a-structure is employed as a device of control, as illustrated by the familiar foster-placement of problem children. Such methods of regularizing conduct by controlling the subject's place in the structure is greatly extended in application by some other culture groups.

A change in the locus occupied in the structure calls for new integrations of values; and differences between structures have comparable differences in mental organization. An assignment to a locus involves reflection and selection of means to ends required or permitted in the organization. Conduct is incorporated in values, people, objects. In this way personality grows into a form—an order of content. But this form changes upon occasion, thus indicating that the ego is not an entity but an integration of values. It is a *unity*,

though not a *unit*. Such seems to be the explanation of behavior, once we have granted the permissive individual capacities, the integral view of the social system, and the principle of spontaneity regarding culture phenomena.

The more fixed the statuses and positions, and the less the movement from one category to another, the more definite is the personality patterning. But the absence of rigorous categories, rather than being neutral, has distinctive effects upon personal organization. An unstable structure and the predominance of the competitive, over the status, order; and the prevalence of the achieved, as compared to the ascribed, statuses are reflected in the personality patterning. The traditions, hazards, comparative advantages or disadvantages, defensive reasonings and techniques of getting along are integrated into concurrent personality patterns. The status type-patterns and positional type-patterns in general supply a variety of so-called social types that might be profitably studied as a test of the hypothesis here entertained.

Lastly, we may note the individually variant personality patterns, such as those found within a given rank and functional position, and even in a family group, and, most significantly, between identical twins. While these variants may not seem to conform to our hypothesis, their personality organization is, nevertheless, composed of the culture, their locus, and their resulting experience uniquely compounded. After entering whatever explanation for these variants the facts may warrant, we note that they may be studied with reference to the content and organization of the accessible culture patterns, their position in a familial and other group, and other occasions that supply content and give direction to mental integration.

The reciprocal bearing between a social-cultural structure and conduct integration is further affected by (1) the relative and absolute number of the occupants in the categories; (2) the diversity of these categories, and (3) the harmony or disharmony between the demands made upon the subject.

(1) The number of persons in the several categories is significant in various ways, and quite aside from the effect of the number in the group as a whole (as has been indicated by Simmel,⁹ Von Wiese and Becker).¹⁰ The size of the group is an important factor in its structure and in the character of its contacts with other groups; in turn these contacts react back upon its internal constitution. Reference to these aspects are omitted in these closing remarks, only the question as to the effect of variable numbers in the categories being briefly noted. Different effects are produced by the relative numbers of persons, respectively in subordinated, superordinated, and coordinated categories. This applies to any type of system, whether familial, political, or other. A comparison of our own with some other kinship classificatory system will serve as an illustration. In our organization there is one person standing in the relationship, respectively, of father and mother, and a correspondingly small number in the relationships of brother and sister. But in some systems there are several or many persons in each of the parental statuses and a correspondingly large number in the sibling status. Authority is thus shared by all the persons in the father or mother relation, and control is presumably propor-

⁹ Nicholas M. Spykman. *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925, pp. 128 ff.

¹⁰ Leopold Von Wiese and Howard Becker, *Systematic Sociology*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1932, Chapters XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL, XLI.

tionately effective. While minute differences in preferment due to either prescribed reasons or proximity have been reported under such social arrangements, the appropriate conduct is extended toward all those in the parental category. Likewise incompatibility toward one person in authority does not bring about a clash with all the persons who stand in an authoritarian relation. Furthermore, it is clear that authority inheres in the solidarity of the structure, not in comparative force. Authority, like morale, implies inner identity of the social and the personal organizations whether or not superordination and subordination are involved.

The comparative number of persons in a given status or position affects the prestige or prejudice attaching to the category. Typically, numbers and prestige correlate inversely. Thus the highest status is usually reserved for one occupant; and obversely, in an open class system, the categories with the most occupants have the lowest ranking status or position. The less subject to individual achievement—as in a hereditary monarchy—the greater is the social distance to the next adjacent category and the higher is the prestige. Similar observations apply also to the competitive order; for the greater the difference in some mark of success, the greater is the disparity in prestige.

If this analysis of the connection between numbers and the ranking of categories is valid, it should be useful in understanding leadership, dominance, differential wages, publicity-value attaching to a name, and other like phenomena. The type of categories and the manner of assignment thereto also affect competitive and cooperative behavior. The more open the positions are to new recruits (whether due to a rise or a fall in the scale) and the more the likelihood of comparative or absolute descent in the social ladder, the

more intense competition will be and the more will cooperation assume the form of associative individualism. Obversely, the more secure the status and position, the more ready, other things being equal, will the occupants be to cooperate.

Accordingly, freedom to change from one position to another intensifies competition, the means whereby social capilarity takes place. In brief, the less definite and the more subject to change a category is, relative to others, and the less prescribed the number who may occupy it, the more intense the striving to defend or improve one's rank. In any civilization with a motif of competitiveness coupled with acquisitiveness, personality will be integrated around these traits as organizing foci. In a corresponding way, cooperative type-patterns are formed by suitable culture data. The type of structure is in keeping with, and contributory to, the dominant motif; and the high degree of mutability, at least of the occupancy of the positions, has probably been a reason for the traditional emphasis upon individual motivation and upon the individual as a causative agent. The intensity of competition is thus seen to be connected with the democratic foundation of our culture, so that the structure coincides with, and reinforces, this dominant tendency.

If, as in our modern world, the number of occupants of a given category is large, the phenomenon of special interest groups arises. The occupants tend to create a so-called climate of opinion—a dominant trend and a plan of action—which we recognize as class conflict. A class or other special interest group forms on the basis of a comparable ranking or functional position, especially if the unity of the larger structure is obscured in consequence of its complexity and the wide social distance between adjacent categories. Such facts may imply that persons apprehend

only those structural relations with which they deal directly. And, indeed, observational evidence from some groups suggests that the subjects have no comprehension of the interrelations within the system as a whole. This implies that the subjects have not fully participated imaginatively in the rôles of the others and that they have no systematic knowledge about them. They organize with reference to different objects and the objects which they share are organized from unlike points of view. Such differences of integration no doubt will be the more likely, the more complex the structure, the greater the anonymity, and the larger the numbers of persons involved. Under these circumstances, the structure is viewed differently by the occupants of each category. If, in addition, an open class system prevails, the culture favors competitiveness, and the working relations are changed rapidly, one must expect that populous categories will react aggressively upon other categories. Under present conditions further obstacles to unity arise from the fact that dealings are increasingly mediated through impersonal devices. If, then, the structure is beyond the ken and the intention of at least the majority, and if the members of a category are isolated from others and are numerous enough to form a distinctive climate of opinion in consequence of close and largely exclusive contact among themselves, class conflict forms. However, it is not the conflict of interest, as such, but the formation of interest groups which initiates overt conflict.

If, then, it is observed that complex systems do not retain the type of unity above described, we must observe that the difference is not one of kind or of principle, but of degree. Further, it is necessary to recall that we see phenomena in the light of our own culture conditioning. Competitiveness is encouraged by the culture

and conflict itself is subject to consensus, for instance, regarding the points of disagreement. Further, the process seems to produce an inner conforming to the conditions disclosed by experience in which conflict is still a minor element. From such action new bodies of doctrine arise and reflect back upon the action out of which they emerge.

(2) The greater the variety of open statuses and positions, the more intense is the competition and the greater is the variety of social types. The larger the number of categories, also, the more resistant the structure may be to change through manipulation or control by any one group within the system. A minute example may be cited as indicative of the type of questions which arise in connection with the diversity of the structure and the person's place within it; namely, the significance of birth order and the reaction by the person to the order which he himself helps to produce. The mere addition or subtraction of a member rearranges the configuration. Accordingly it is possible that different personality patterns may be promoted by differences in the number of children and the place inherent in the birth order. Whether or not measurable consistencies may be so discovered, the question appears as a pertinent research hypothesis, in view of the importance of the social structure in other respects. Also, subtle cultural influences may be involved in defining a rôle, such as is implied in rules regarding primogeniture and ultimogeniture. However, any one specific theory must be checked against general principles such as those suggested. Thus, if our main premise is valid, the child who effects one integration in the presence of one set of values will change when the latter change decisively.

(3) The harmony or disharmony between the demands placed upon a person

by his own and adjacent categories or by the social norms is a problem of cultural and structural integration and, correlatively, of personality organization. The demands placed upon a person and the behavior pattern presented to him may be consistent or inconsistent in their meaning, as viewed from within the given culture. As long as one conducts his living in conformity with what others—usually categories of other people—expect from him, and, obversely, when others reciprocate according to norms, tensions are infrequent. However, if there are contradictions between the norms or between these and personal preferences, the logical or meaningful contradictions involve the person, and may be mistakenly interpreted as his own aberrance. The absence of such subjective conflicts under the same conditions constitutes quite different social phenomena.

Cultures differ in the degree of integration. Especially is the culture that has many new inserts or accretions by borrow-

ing or invention likely to have discordant elements that lack congruity. Such dissonance has unlike significance, depending on whether the inconsistencies pertain to the categories or to other culture data which do not involve norms of social relations. Furthermore, while it is generally supposed that a dominant idea of the culture tends, if given enough time, to permeate those phases which have a logico-meaningful relation, variations in the details will, nevertheless, occur in complex versus simple and dynamic versus relatively static, societies.

Our own culture contains incompatible streams of ideas that have coexisted without fusing. These at times produce personality tensions and subjective conflicts, proving that the person is exposed to these illogical norms. However, some categories isolate themselves from one or the other of these incompatible ideas. Such considerations afford specific instances of the concurrence of the social organization and personality patterning.

SOME RECOLLECTIONS OF LESTER F. WARD AND JAMES Q. DEALEY

SAMUEL CHILES MITCHELL

University of Richmond

IN ORIGINALITY of thought, Lester F. Ward surpassed any man with whom I have been thrown. At Brown University, where I was lecturing for the session 1908-9, three of us had desks in the same office,—James Q. Dealey, Ward, and myself. All of us worked in Maxcy Hall, in front of which stands the equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius, a replica of the ancient bronze on the Capitoline Hill in Rome. Book shelves lined two sides of our office, and the room was not especially large. Our heads were pretty near together.

The first thing Ward did, when he appeared each morning, was to read carefully the College paper—the Brown Daily Herald—a student-sheet with quips, gossip, and especially athletics. It was not a cursory glance that he gave those pages, for he spent a long time in their perusal. While he was thus conning its pages, I would be busy in my thought, wondering what on earth he found there, either to entertain or instruct. I am sure, however, that he was really gathering light on some thought-process that it may have illustrated. Had the youthful editor known

how diligent a reader he had in Dr. Ward, it would have elated him exceedingly.

In personal appearance Dr. Ward was tall, with shoulders somewhat stooping. His brow was bold and his face strong. Side whiskers gave him an English air, with a slight resemblance to Huxley. His movements were a trifle angular, and his bearing unconventional. Ward was not of the academic type. He was a product of the frontier, and something of his native ruggedness might have been lost had he had too much of the polishing process of the schools. His manner was gentle, a bit reserved and uncommunicative. He inspired in me, in our daily contacts, a feeling of love and reverence. I never for a moment forgot that he was pre-eminent as a social investigator—better known, at that time, in Europe than in America; and yet so kindly was his manner that in the ordinary intercourse of the office there was no sense of awe or aloofness. Indeed, I think it is true to say that I knew two different Wards—the ordinary mortal, so little self-assertive that at times he seemed almost passive in his friendship; and the thinker, searching, fearless and masterful.

The playful element in Dr. Ward came out now and then—as when, at the close of the year in chapel, President Faunce took occasion to thank the members of the faculty for their attendance, adding that without invidious comparison he should like particularly to express his gratitude to Dr. Ward, who had been so constant in his presence. Whereupon Dr. Ward nudged me, sitting next him, and remarked: "I deserve no credit for it, as the servant is cleaning up my room at this hour." The suggestion of candor and honesty in his conduct, that creeps out in this incident, was characteristic of him. He was as far from sham or pretence as any one with whom I have been familiar. 'Plain as an old shoe' hits off the general

impression he made. At bottom, this was simplicity of character and sincerity of thought, of rare order. In this way his influence was ever penetrative, and in him you were conscious of a force like that of Nature moving to its goal.

Of course, I was interested to know his manner of lecturing to a class, and was struck at once with the fact that the line of thought presented was logical and unified, and not at all desultory. He had in mind one angle of truth, and sought to define it sharply and exhaustively in that hour. He appealed solely to reason, with no attempt to engage the emotions of his students. I do not mean to imply that his lecture was not interesting, but that to me it was abstract. I fancy, for average students, Ward was somewhat above their heads in the class room or seminar, for he dwelt in the main out on the circumference of social science.

The centenary of the birth of Edgar Allan Poe was observed at Brown University, on January 19, 1909. Local interest attached to the celebration, as the poet had lived, at one period, in Providence, and had expected to be married to Mrs. Sarah Helen Whitman, also a resident of Roger Williams' bailiwick. An exhibit of Poeana had been elaborately arranged, in the John Carter Brown Library, by its gifted Librarian, Mr. Winship. A public meeting was held, with addresses by distinguished men on the life and writings of the wayward poet, essayist, and storyteller. Ward of course was there, for he took keen interest in such College affairs. At the close of the meeting, he and I went directly to the office. While I sat at my desk, tugging at some routine task, Dr. Ward was standing before the book shelves, hunting for some volume. At last he brought a big book of geological reports which he had written for the Government. Holding the book open

with both hands, he laid it upon the desk, and with his long finger pointed to a particular passage, which he asked me to read. It was a quotation from Poe, where, in one of the flights of his imagination, he had pictured a gold mine in the Black Hills of the Rockies. Ward, in his geological researches, had actually located some such mine, and in recording the fact, quoted at length the pioneer guess of the poet. Evidently, as he had sat listening to the laudations of Poe, his mind had been struggling with the use he made of this passage in what is usually a dry government report on geology. I do not recall Ward's precise remark in pointing out the passage, but the impression I gleaned was his delight in having a personal share, in this way, in the Centenary, and in the appositeness of the poet's imagination to Ward's utilitarian studies.

During that session, Dr. Ward, as we all knew, was in constant anxiety about his wife, who was a great invalid. He did not refer to this fact, in the ordinary round, but it figured in the background of our attitude toward him. He seldom went out in social gatherings, and my knowledge of him was confined chiefly to the campus. His studies, too, were so creative and of so absorbing a character that they tended to isolate him, even in the College circle. Now and then he would place on my desk some paper he had published in a current periodical; but never in a way to invite comment, much less praise.

I referred to the fact that in Dr. Ward there were two personalities, the quiet friend and the aggressive thinker. He had also two different careers,—first as a geologist, specializing in paleobotany, and later as a sociologist. The transition was doubtless gradual, and is suggestive of the range and activity of his thought in many fields of research. His springboard in

sociology was Herbert Spencer. I suppose it would be true to say that it was James Q. Dealey who drew Ward from Washington to Providence, from the Government to the University. For this, scholarship is under a debt of gratitude to Dealey, who I think would have delighted to call himself the disciple of Ward in sociology.

Dealey I knew from boyhood, when we were both in business in Galveston. He was book-keeper for the Galveston News, and I was in the stationery store of William Terry & Co. As regards binding and printing, the two firms had many relations, and Dealey and I many personal contacts. Along with other clerks we formed a literary society that met in the Courthouse, and I can see Dealey now, on the floor, making his first speech, with a fluency and accuracy of ideas that called forth my amazement. There was at that time no public library, such as Mr. Rosenberg afterward gave to Galveston. Our group learned that there were a lot of books stored in an upper room which had previously been the nucleus of a library. Dealey was in the front in getting permission to move these books to an accessible place and throw them open to the public. It was at night that we worked feverishly at the task of transferring the volumes. Dealey and I often talked of possible plans to go to college, and finally these plans came true. He went first to Cook's academy in Buffalo, and thence to Brown University, where he received in turn the A.B. and Ph.D. degrees, and ultimately became head of the department of Political Science. Well known through his students, lectures and books, when he retired from Brown he joined with his brother, Mr. George B. Dealey, in editing the Dallas News. It was fortunate for the Lone Star State to have in charge of that great paper two such brothers. Well do I remember in Galveston their father, an Englishman,

with all the character and common sense typical of that ruling race. What a rich contribution the ship that brought that family made to the culture and idealism of our country!

Dealey was, in fact, my link with Brown. The Maritime Conference to block out a code of Prize Law was called to meet in London in the Fall of 1908. President Theodore Roosevelt appointed, as a delegate to this Conference, Professor George Grafton Wilson of Brown, who was also Lecturer on International Law at the Naval War College in Newport. He is now a distinguished member of the Harvard faculty. Through my friendship with Dealey, his colleague, Wilson, invited me to teach at Brown during his absence in London. It was a happy experience for my family and myself, as in Providence we were permitted to inherit the home and friends of Wilson as well as his classes. Many able scholars and teachers were in the Brown group, which fact enabled me to understand how that small college had trained four Secretaries of State—Marcy, Olney, Hay, and Hughes. But in the group, by common consent, Lester F. Ward was pre-eminent.

My acquaintance with sociologists began with the friendship of Albion W. Small, who established the first Chair of Sociology in our country, at the University of Chicago, and founded the Ameri-

can Journal of Sociology. I was so thrilled by a series of lectures I heard from Dr. Small, in 1895, that he was invited to make the James Thomas Lectures at the University of Richmond soon thereafter. There was a heartiness, a glow, about Small that gave him immediate access to the social life of Richmond. Mrs. James Thomas was still living in her gracious home, and Small, upon arrival, called to pay his respects to that charming matron of the old school. His opening words in the first lecture were a delicate tribute to the beauty and culture of that Southern home. Henceforth, Small had the right-of-way in the Capital of the Confederacy; and, as a matter of fact, a few years later was asked to speak again on the Thomas Foundation.

During the year that I was at Brown, Dr. Small made an address in a public hall in Providence. Seated upon the platform behind him was Lester F. Ward, while James Q. Dealey presided. In beginning, Small turned to Ward and greeted him as the Father of American Sociology. I was sitting in the audience, and could see the play upon Dr. Ward's face of every idea advanced by Small. Happy was the audience that evening, in looking upon the countenances of three men who have done so much for the advancement of the social sciences in America!

LESTER F. WARD SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The following news item comes from the office of the secretary of the Lester F. Ward Sociological Society:

Dean Henry Gratton Doyle of Columbian College, The George Washington University, conducted the inauguration ceremony for the newly elected officers of the Lester F. Ward Sociological Society at its Founder's Banquet, Thursday, April 15, 1937, at the Grafton Hotel, Washington, D. C.

The Banquet marked the second annual anniversary of the Ward Sociological Society as an academic club for sociological students.

Dr. Nels Anderson, Director of the Labor Relief of the Works Progress Administration, was the guest speaker of the evening. He addressed the group on the topic, "Public Administration in the field of Social problems."

Within a year, the Society has attained a membership of one hundred and fifteen.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

A POPULATION POLICY FOR THE SOUTH*

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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

THE South as a culture area is characterized by certain rather unique population problems,¹ and it is important that careful and critical thought be given to the field. Many questions come immediately to the attention when one thinks of a population *policy* for the South. A policy infers a rather definite course of action to be pursued, and the pursuance of this course implies that some means should be available for the accomplishment of the aim or policy. It would be very difficult to outline such a definite course of action at present; one that should be put into actual effect, or even one that leaders in various walks of life in the South might be able to agree upon. It is obvious that any policy would have to be initiated "by the consent of the governed" and carried out with the full and complete sympathy of the people in the region.²

* A paper read before the Association of Southern Agricultural Workers, Nashville, Tennessee, February 4, 1937.

¹ For a discussion of some of the problems bearing upon the racial composition of the Southern population, see the recent pamphlet, *Population Problems in the South*, by the Conference on Education and Race Relations, 710 Standard Building, Atlanta, Georgia, January, 1937.

² See remarks made by Robert Cooley Angell as to Charles H. Cooley's views on social planning, *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. XX, No. 1, 1935, p. 4.

In this paper no attempt will be made, in fact, to outline such a definite population policy for the South. Another alternative will be adopted; namely, the formulation of certain broad principles that must necessarily be involved in a population policy, and the statement of the more important essentials which should be considered in shaping such a policy. The important thing at present, it seems, is to direct our thinking in channels that may some day lead to a population policy for the Southern Region. At present there are not available sufficient data or facts, nor do we have a sufficient understanding of the problem to formulate a definite policy.³

Before attempting to state the fundamental issues involved in a population policy for the South, some basic factual information should be introduced. Most of the data will deal with population statistics and economic indexes, both of which are necessary before we can map the way for policy determination.

RATE OF INCREASE OF SOUTH'S POPULATION

In order that the rate of increase of the South's population may be shown, certain

³ For past considerations and general aspects of the population problem see such publications as Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems*, McGraw-Hill, 1930; E. B. Reuter, *Population Problems*, Lippincott, 1923; etc.

figures are presented in Table I, together with figures for the United States and "All Other States," which may be used for comparative purposes.

increased from 10,259,016 in 1860 to 33,771,653 in 1930. This was an increase of 23,512,637, or 229 per cent. The increase for "All Other States" was

TABLE I

POPULATION AND PER CENT INCREASE BY DECADES IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE SOUTHERN STATES,* 1860-1930

CENSUS YEAR	UNITED STATES		SOUTHERN STATES		ALL OTHER STATES	
	Population	Per cent increase	Population	Per cent increase	Population	Per cent increase
1860	31,443,321		10,259,016		21,184,305	
1870	38,558,371	22.6	10,808,397	5.4	27,749,974	31.0
1880	50,155,783	30.1	14,638,936	35.4	35,516,847	28.0
1890	62,947,714	25.5	17,823,990	21.8	45,123,724	27.0
1900	75,994,575	20.7	21,913,230	22.9	54,081,345	19.9
1910	91,972,266	21.0	26,339,474	20.2	65,632,792	21.4
1920	105,710,620	14.9	29,551,867	12.2	76,158,753	16.0
1930	122,775,046	16.1	33,771,653	14.3	89,003,393	16.9

* Includes following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma (first Census figures given in 1890), South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.
Source of Data: United States Census Reports.




FIG. I. PERCENTAGE RATE OF INCREASE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION FOR THE SOUTHERN STATES, "ALL OTHER STATES," AND THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1930

From Table I it may be seen that the population of the nation as a whole increased from 31,443,321 to 122,775,046 between 1860 and 1930. This was an increase of 91,331,725 or 290 per cent. Correspondingly the South's population

increased from 10,259,016 in 1860 to 33,771,653 in 1930. This was a 320 per cent increase. The South had a smaller rate of increase in population from 1860 to 1930 than did the states outside the South.

TABLE II
PER CENT THAT SOUTH'S POPULATION WAS OF TOTAL
POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, BY DECADES,
1860-1930*

CENSUS YEAR	POPULATION		PER CENT SOUTH'S POPULA- TION WAS OF TOTAL
	United States	Southern States	
1860	31,443,321	10,259,016	32.6
1870	38,558,371	10,808,397	28.0
1880	50,155,783	14,638,936	29.2
1890	62,947,714	17,823,990	28.3
1900	75,994,575	21,913,230	28.8
1910	91,972,266	26,339,474	28.6
1920	105,710,620	29,551,867	28.0
1930	122,775,046	33,771,653	27.5

* Source: Data from United States Census Reports.

The relative rates of increase in population by decades for the South, All Other States, and the United States are shown by the curves in Figure I.

Figure I shows a very rapid rate of increase for the South's population from 1860-1870, but in all probability the Census figures were vitiated somewhat by the situation prevailing at the time. It is thought that the figures for the remaining decades are somewhat more dependable. The curves in Figure I may be studied to show other trends, but the main thing to be emphasized is the fact that the rate of population increase in the Southern States has been lower than for the states outside




FIG. II. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES LIVING IN THE SOUTH AND IN "ALL OTHER STATES" BY DECADES, 1860-1930

the South during the last two decades, 1910-20 and 1920-30.

PROPORTION OF POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES LIVING IN THE SOUTH

Another important fact with reference to the population of the South is the pro-

portion in the South at each Census year since that time. The figures are presented in diagrammatic form in Figure II.

Figure II, should be compared with information which will be presented later concerning birth and death rates in the respective areas.

TABLE III
URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION FOR 1930, AND ESTIMATED CHANGES IN POPULATION, 1930-1960, FOR THE SOUTHERN STATES AND IN THE UNITED STATES

STATE	POPULATION IN 1930*		ESTIMATED CHANGE IN POPULATION 1930-1960**			
			No migration		With migration	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Alabama.....	744,273	1,901,975	-18,000	1,115,000	220,000	116,000
Arkansas.....	382,878	1,471,604	-39,000	759,000	55,000	18,000
Florida.....	759,778	708,433	-60,000	232,000	364,000	165,000
Georgia.....	895,492	2,013,014	-39,000	1,178,000	145,000	-155,000
Kentucky.....	799,026	1,815,563	-34,000	1,050,000	132,000	196,000
Louisiana.....	833,532	1,268,061	-50,000	745,000	163,000	205,000
Mississippi.....	338,850	1,670,971	-42,000	829,000	66,000	222,000
North Carolina.....	809,847	2,360,429	66,000	1,504,000	392,000	48,000
Oklahoma.....	821,681	1,574,359	14,000	1,046,000	308,000	198,000
South Carolina.....	371,080	1,367,685	-6,000	767,000	69,000	664,000
Tennessee.....	896,538	1,720,018	-42,000	923,000	259,000	17,000
Texas.....	2,389,348	3,435,367	-58,000	1,752,000	873,000	557,000
Virginia.....	785,537	1,636,314	-22,000	802,000	80,000	75,000
Southern States.....	10,827,860	22,943,793	-330,000	12,702,000	3,126,000	2,326,000
All Other States.....	111,947,186	46,011,030	-215,000	8,570,000	10,175,000	3,322,000
United States.....	122,775,046	68,954,823	-545,000	21,272,000	13,301,000	5,048,000

* Source: *Fifteenth Census of the United States, Population, Volume I, Number and Distribution of Inhabitants*, 1930 p. 15.

** Source: Estimates of Thompson and Whelpton as given in the Report of the National Resources Board, Washington, D. C., December 1, 1934.

portion of the Nation's population living in the Southern States by decades. Data showing this are presented in Table II.

The percentages in the last column of Table II are very interesting and enlightening. With the exception of the Census year, 1860, the South has maintained an almost constant proportion of the Nation's population. About twenty-eight in every 100 of the Nation's inhabitants have lived

THOMPSON AND WHELPTON'S ESTIMATES OF THE FUTURE RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION

Having presented data with respect to past rates of increase in population, Table III gives an estimate of future changes in population.

The figures in Table III are based on estimates of Thompson and Whelpton.⁴

⁴ See footnote to Table III for citation.

It is not necessary to comment on the fact that all estimates of population growth are subject to the many changes and fortuitous circumstances that may intervene. However, these authorities are recognized for their distinguished contributions to population statistics, and the estimates are about as reliable as may be had.

While the actual figures are presented in Table III, it will be more interesting for comparative purposes to summarize the data on a percentage basis, which is done in Table IV.

TABLE IV

THE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATED CHANGE OF THE URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION, WITH AND WITHOUT MIGRATION, FOR THE SOUTHERN STATES, "ALL OTHER STATES," AND THE UNITED STATES, 1930-1960*

REGION	PERCENTAGE ESTIMATED CHANGE 1930-1960			
	Urban		Rural	
	No migration	With migration	No migration	With migration
Southern States.....	-3.0	28.9	55.4	10.1
"All Other States".....	-2.0	9.1	18.6	7.2
United States.....	-0.4	10.8	30.8	7.3

* Source: Data derived from Table III.

These percentages (in Table IV) present a very interesting situation as to the outlook for population changes in the various regions. It will be noticed that the urban population will decrease in the Southern States and All Other States, by 3.0 per cent and 2.0 per cent respectively, assuming no migration between urban and rural areas. With migration, the urban population will increase by 28.9 per cent in the Southern States, and by 9.1 per cent in the remainder of the country.

For the rural areas, assuming no migration, the population of the South will increase by 55.4 per cent, while the rest of

the states will show an increase of only 18.6 per cent. The outlook for the rural areas is, of course, very different when migration is taken into account. The South's rural population will increase only 10.1 per cent under these circumstances, while the rural population in other states will increase slightly less, or 7.2 per cent.

In order to show these comparisons in graphic form, Figure III is presented. A cursory glance at this chart will reveal immediately the conspicuous differentials in rates of change in the population as between the various groups portrayed.

It may be assumed that there will be migration between the rural and urban areas of the United States between 1930 and 1960; consequently the data presented above must be interpolated to arrive at the most probable trend. Even population experts, and others well informed in the field, would have difficulty in making proper allowances for this factor. However, the data represent about as good a basis for a forward look as can be obtained at present, and the range between "no migration" and "with migration" offers the area of speculation as to just what will happen to the future of the population in the regions.

CRUDE BIRTH AND DEATH RATES ANALYZED

In the consideration of a population policy, no factors are of greater import than that of the birth and death rates. In order to make the most valid comparisons one should deal with standardized rates, inasmuch as the age factor is important in all birth and death rates, as well as the ratio of the sexes. The South differs in these respects from the rest of the country, and this fact should be kept in mind. However, space limitations do not permit such a detailed analysis in this paper, and the alternative of using only crude rates

will be adopted.⁵ Dr. Howard W. Odum, in the recent volume, *Southern Regions of the United States*, which should be consulted by everyone interested in Southern population policies, makes the following analysis of age differences as between the South and other regions:

The Southeastern States afford a superabundance of youth and a small proportion of the aged; heavy

exception of the Dakotas, Idaho, and West Virginia, no state outside of the Southern regions records as much as 40 per cent of its population under 19 years of age, and no Southeastern State, except Florida, shows a ratio as low as 40 per cent. In contrast to the low states of California and Nevada with 30 and 31 per cent are the Carolinas with 50 and 49. In ratios of people 55 years of age and over, the Carolinas again with 7.9 and 8.4 per cent, contrast with New Hampshire and Maine, with 18.6 and 17.8 per cent respectively. Again, the Southeastern States are




FIG. III. RELATIVE CHANGES, ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS, OF THE ESTIMATED URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION OF THE SOUTHERN STATES, "ALL OTHER STATES," AND THE UNITED STATES, ACCORDING TO THOMPSON AND WHELPTON, 1930-1960

(For source of data, see footnotes to Tables III and IV)

burden, on the one hand, for education, and lighter, on the other, for old age security. Thus, with the

⁵ That there are differences in the completeness of birth registrations, which in turn reflects upon the reliability of the statistics in this field, is brought out in the following article: T. Lynn Smith, "Rural-Urban Differences in the Completeness of Birth Registration," *Social Forces*, Vol. 14, No. 3, March, 1936.

below the other regions in the proportion of people in the prime of work age, from 20 to 54 years, at least eight of the eleven states falling within the lowest quartile. The Carolinas with 41 and 42 per cent again contrast with the high states of Nevada and California with approximately 55 per cent each. Of population 15 years of age or older who are married, the Southeast ranks high in the number of females, seven of the 11 states in the highest quartile, but no Southeastern state ranks among the topmost 12 in

the ratio of married men. This and the relatively small ratio of men at the ages of 20 to 35 may have its relation to the large migration of people from the Southeastern States.⁶

The crude birth and death rates (births or deaths occurring during one year per

(2) the corresponding variation between the birth-death ratios, which indicates the surplus of births over deaths. North Carolina had the highest crude birth rate among the Southern States in 1932, with a rate of 24.0. Oklahoma had the lowest,

TABLE V
CRUDE DEATH AND BIRTH RATES AND BIRTHS PER 100 DEATHS IN SOUTHERN STATES AND UNITED STATES, 1932*

STATE	BIRTHS AND DEATHS (EXCLUSIVE OF STILLBIRTHS)					RANK OF BIRTHS PER 100 DEATHS AMONG STATES IN UNITED STATES IN REGISTRATION AREA
	Number		Per 1,000 population		Births per 100 deaths	
	Births	Deaths	Births	Deaths		
Alabama.....	62,939	27,680	23.5	10.3	227	7
Arkansas.....	37,450	16,315	20.1	8.7	230	5
Florida.....	27,402	18,288	17.9	12.0	150	28
Georgia.....	63,717	32,128	21.9	11.0	198	15
Kentucky.....	59,505	29,059	22.6	11.0	205	14
Louisiana.....	43,298	23,311	20.3	10.9	186	18
Mississippi.....	46,273	20,311	22.7	10.0	228	6
North Carolina.....	77,902	31,051	24.0	9.6	251	3
Oklahoma.....	41,039	19,285	16.8	7.9	213	11
South Carolina.....	41,518	19,884	23.8	11.4	209	12
Tennessee.....	52,491	28,628	19.8	10.8	183	19
Texas**.....						
Virginia.....	54,582	28,898	22.4	11.9	189	17
Southern States.....	608,116	294,838	21.5	10.4	206	
All Other States.....	1,465,926	998,431	16.2	11.0	147	
United States.....	2,074,042	1,293,269	17.4	10.9	160	

* Source: Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D. C., 1932, pp. 39-47.

** Not in Registration Area in 1932.

Note: The following figures, giving the Quartile Distribution and the Range for all the states of the United States, for *Births per 100 Deaths*, will aid in interpreting the data in Table V—Range = 94-273; Q_1 = 137; Median = 162; Q_3 = 209.

1,000 of the population at the mid-year) for the year, 1932, are shown in Table V.

The most significant facts brought out in Table V are the following: (1) the variation as between the respective states in the South, in both birth and death rates; and

⁶ Howard W. Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1936, pp. 93-95.

16.8. The rates for the Southern States, All Other States, and the United States were, in that year, respectively, 21.5, 16.2 and 17.4.

In 1932 Florida had the highest death rate in the South, 12.0; whereas Oklahoma had the lowest, 7.9. Thus, Oklahoma had the lowest birth rate and also the lowest death rate in the South in 1932.

The death rates for the regions were as follows in 1932: Southern States, 10.4; All Other States, 11.0; and United States, 10.9.

The surplus of births over deaths is one of the most important factors in population statistics. These figures are given, for 1932, in the next to the last column of Table V. Here we find that the rates fluctuate very materially as between the different states of the South. North Carolina, with the highest birth rate and also a low death rate, naturally had the highest excess of births over deaths, or 250 births for every 100 deaths in 1932. This is a surplus of 150 births for every 100 deaths. Florida, with an index of 150, stood at the bottom of the list in 1932, having only 50 surplus births for every 100 deaths.

The Southern States had 206 births for every 100 deaths in 1932, while All Other States had only 147. The rate for the United States was 160.

I have arranged the states of the United States in rank order, with reference to births per 100 deaths,⁷ and the rankings of the Southern States are given in the last column of Table V. This shows that the states of the South ranked high among the various states of the Nation in the surplus of births over deaths. For instance, four of the Southern States ranked seventh or higher, while eleven ranked nineteenth or higher. Florida ranked twenty-eighth among the states. Texas was not in the Registration Area in 1932. Whereas the states of the South rank high in the surplus of births over deaths, it will be shown later that the Southern States rank very low in measures of economic well-being.

BIRTH AND DEATH RATES RELATED TO COLOR AND TO RURAL-URBAN AREAS

The birth and death rate data so far presented have applied to the total popu-

lation. There are certain differentials as between the white and colored groups, and between rural and urban areas that are important in population studies.⁸

Table VI presents data as to crude birth and death rates, analyzed by color and by rural-urban sub-classes. The table contains many interesting comparisons, but only a few of the more important will be mentioned. The variations between states in the South in all the sub-classes may be noted.

In the Southern States as a whole, and in the United States, as may be seen from Table VI, birth rates were higher in the rural areas and smaller cities, than in cities of 10,000 or more. The death rates were lower in rural areas and in the smaller cities than in cities of 10,000 or more. This is conspicuously true of the strictly rural areas. However, these relationships are well-known and have been pointed out in many writings.⁹

Birth rates were higher in the Southern States than in the Nation for every group cited in Table VI. Death rates for whites in the South were slightly higher in cities of 10,000 or more and lower for the rural areas, than in the United States as a whole. For the colored population in 1932 the death rate was the same in the South as in the Nation, which would be expected in view of the high proportion of the total Negro population living in the South.

⁸ Attention is again directed to the fact that crude rates are being used, and this is especially important when groups are being compared that differ in sex and age composition; as do rural and urban areas, for instance. Those groups with a high ratio of women in the productive ages (15-45) would have higher birth rates, and those with a high proportion of old and very young people should have a higher death rate.

⁹ Pitirim A. Sorokin and Carle C. Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology*, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1929, pp. 181-194, and 205-211. (See references in this work).

⁷ Using data as given in the citation to Table V.

The death rate was somewhat lower in the rural areas of the South than for rural America as a whole, but the difference is not significantly great.

POPULATION INCREASE AND MIGRATION

The foregoing analysis of birth and death rates, together with the birth-death

of population increase for the last two decades than the remainder of the states. Also it was shown that the South has retained about a constant proportion of the population of the country, rather than an increasing proportion. What is the answer to this apparently paradoxical situation?

TABLE VI
CRUDE BIRTH AND DEATH RATES BY COLOR, AND BY RURAL-URBAN CLASSES, FOR THE SOUTHERN STATES AND THE UNITED STATES, 1932*

STATES	BIRTHS AND DEATHS PER 1,000 OF POPULATION (EXCLUSIVE OF STILLBIRTHS)											
	Births						Deaths					
	White			Colored			White			Colored		
	Cities 10,000 or more	Cities 2,500 to 10,000	Rural	Cities 10,000 or more	Cities 2,500 to 10,000	Rural	Cities 10,000 or more	Cities 2,500 to 10,000	Rural	Cities 10,000 or more	Cities 2,500 to 10,000	Rural
Alabama.....	18.7	21.5	24.1	19.3	20.0	27.0	11.5	11.3	7.5	17.5	18.7	11.7
Arkansas.....	15.3	15.8	22.1	11.2	15.1	19.5	15.3	10.8	6.7	21.6	18.0	8.3
Florida.....	17.4	18.7	17.0	17.7	21.0	19.7	12.0	13.9	8.0	18.5	20.1	12.6
Georgia.....	19.5	**	21.0	21.5	**	25.0	12.4	**	8.1	21.5	**	12.4
Kentucky.....	17.2	**	25.0	13.0	**	14.8	14.5	**	9.5	21.4	**	17.1
Louisiana.....	18.2	18.9	19.5	24.0	21.4	13.8	10.0	6.4	21.8	20.4	9.6	
Mississippi.....	19.5	20.8	21.9	16.0	27.3	24.7	12.7	11.4	7.1	20.8	18.0	10.5
North Carolina.....	21.6	24.5	23.8	20.6	21.5	27.0	11.5	10.0	7.7	17.5	16.5	10.2
Oklahoma.....	17.2	29.2	15.3	13.5	32.6	9.7	10.7	16.2	5.1	15.3	23.6	5.6
South Carolina.....	22.6	20.1	20.7	23.9	22.0	28.2	13.9	10.1	7.8	25.8	16.4	12.6
Tennessee.....	19.4	20.0	20.7	17.0	16.3	16.7	12.2	13.1	8.3	20.2	20.0	12.2
Texas***.....												
Virginia.....	19.0	28.0	21.9	20.2	25.1	26.9	11.6	15.7	9.2	19.4	23.7	14.7
Southern States.....	18.7	22.7	21.5	19.4	22.0	23.9	12.4	12.7	7.7	19.9	19.1	11.3
United States.....	16.5	**	17.5	19.1	**	22.7	11.2	**	9.8	16.9	**	12.3

* Source: Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D. C., 1932, pp. 39-47.

** Included with rural, and this fact must be considered in comparing the rural rates in the Southern States with the rural rates in the United States. The rates for cities of 10,000 or more are comparable.

*** Texas not in Registration Area in 1932.

ratios as given in Table V, suggest that the South should have a more rapidly increasing rate of population growth than the rest of the Nation. As was emphasized above, however, such is not the case. With a much higher ratio of births to deaths, and accordingly a greater natural increase, the South has had a lower rate

In the first place, the most plausible answer would seem to be that the South has furnished a surplus of population; but that this surplus has moved out of the South into other areas. Migration thus becomes an equilibrating factor, making possible the great flow of population around the principle of labor demand.

There has been a greater demand for labor outside the South than within the area, and the surplus of population has gravitated toward these areas of greater labor demand.

That it has cost the South to rear and educate the youth who have thus migrated, is well stated by Vance in the following words:

Under this regional process, aided by the restriction of foreign immigration, the South is in the position of rearing and educating, however imperfectly, the labor reserves for the rest of the nation. To low standards already existing will increasingly be added the enforced mobility, characteristic of populations which have out-stripped their resource structure. The alternative lies in the adjustment of a decreasing rate of population growth to an increasing utilization of regional resources.¹⁰

In *Southern Regions*, Odum comments on this point as follows:

For one thing, the [Southern] region not only has an unfavorable balance of its trade with the resulting outflow of its wealth to contribute to other regional surplus, but a similar outflow of people whose economic evaluation may be estimated as widely varying figures; but in any estimate the aggregate runs into billions of dollars.¹¹

At the same time, the South has been better off than it might have been had this outlet for surplus population not existed, and the migrants from the South have also furnished an available labor supply to the areas of their reception. These outlet and intake valves of population are very important, especially in connection with policies affecting living standards in a given area.

Another reason that the rate of increase of the South's population has been lower

for some of the decades, than for the Nation as a whole, is the fact that immigration to this country has swelled the ranks of population in areas outside the South, and has not added much to the Southern population. In support of this, the following statement is offered:

Two features stand out clearly. The first is the early prominence and the recent decline of the far Western States in respect to their proportion of foreign population. The second is the consistently high percentage of foreign elements in the Middle Atlantic States and, in recent years, in the New England States. It may further be noted that the Southern States bring up the rear throughout the whole period of comparison, while the Middle West has occupied a median position, losing ground somewhat from 1870 to 1900, but gaining from 1900 to 1920.¹²

Southern Regions contains some data bearing upon the outflow of the South's population, and, in addition, gives the number coming into the region from outside, as follows:

The facts are that of the native born population of the United States in 1930, 28,700,000 were born in the Southeast, of whom 24,100,000 were born in rural districts and 4,600,000 in cities. Since only about 17,500,000 of these Southeastern rural born live in the area of their birth, it is evident that over 6,500,000 have moved elsewhere. Of these, 3,800,000 have left the section entirely, while 2,900,000 have moved to Southern cities. On the other hand, 400,000 have come into the region from elsewhere, still leaving a loss of 3,400,000. Thus the rural districts of the Southeast have exported about a fourth of their natural population, have continued their own growth; and added much to the growth of Southern cities, and have sent about 3,500,000 to other regions.¹³

THE PHYSICAL WEALTH OF THE SOUTHERN STATES AS AN INDEX OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING

Turning now from a consideration of population data as such, a few indexes of

¹⁰ Rupert B. Vance, *Human Geography of the South*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1935, p. 481. (See Chapter XVIII of this work, "Reconstructing the Region," for some excellent discussion bearing upon the subject of this paper).

¹¹ Howard W. Odum, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

¹² Niles Carpenter, *Immigrants and Their Children*, 1920, Census Monographs VII, Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1927, p. 17.

¹³ Howard W. Odum, *op. cit.*, p. 463.

wealth resources will be exhibited, as these relate to the population resources. In Table VII is presented a comparison of the basic wealth of the Southern States, the remainder of the states, and the nation as a whole. These data are for the same year (1932) as the birth and death rate figures cited above.

as a rough index of economic well-being, the average person in the South was only about one-half as well off as the average in all states outside the South. Expressed differently, for every hundred dollars in physical wealth assigned to the individuals outside the South, the individuals within the South had only about fifty

TABLE VII

AMOUNT AND PER CENT OF THE NATIONAL PHYSICAL WEALTH RELATED TO POPULATION, AND THE PER CAPITA WEALTH FOR THE SOUTHERN STATES, ALL OTHER STATES AND THE UNITED STATES, 1932*

STATES	PHYSICAL WEALTH**		POPULATION		PER CAPITA WEALTH	
	Amount (millions of dollars)	Per cent of total for United States	Per cent of total for United States	Number (thousands)	Amount (dollars)	Rank among states
Alabama.....	2,592	.89	2.15	2,682	966	48
Arkansas.....	1,870	.64	1.50	1,867	1,002	47
Florida.....	2,107	.73	1.22	1,528	1,380	41
Georgia.....	3,247	1.12	2.33	2,910	1,116	45
Kentucky.....	3,481	1.20	2.11	2,638	1,319	42
Louisiana.....	3,166	1.09	1.71	2,138	1,481	40
Mississippi.....	1,709	.59	1.63	2,036	839	49
North Carolina.....	3,685	1.27	2.60	3,244	1,136	44
Oklahoma.....	4,505	1.55	1.95	2,440	1,846	36
South Carolina.....	1,848	.64	1.40	1,745	1,059	46
Tennessee.....	3,363	1.16	2.12	2,650	1,269	43
Texas.....	10,716	3.69	4.78	5,964	1,798	37
Virginia.....	4,020	1.38	1.95	2,435	1,651	39
Southern States.....	46,319	15.66	27.46	34,277	1,351	
All Other States.....	244,397	84.34	72.54	90,545	2,699	
United States†.....	290,616	100.00	100.00	124,822	2,369	

* Source: Derived from *The University of Virginia News Letter*, University, Va., Vol. XIII, No. 1, October 1, 1936, Table III.

** Major bases include (1) fixed real capital, 49 per cent of the total; (2) consumption goods, 44 per cent; and (3) circulating capital, 7 per cent. (Consult above source for further breakdown of sub-classes.)

† Includes District of Columbia.

The main thing to be noted in Table VII is that the South had in 1932 about 16 per cent of the physical wealth of the United States, and about 27 per cent of the population. Consequently, the Southerner's share of the Nation's wealth was considerably less, on a per capita basis, than for the other states in the country. The figure for the former was \$1,351, and for the latter, \$2,699. If this might be used

dollars, in 1932. While physical wealth may or may not be a fair index of economic health, there is in all probability some correlation between the two.

In the last column of Table VII the Southern States are ranked in the order in which they appear among the states of the nation in per capita physical wealth. These rankings do not speak very well for the South, as all of the states in the

Southern region fall near the bottom of the list, and actually eleven of the thirteen Southern States are the lowest ranking states in the nation. The other two states skip only one rank.

may not be sufficiently representative as a basis for final generalizations, yet when that year is used for relative comparisons only, it seems a justifiable expediency upon which to base tentative conclusions. The

TABLE VIII

AGGREGATE PERSONAL INCOME AND PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME FOR THE SOUTHERN STATES, "ALL OTHER STATES" AND THE UNITED STATES, 1929*

STATE	AGGREGATE PERSONAL INCOME (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)	POPULATION JULY 1 (IN THOUSANDS)	PER CAPITA INCOME (IN DOLLARS)	RANK AMONG STATES IN PER CAPITA INCOME
Alabama.....	872	2,631	331	45
Arkansas.....	575	1,851	311	47
Florida.....	786	1,435	548	31
Georgia.....	999	2,914	343	44
Kentucky.....	1,037	2,607	398	42
Louisiana.....	914	2,086	438	38
Mississippi.....	574	1,998	287	48
North Carolina.....	994	3,134	317	46
Oklahoma.....	1,195	2,375	503	34
South Carolina.....	454	1,739	261	49
Tennessee.....	900	2,602	346	43
Texas.....	3,054	5,753	531	32
Virginia.....	1,044	2,420	431	39
Southern States.....	13,398	33,398	397	
All Other States.....	77,987	88,287	882	
United States**.....	91,385	121,832	750	

* Source: Derived from Maurice Leven, Harold G. Moulton, and Clark Warburton, *America's Capacity to Consume*, the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1934, pp. 172-3.

Note: Includes income from profits from the sale of property and imputed rent on owned homes. Excludes imputed income from durable consumption goods other than homes, *Ibid*.

** Includes District of Columbia.

Addendum to Table VIII: In order to give a more meaningful interpretation to the data in this table, the Quartile Distribution and the Range of the *Per Capita Personal Income* for all the states of the United States are given as follows: Range = \$261-\$548; Q_1 = \$438; Median = \$633; Q_3 = \$841.

PERSONAL INCOME AS ANOTHER ECONOMIC INDEX

While physical wealth is of basic importance in relation to the long-time view of population, it may be that the income of the people is of greater significance from the short-time view. Such figures are accessible for one year (1929) and are presented in Table VIII. While any one year

Agricultural Adjustment Administration in Washington has regarded the year, 1929, as about as representative of the country's conditions as a whole as any year that might be taken.

The data in Table VIII show that the aggregate personal income of the South amounted to \$13,398,000,000 in 1929, as compared with a total for the nation of \$91,385,000,000. It may be seen that the

South's share of the total personal income of the United States was about 15 per cent; whereas the South in that year had about 27 per cent of the nation's total estimated population. Stated in another way, of every one hundred dollars of personal income in the nation in 1929, the South had about fifteen dollars; yet, of every hundred people in the nation that year, the South had approximately twenty-seven. Thus, the South had only a little more than half its pro-rata share of income, on a population basis.

The figures, as shown in Table VIII, give the South a per capita personal income of \$397, as compared with \$882 for the remaining states of the nation. And a still more significant comparison is found in the last column of the table. In this is given the states of the South as they ranked among the states of the United States in per capita personal income in 1929. It will be noted that all the Southern States ranked very low, and that the eight lowest ranking states are included in the list of Southern States in the table.

PLANES OF LIVING AND ECONOMIC CORRELATIVES

A further indication of the relative showing of the Southern States, from the economic standpoint, is found in a study of planes of living among the people of the United States by Goodrich, Allin and Hayes.¹⁴ They worked out a Plane of Living index, using the percentage of the number of income tax returns, of telephones and of radios to the county population, expressed as a proportion of the national average in each case. The three proportions were then averaged to give the index of the Plane of Living for that

county.¹⁵ A map for the United States was finally constructed, with each county index presented in color and using six classes. An examination of the map so constructed reveals that a very high proportion of the counties in the Southern States fall within the two lowest Plane of Living classes. Also, a significantly large number of the Southern counties fall in the lowest class, especially in the states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi.¹⁶ The entire analysis of planes of living, as made by these writers, shows about the same findings concerning the South's economic position, relative to the rest of the country, as that indicated by the Plane of Living index.

SUGGESTIVE QUESTIONS FOR THOUGHT STIMULATION

It might be well to depart at this point and formulate a few pertinent questions concerning the South's population problems. Some claim that a question stated, is partially answered. Accordingly I shall present a series of questions that should be thought through before any attempt is made to mould or formulate a population policy for the South.

1. Should the South attempt to care for its own population? Or
2. Should the South urge the migration of larger numbers of its population to other areas? (Speeding up of population mobility accentuates certain social and economic changes, while curtailing of mobility results in the retention of custom and tradition, and breeds conservatism).
3. Are there ample resources in the South to take care of its population; given sufficient opportunity and means to develop these resources, or to change the nature of present resources in form so as to make them more available to the people?

¹⁴ Carter Goodrich, Bushrod W. Allin and Marion Hayes, *Migration and Planes of Living, 1920-1934*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1935.

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 16 for method of determining the indexes.

¹⁶ The map is presented in *ibid.*, opposite p. 10.

4. What standard of living should be held up to Southern people, and how should such standards or planes of living be distributed among the respective groups in the population?
5. Should the South attempt to stimulate new industries, or to develop such as it now has, as a means of supplementing the agricultural income and of providing additional work for its people?
6. What are the possibilities of increasing efficiency in methods of production so as to enlarge volume of production, and what effect would this have upon other areas, both national and international?
7. Would it be wise for the South to work toward free trade, or substantial reductions in trade barriers, in order to discover and develop wider markets for its products?
8. What are the legal and political implications in the foregoing question, and how should the matter be handled—by states or Federal government? (Only the Federal Government can enact tariff legislation).
9. How shall conflicting attitudes be reconciled in distributing the proceeds of any program which results in economic advantage by way of increased purchasing power in the South?
10. How far can the South go in supporting a policy for increasing its purchasing power, when in some respects personal and individual freedom might be involved?
11. Should the South make a definite attempt to change from a cotton economy to a diversified agriculture, and what would be the effect of this on inter-regional competition?
12. Shall any policy that may be fostered have for its purpose "the greatest good of the greatest number," or shall free and open competition be permitted?
13. Shall socialized medicine and public health measures be greatly encouraged, and, if so, how shall such measures be correlated with vested interests and the capitalistic mores?
14. Should there be any effort to restrict population growth, and if so, by what methods?
15. Is it advisable to stimulate the wants of people beyond their capacity to purchase and thereby to be able to satisfy these wants; or, stated differently, if wants are stimulated, will people exert greater effort to satisfy them and thus attempt to improve their living conditions?

These questions merely point out some of the more important factors that are facing the people of the South today, and they, together with many similar questions, must be carefully weighed and evaluated in defining any program involving socio-economic changes. A cursory examination of the questions will indicate how complex is the problem and how difficult it will be to establish any policy that must encompass a culture so broad and comprehensive. No amount of wishful thinking will usher in a new era in the South, or point out methods whereby the same may be achieved. The people of the area must face reality and the problems presented suggest that much realistic thinking must be done.

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF A POPULATION POLICY FOR THE SOUTH

To come now to the more specific question of a population policy for the South, let us consider some theoretical aspects of the topic. In the first place, what is the major aim in view? It must be admitted, as Reuter states, that "The United States has had no consistent population policy."¹⁷ The same is true with reference to the South. But simply because a nation or region has neglected to formulate a policy in the past is no reason for not attempting to do so in the future. To quote Reuter again "It would appear that few things could be of more fundamental interest and concern to a society than the course of its own development."¹⁸ Certainly, it may be assumed that population is of nuclear importance in the development of a geographical area, and in rounding out the culture or civilization of a people.

A. *The Optimum Population.* The conception of an "optimum population" has

¹⁷ Edward Byron Reuter, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

received much consideration at the hands of population experts in recent years. Concerning this concept, Dr. A. B. Wolfe says the following:

... the real population problem will be considered to be that of attaining, and maintaining, the most productive ratio between population and natural resources. Productivity is to be measured by the *per capita* income of ultimate consumers' goods. This ratio is called the *optimum*, and a population of this most efficient size the *optimum population*. . . . The notion of the optimum is frankly a utilitarian and an individualistic concept. It assumes that the function of the economic process is to serve individuals. . . . Perhaps the toughest and the most fundamental problem the world has to solve is to harmonize national safety with per-capita efficiency.¹⁹

Carr-Saunders' theory of population growth is stated in terms of man's attempt to attain the optimum number. He says: "This is the number which—taking into consideration the nature of the environment, the degree of skill employed, the habits and customs of the people concerned, and all other relevant facts—gives the highest average return per head."²⁰ Whether it is possible for a society to attain such a desired number is speculative. The factors that enter into population growth are very complex and varied; it is doubtful whether it would be easier for man to control his numbers, or to re-make man in some other form!

At any rate, the ideal of an optimum population for the South, must be postponed for a future generation to consider,

¹⁹ A. B. Wolfe, "The Optimum Size of Population," *Population Problems*, edited by L. I. Dublin, Houghton Mifflin Co., New York, 1926, pp. 68-9. The same writer discusses the concept of optimum population in the following: A. B. Wolfe, "The Theory of Optimum Population," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 188, Nov., 1936, pp. 243-249.

²⁰ Alexander Morris Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem; a Study in Human Evolution*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1922, p. 476.

in view of the urgency of existing conditions, for, as Dr. Odum states:

From every prospect, however, the indications are that the Southeast will have a continuing crisis in its increasingly large ratio of people such that the problem of optimum population for an agrarian region must, for a time at least, probably give way to the problem of optimum production and use in a very realistic given population, already in existence. This does not mean that the reduction of the population does not offer a field of the greatest importance but rather lesser immediacy.²¹

One must keep the long-time and the short-time points of view clearly differentiated in thinking of policies affecting population. The long-time view would have to include all such factors as optimum numbers, cultural standards, societal equilibrium, eugenics, dysgenics, etc. The short-time view of population might be better handled in terms of the standard of living of the people; those now living, or presently to be born. It should be mentioned that the long-time and the short-time viewpoints of population tie up with each other, of course, but the difference is in the immediacy, or in the emphasis upon the near at hand, in the short-time view; rather than upon the remote, which characterizes the long time view.

B. Population Policy and Standards of Living. Obviously, the ideal population policy should have for its aim the improvement of the living standards of the people. For present purposes it might be well to define the material standard of living of the people in any area as the *ratio between the available resources (physical and economic) and the number of people*.²²

²¹ Howard W. Odum, *op. cit.*, p. 469.

²² For an application of this idea, as used by economic theorists, see Carle C. Zimmerman, *Consumption and Standards of Living*, D. Van Nostrand Co., New York, 1936, p. 205, in which the Plane of Living is expressed in a formula, with income as the numerator and population as the denominator. See Zimmerman's comments concerning the formula. Also a

This interpretation is in terms of the material standard of living and implies that the resources should be available to the people; that is, accessible in terms of purchasing power, or command over purchasing power. Thus, the ratio involves two variables: (1) the amount of effective purchasing power, and (2) the number of people. It is assumed that to decrease the number of people would increase the material living standard, and vice-versa—with purchasing power remaining constant. With the number of people held constant, the material living standard would be increased by increasing the purchasing power, and vice-versa.²³

Under this theory of the *resources-population ratio*, the South is confronted by two alternatives in any attempt to improve the material standard of living of its people. (1) The number of people might be reduced either by emigration, by a reduction in the birth rate, or by a rising death rate with the birth rate lower than the death rate; and (2) the command over purchasing power might be increased.

The first alternative is in a doubtful category, so far as any possibility of accomplishing the end result is concerned. Indeed, but few look upon a rising death rate as a population advantage; and the first two methods mentioned under point one above are in the doubtful column, so far as ability to direct their course is concerned. Emigration would perhaps be the easiest end to accomplish, but a conscious effort

toward this is doubtful under the present political and economic organization.

The second alternative does hold out hope, but it can only function under the assumption that the number of people remains constant, or does not increase as fast as the command over purchasing power. In order to achieve an increased command over purchasing power the efficiency of production in agriculture and industry would have to be increased; or the prices of products sold by Southern people would have to increase, relative to the prices paid by them for products purchased. Either of the latter would increase the "real wages" of the people, and thus result in an improved material standard of living.

Since it has been shown that the average income, as well as other economic indexes, is low in the South, it is perhaps a wise thing for Southern people to direct attention to the relation between population and economic resources. All efforts toward this end, centering around improvement in the efficiency of agriculture and industry, should certainly react favorably upon the South's material standard of living, and this seems to be one of the most important situations confronting the region at present. "The extra high rate of natural population increase is an indication of the necessity both for an expanding industry and an expanding agriculture in the region unless indeed there must be more migration or lower standards of living."²⁴

In commenting upon the relation of average income to population density, King emphasized the following relationship:

Given: a nation with a definite supply of resources and a certain stage of progress in science and the arts, there is always a definite population which can utilize

rather complete analysis of the relation between agricultural population and resources is given by: John D. Black, "Agricultural Population in Relation to Agricultural Resources," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 188, Nov., 1936, pp. 205-217. His analysis is by geographical regions, which includes the three Southern regions.

²³ For an excellent graphical illustration of this point, see Horace Boies Hawthorn, *The Sociology of Rural Life*, The Century Co., New York, 1926, p. 94.

²⁴ Howard W. Odum, *op. cit.*, p. 463.

these advantages in such a way as to secure maximum benefits for all. . . . It should, therefore be the aim of every nation to keep its population at that number which is found to result in the greatest amount of real income to the average citizen.²⁵

The analysis being made leaves out of the picture the matter of wealth distribution, but assumes that any increase in real wages would go to the masses of the workers. Unless it is assumed that increased amounts of purchasing power would be distributed to the masses of the people, this method might not act in such manner as to buttress the standard of living of the people at large, but might conceivably result in wealth concentration.

Increasing the efficiency of methods of production is always an important thing for a people. If, however, this results in an increased supply of the product, which in turn beats down the price, then little has been accomplished, and we are brought right back to the point at which many arguments in recent years have originated. But if increased efficiency results in reducing unit costs, and not in an increased volume of production, it would seem that purchasing power would be augmented by the amount of the savings in unit costs of production. Under a speeding up of this situation to a high degree, it might be that a certain amount of agricultural labor would be displaced in the South, especially if commercial types of agriculture should come to prevail more extensively. But, under the conditions stated, it is possible, with the "family-farm" system,²⁶ that

²⁵ Willford I. King, *The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1923, pp. 238-240.

²⁶ See Roy Hinman Holmes, *Rural Sociology, The Family-Farm Institution*, McGraw Hill Book Co., New York, 1932, for a treatment of the family-farm point of view. This author treats Rural Sociology very largely through this frame of reference, and advocates the family-farm system as being better suited to American country life than commercialized farming.

greater savings would be realized, more leisure time made available for the farm family, and the standard of living enhanced.

In shaping agricultural policies in this country in the past most of the calculations have been made in terms of yields per acre, production per cow, etc.; in other words, in terms of physical units. I suggest that the welfare of the people, the standard of living (purchasing power), might be better approached by certain per capita calculations. This will inevitably direct attention to the people; rather than to the land, the factory, or other physical factors. It is not good policy to neglect these latter factors, but too little attention has been paid to the former in the past. Such an emphasis might reveal new relationships.²⁷

Per capita figures are theoretical, and do not show how economic goods and services are dispersed among the population; but they do indicate what individuals would have—if these goods or services were prorated to all individuals on an equal basis. Such calculations furnish an aid in analysis and offer a good tool to assist in thinking about policies and plans for social and economic welfare. Thinking so directed must not, however, fail to consider the nature of averages, which may distort the meaning unless something further is known as to the dispersion.

What has been presented above refers largely to the material standard of living, as measured in terms of purchasing power. Psychic and social standards must not be overlooked, however. The influence of the present movement toward farm electrification, may have one effect that is strictly economic and another that is psycho-social. The riddance of some of

²⁷ See Hawthorn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 95, for discussion as to the difference between a "man economy" and an "acre economy."

the drudgery from the farm home will unquestionably have a psychological reaction upon the members of farm families. The availability of electrical power may tend to extend urban attitudes into rural areas in the South, to give the farmer a new interpretation of leisure-time activities, and to produce a host of similar changes in attitudes and mental outlook.

The entire configuration of the modern industrial and technological scheme offers a challenge to the strictly *material* interpretation of the standard of living. This has been expressed by Zimmerman in the following statement:

Moreover, we should not ignore the rôle of the non-material factors in the general standard of living. The formulas of the economists deal directly only with the material well-being. Practically all great thinkers agree that the non-material standard of living is the psychological control or balance which makes the material possible. It is not only periods of increasing population in regard to natural resources which disturb this balance but also periods of stable or of decreasing population and great extensions of individualism. We can see that the more complex material structures require, at the same time, more complex and stable non-material structures. In the non-material structures, family life with its fundamental components, the birth rate and children, is probably one of the most important determining factors. Man is a vain and careless animal, and often tends to create the very structures which destroy him. Consequently, the "spiral" development of a material standard of living is in most cases one of the important elements tending to inhibit the future development of wealth and material well-being. Antagonisms in the race for material goods arise among the social classes and among the various nationalist groups when such goods become the primary objective in any civilization.²⁸

SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS BEARING UPON A POPULATION POLICY FOR THE SOUTH

In the foregoing discussion, certain factual data have been presented. From

these and a careful study of other facts, it may be concluded that:

1. The South's population has increased at a slower rate during the last two decades than has the population in other sections of the country.
2. The rate of natural increase of population is much higher in the Southern States than in the rest of the United States.
3. These two propositions are in conflict with each other, but may be explained by,
4. The fact that migration out of the South has relieved the area of substantial numbers of its people (Odum shows a net outflux of about 3,400,000), and
5. The immigrants to the United States from abroad have settled largely in areas outside the South, thus swelling the population in the latter territory and adding very little to the former.
6. That these two factors, 5 and 6 above, have counteracted the effect of the high ratio of births to deaths in the South, as compared with the other states, is shown by the fact that the South's population has remained, since 1870, at about 28 per cent of the total population of the nation.
7. The fact that migration has eased the population tension in the South in the past does not obviate the condition as to the high rates of natural increase within the South, but leaves this to be faced as a very important population problem in the future.
8. In the face of these high rates of natural increase, it has been shown that the Southern States rank near the bottom among the states of the nation in per capita wealth and in per capita personal income, as well as in several other economic indexes as shown in certain recognized socio-economic studies.
9. Material standards of living should not be over-stressed at the expense of certain psycho-social standards, even though the latter may be somewhat an outgrowth of the former, or correlated therewith. People do tend to rate certain psychic standards at a high worth, and some of which have little material or economic value; such, for instance, as the pleasures and satisfactions derived from having large families, even though this may reduce the spending power per member.
10. The South has, admittedly, a much lower

²⁸ Carle C. Zimmerman, *Consumption and Standards of Living*, D. Van Nostrand Co., New York, 1936, p. 212.

rate of per capita consumption of economic goods than the remainder of the country, and this condition has existed for a long period of time.

11. The South compares very unfavorably with the rest of the nation in matters of education, illiteracy, and in expenditures for certain other socio-economic activities. This precipitates the question of national living standards, and implies that many social and public welfare activities should be analyzed in the light of national interests and consideration.²⁰
12. The material standard of living of a people is the ratio between the amount of available, effective purchasing power, and the number of people. This furnishes a direct point of attack for increasing the living standards.
13. According to the above formula, there are two alternatives facing the South in shaping a population policy: (a) decreasing the number of its people, either by emigration, or by restrictions upon the birth rate, or by permitting the death rate to increase faster than the birth rate; and (b) augmenting the effective purchasing power available to the masses of the people of the South. This furnishes perhaps the most efficacious method of elevating the standard of living of Southern people that is available at present. But the achievement of this goal is complicated by national and international considerations. In seeking an expansion of markets for Southern products, the tariff and other trade barriers claim attention, and the Federal government is the only agency qualified to handle these economic factors. If the South should desire to abandon the strict cotton economy which has characterized its agriculture in the past, and to adopt a more diversified or a different type of farming, then inter-regional competition and considerations must be recognized.
14. The South might consider bringing in additional industries, or developing those

already in existence; but these also have their outside component relationships, and this must be realized.

15. Perhaps one factor needs special emphasis in connection with the South's efforts to enhance its standard of living; namely, the more efficient use of labor on an annual basis, rather than on a seasonal basis as it has been in the past, but this is tied up with the whole background of cotton culture and tradition.
16. No greater need presents itself than that of continuous effort to improve and to increase the education and the educational facilities of the South, especially insofar as the masses of people are concerned. Education is the bulwark of any civilization, and there is no estimating the limits to which a free people may go when motivated by a sound and judicious educational ideal and program.
17. Under modern conditions of life the inter-relationships between rural and urban aggregates are so entwined and are of such mutual and reciprocal character, both within the South and between the South and other areas, that a united effort should be put forth to create a unified attack upon the problem of living standards. The cities within the South and in other sections are dependent upon the rural population of the South and elsewhere for the food supply and other economic goods. Also there seems to be no question but that purchasing power is concentrated in urban areas. These two conditions indicate a grave need for rural-urban cooperation in attacking all problems that are of mutual concern. This applies to education, health, recreation, and many other advantages. And it does not overlook the matter of public highways, which constitute the arteries of modern life. Society is geared to these, and to electrical power lines, and all people separated from these two modern utilities are still, relatively isolated, somewhat as they were a quarter of a century ago. They must turn to the non-material (family, neighbors, etc.) or social interactional types of enjoyments. It is not theirs to enjoy the creations of the technological civilization. If they are ever able to do so, it must be through the efforts of the society, of which they are a constituent part, and to which they look for the opportunities offered at the hands of technology.

²⁰ Wooster has the following comment along this line: "Also owing to migration, it is evident that a child born in Mississippi or Alabama has, in about 12 per cent of the cases, made his life contribution to some other section, say New York or Illinois. For this reason, the educational and cultural level of the Southern population is almost as much of national as it is of sectional concern." Quoted in Odum, *op. cit.* p. 473.

SAMPLING THEORY IN SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

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THE literature of current sociological research shows conspicuously few studies that make careful use of any accepted theory of sampling. This situation seems to be due partly to difficulties in imposing the severe requirements of a mathematical sampling theory upon the complex and uncontrolled problems which sociologists usually choose to study, partly to the prevalence of an imperfect understanding of the existing theory and its demands, and finally to the failure of the theory itself to provide many needed sampling errors for stratified samples. The present paper is an attempt to interpret, in as non-mathematical and as practical a way as possible, the meaning of the basic sampling theory as applied to social research, in the hope of directing more attention to the problem and some of its difficulties.

A first distinction that needs to be made clear in any discussion of sampling is that between what we will call a *dynamic universe* and a *static population*. The former is a set of factors or causes that acts to produce certain results, and that may produce such results indefinitely and in any desired number. For this reason it is spoken of as an "infinite" universe. The static population, on the contrary, is a group of results, technically called "events," produced by the action of a dynamic universe. When separated from the dynamic universe that produced it, such a population is fixed both in composition and in number, and is therefore often termed a "limited" universe. If one is concerned with the results of repeated tosses of a set of pennies or dice, or with the recurrent death rate of a defined population subject to specified conditions, one has a dynamic

universe. In this case, the chance, p , of throwing a head or a six, or of a person dying, is a function of the number of sides and balance of a penny or die, or of the age, sex, and living conditions of a person. However, the proportion of heads, sixes, or deaths resulting from any one toss of several pennies or dice or from any one registration of deaths over a year will vary somewhat from those of other tosses or registrations, due to many small and unbiassed or "random" factors; but the amount of such variation can be measured by standard error formulas, provided the assumptions on which the latter are derived are satisfied in taking the sample.

The best known type of sampling is called by Yule¹ "simple" sampling, and by some other writers Bernoullian sampling. The conditions that distinguish it are three: (1) Each member of the dynamic universe (e.g., a penny, a die, a person) must have the same biassed chance, p , of producing an event defined as a "success" (a "head," an ace, a death) when tossed or otherwise exposed to the action of the dynamic universe. In other words, all biassed factors must affect equally all members of a dynamic universe over an experimental period; (2) the mean biassed chance of success, \bar{p} , in the dynamic universe must remain the same from sample to sample; and (3) the biassed chance, p , of any member of the dynamic universe becoming a success must not be affected or influenced by any other member.

The technique of sampling a dynamic universe under the conditions of simple sampling consists in making sure that

¹ Yule, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, chapter XIII. Davis and Nelson, *Elements of Statistics*, pp. 322-328.

these three conditions are met. In the artificial situation, say 1,000 pennies are taken, all of which are known *a priori* to be approximately identical with respect to balance between head and tail, and tossed. Of, if p is not $\frac{1}{2}$ but $\frac{1}{3}$, dice instead of pennies are thrown. If p is $\frac{1}{8}$ or any other value, drawings are made from a shuffled deck of cards, or from an urn of well mixed balls, some white and some black. Whenever an urn of balls or a deck of cards is used, each ball or card drawn is replaced before the next is taken, to maintain the assumption of an infinite universe. Notice that the penny, the die, the urn of balls, or the deck of cards represents the *individual member* of the dynamic universe, and that the chance of success, p , in penny ($\frac{1}{2}$), die ($\frac{1}{6}$), urn, or deck ($s/(s + f)$, where s = number of "successes" and f = number of "failures"), is the biased chance of success of the individual member. Thus if a member of a female population 20 years of age has a chance of death of .00210, the deck used to represent the chances of death of this individual should contain 10,000 cards and include 21 aces ("successes" or chances of death), or approximately 500 cards of which one is an ace.

In actual sociological research, however, the chance of success of the individual member, p , is not known *a priori*, for if it were there would be no point in sampling to find it. Therefore one cannot set up a penny, a die, or a deck of cards to represent the chances of success of any member of the dynamic universe, and "toss" or "draw" the universe in this way. Instead, in order to satisfy the requirement that p remain the same from member to member, it is almost always necessary to limit severely the definition of a dynamic universe, in order to exclude those members who are subjected to biased factors different from those to which the remain-

ing members are exposed. That is, a definite set of biased factors, or a homogeneous universe of members, is separated off for simple sampling. Next, this homogeneous dynamic universe must be "tossed" by allowing the defined biased factors and random factors to act on the members over a period and convert them into static events, or "successes" and "failures." If during this period the biased factors vary for some members, they must be omitted from the results; or if the variation is general, the whole sample must be abandoned.

To meet the second requirement of simple sampling in dealing with a dynamic universe, it is necessary that each sample shall use members having the same mean chance of success, \bar{p} , as those of other samples; which is equivalent to saying that each sample must be subject to approximately the same set of biased factors. In social research, it is usually difficult to be sure that a complex dynamic universe will continue or recur essentially unchanged relative to the mean chance of success, \bar{p} ; but this can be approximately accomplished by selecting carefully defined and relatively simple universes or sets of factors which are of frequent importance as components into which more complex social situations may be resolved.

The third requirement of Bernoullian sampling, that the chance of success, p , of each member of the dynamic sample shall be independent of the influence of other members, is also a matter calling for intimate knowledge of the biased factors operating in the defined universe. Where dependence is discovered between two or more members, they should be excluded from the universe and sample.

The theory of simple sampling may now be applied to a rather typical sociological problem, but simpler than most. It is wanted to know if divorce in our society

is commoner among couples where the wife is a youngest child than among couples where this is not the case. The significance of the difference between the divorce rates of the two classes of couples is to be tested by the use of the standard error of simple sampling ($E_p^2 = pq/n$).² This means that the conditions of simple sampling mentioned above must be complied with in taking the samples. First, the biased chance of divorce, p , must be the same for every couple in the dynamic universe at the beginning of and during some trial period. Of course, this is not true of couples at random. Age, presence or absence of children, time married, occupation of husband, urban or rural residence, religion, and other factors affect the likelihood of divorce. Therefore, if possible, an approximately homogeneous dynamic universe with respect to these factors must be set up. This can be done only by careful definition, made possible by a thorough knowledge of the subject in hand. Thus it may be specified that the couples in a sample must be alike in regard to age, time married, occupation of husband, and so on. If one is satisfied that the biased chance of divorce is essentially equal among couples that meet these specifications, one may turn to the second requirement. Will the dynamic universe thus limited by definition continue or recur? This question may probably be answered in the affirmative, at least for a period of decades. The final requirement to which the sample must be subjected is that no couple in it shall influence the chance of divorce of another. This can probably be taken care of by selecting couples that have never heard of one another. Next it is necessary to find couples of the proper

description to form two adequate samples, one in which the wives are youngest children, and one in which they are not. Of course, if couples can be obtained that have already been exposed to divorce under valid conditions for a sufficient period, say ten years, they are preferable to couples that must be observed for that length of time. The difficulty of recruiting such samples is obviously very great. Suppose, however, that we succeed in getting them. It then remains only to count the number and estimate the proportion of divorces in each of the two samples, and apply the standard error of simple sampling of attributes to test the reality of their difference.

In carrying through the method of simple sampling a dynamic universe in this illustration, the reader will have noticed that it has been necessary to limit severely the generality of the initial question. As a result, the claim can only be made that couples like those defined in the reduced homogeneous universe show, say, an increased tendency toward divorce if the wife is a youngest child. If it is wanted to test the broader hypothesis that applies on the average to all sorts of couples, this cannot be done by the method of Bernoullian sampling.

It is evident from the discussion to this point that the first requirement of simple sampling, that the chance of success must be the same from member to member of a dynamic universe, usually involves the sociological investigator in three practical difficulties: (1) He is compelled to cut down the dynamic universe sharply in order to provide homogeneous conditions. Although simplification is scientifically desirable, reducing the universe to a single stratum generally changes the meaning of the findings in ways quite contrary to the investigator's interest and purpose; (2) it is seldom easy and often impossible to set

² $q = 1 - p$, and n is the number of members in the sample. A difference is "significant" if it is highly improbable that it is due to random errors of sampling.

up with confidence any definition of a complex universe that will insure that p is the same from member to member; (3) if the investigator succeeds in devising a satisfactory definition, he has trouble in finding a sufficiently large sample of members who meet it.

For reasons such as these, it would seem desirable in sociological research to follow a method of sampling on which the first condition of simple sampling is not imposed. We therefore turn to a type of sampling which assumes that the chance of success, p , is not the same from member to member of the dynamic universe. However, the second condition of simple sampling, that the mean chance of success, \bar{p} , shall be unchanged from sample to sample, continues to hold. This is usually called stratified sampling under Poisson conditions.³ The method is to draw a sample composed of a sub-set of members from each of several strata of the dynamic universe, the number of members taken in each sub-set being proportional to the population of the stratum from which it is drawn. A stratum consists of a group of members each with approximately the same chance of success, p_i , and each stratum differs from the other strata in the value of its p . Within a stratum, moreover, all three of the conditions of simple sampling must hold. It thus appears that the Poisson method multiplies some of the difficulties of simple sampling, in proportion to the number of strata present. Each stratum must be defined in terms of the factors that control the value of p from member to member, just as the universe was in the case of Bernoullian sampling. The advantage of Poisson sampling, however, lies in the fact that the universe need not be restricted as in simple sampling, since any group of members differ-

ing from the rest is not now excluded from the universe and sample, but becomes a separate stratum which is proportionately represented in the sample.

The application of Poisson sampling to a dynamic universe may also be briefly illustrated with the problem of divorce among couples where the wife is or is not a youngest child. If this dynamic universe and its strata are not already fully known, the important strata must be discovered and defined before a Poisson sample can be taken. As in the case of simple sampling, the major factors that are known to control the divorce rate, which are the presence or absence of children, occupation of husband, religion, and so on, are determined. Only those combinations of factors are taken as strata that are found actually to occur in the universe, as shown, if necessary, by preliminary inspection of a large number of members (couples) taken at random. Thus one stratum may consist of Catholic couples with children where the head is an unskilled laborer, another of Protestant couples of the same kind, a third of Protestant couples without children where the head is a business man, etc. After a satisfactory estimate of the relative populations of the several strata in the universe is obtained, the next step is to take a sample containing n_i members proportional to the population of stratum 1, n_i members proportional to the population of stratum 2, etc. If a sample that has already been properly "tossed" cannot be secured, it must be observed over a period. Two identical samples are taken, except that one contains couples in which the wife is a youngest child and the other couples in which she is not. For both samples, the proportion of successes is found in each stratum, and the weighted mean proportion of successes, \bar{p} , in the total sample is calculated. The significance of the differences in divorce rates

³ *Handbook of Mathematical Statistics*, Rietz, ed., p. 84. Yule, *op. cit.*, chapter XIV.

between the two samples is finally tested by the use of Bernoullian standard errors within each stratum, and by Poisson standard errors ($E_p^2 = \bar{p}q/n - \sigma_p^2/n$) for the whole samples, or by other devices. Because the difference between the Poisson and Bernoullian standard errors is usually small, the latter slightly over-stating the former, and because the latter is simpler to compute, the Bernoullian error is often used as an approximation for the Poisson.

It is obvious that a Poisson sample is hard to manage, unless the dynamic universe in which we are interested happens to be well known and clearly stratified or stratifiable with respect to factors that control the defined chance of success. This is the chief obstacle to Poisson sampling in sociological investigations. Another difficulty appears in the fact that the sampling errors for certain statistics have not yet been made available for this kind of sampling. It nevertheless seems to be the method most suitable for sociological use, because it permits the testing of much more complete hypotheses than does simple sampling. Moreover, when the extent and composition of a dynamic universe is so little known that Poisson sampling is impossible, it is questionable whether much confidence can be placed in any kind of sample taken from it. In such a case, the proper course is first to explore the universe by frankly hit-or-miss sampling before representative sampling is undertaken at all.

Another method of stratified sampling is known as Lexis sampling.⁴ It encounters the same difficulties as Poisson sampling, and has a much larger standard error, which applies only to a sample drawn from a single stratum. It is seldom of practical use in social investigations, and will not be described here.

⁴ Rietz, *op. cit.*

Thus far the sampling of a dynamic or causal universe of infinite potential output of events has been considered. Suppose, however, that interest centers only in the results of a single toss of a large set of pennies; or in the death-rate of an historical population in a given year, and nothing is cared about the results of further tosses of the same set of pennies, or about the death-rate of identical populations exposed to similar conditions over an equal period. The problem is now one of sampling a static population or "limited" universe, i.e., of sampling a sample population of events produced by an undefined dynamic universe. We have the results of tossing say 100,000 pennies, or the mortality resulting from a year's exposure to death of say 100,000 persons, and being unable to examine the whole record, wish to judge of it by a sample. Since the events have already happened, there is no concern about their chance of happening. The practical situation is now best illustrated by a deck of cards, in which each card represents a static event, e.g., a survival or a death.

How does the sampling of a limited universe compare with the sampling of a dynamic or infinite universe? The true mean proportion of successes, \bar{p} , is now determined simply by the proportion of successes in the total static population being sampled. The first condition of simple sampling, that each member of the dynamic universe must have the same chance of producing a success, now becomes merely a requirement that the chance of drawing a success from the static population or deck must remain the same from one draw or "event" to another. This makes it necessary to replace each card drawn before drawing the next. The second and third requirements of simple sampling can also be satisfied only if a drawn card or sample is returned to

the deck before another is taken. But the effect of such replacements is to create an infinite universe, whereas what is being sampled is a limited universe. It is therefore seen that theoretically simple sampling cannot be applied to a limited universe. In sampling a static population the cards should not be replaced, and the correction $(N - n)/(N - 1)^8$ should be multiplied into the standard error squared formulas appropriate to sampling a dynamic or infinite universe.

The technique of random sampling a static population consists ideally in assigning each event in the population a number, and taking a sample of n events by the use of Tippett's Random Numbers, rejecting any repetition of the same number, or by entering the numbers on cards, shuffling, and drawing, without replacements. Still another method often used is to take every t^{th} name or card, t being so small that no stratum will be skipped. Notice that the circumstance that a well-mixed population of static events has been obtained by means of Tippett's Numbers or cards, with the chance of drawing a success approximately the same from draw to draw in a large universe, is no assurance whatever that the chance of becoming a success was approximately the same from member to member in the dynamic universe. It can only be said that a sample drawn by the above method shows the proportion of successes, \bar{p} , in the limited universe from which it was drawn, within random errors of sampling. The standard error formula suitable here is that of simple sampling a dynamic universe, corrected to adapt it to a limited universe: $E_p^2 = (pq/n)(N - n)/(N - 1)$. This method applies even if the static population is stratified, since any stratified events present are mixed by the process of randomization.

⁸ N is the population of the limited universe, n of the sample.

A representative sample, however, can be drawn with more certainty from a definitely stratified population of known composition by the method of stratified sampling than by random sampling, because the latter depends upon chance mixing to obtain a proportional representation from each stratum, while the former obtains it systematically. Stratified sampling of a static population consists simply in taking a sample composed of a proportional number of events from each stratum, the technique of sampling within each stratum being that just described for random sampling a static population. The correct standard error formula is now $E_p^2 = (pq/n - \sigma_p^2/n)(N - n)/(N - 1)$.

The method of random sampling a static population may be employed, for example, to determine what proportion of cases receiving emergency relief in a city had ever received relief before 1933—a purely historical question. A number is assigned to each name on the relief rolls, and a sample is drawn by the use of Tippett's Numbers, probably the most effective device for randomization, or by taking every t^{th} name. From this sample the mean proportion, \bar{p} , of families that received relief at any time before 1933 is computed. This P represents the true proportion of such cases on the relief rolls with a standard error of sampling of $E_p^2 = (pq/n)(N - n)/(N - 1)$.

It is accordingly seen that when a static population is sampled, there is no obligation to define the difficult causal situations which occur in dealing with a dynamic universe; and that if all of the events can be catalogued, a random sample may very readily and effectively be drawn from them. It also appears that in dealing with a static population random sampling may be used to test as broad hypotheses as we please, provided they are historical only, since it is no longer necessary to reduce

the universe by definition to meet the requirement that every member must have the same chance of becoming a success. These are considerable advantages. As a matter of fact, when sociologists do systematic sampling, they generally do sampling of this kind. The method, however, has two disadvantages. First, it is often not possible to catalogue all of the events even of a limited universe; but then substitute devices, like covering a map with small squares⁶ and sampling them, may sometimes be used. Second, the method does not allow the findings to be extended beyond the unique population from which the sample is drawn.

As yet the discussion has dealt specifically only with sampling for attributes, i.e., non-measured, dichotomous traits, like the "head" or "tail" of a penny, "male" or "female," "employed" or "unemployed." Sampling for variables is no less important than sampling for attributes, but was not introduced earlier because the same arguments apply.⁷ A single value of the variable is simply substituted for a single event in our previous statements. Very brief attention to the case of sampling for variables, however, seems desirable to round out the interpretation.

Whereas in sampling a dynamic universe for attributes we are concerned with whether or not a member becomes a success, in sampling for variables we are interested in what value of a specified variable is thrown up by the dynamic universe. The requirements of simple sampling for variables are: The chance of obtaining any given value of the variable must be the same from member to member in the dynamic universe, and from sample to sample

and the occurrence of each value of the variable must be independent of the occurrence of every other. Similarly, Poisson sampling for variables requires that the chance of obtaining any given value of the variable shall change from member to member in the dynamic universe, but shall be the same from sample to sample.

Sampling a dynamic universe for variables may be applied to investigating the cost of living of farmers in a state. The factors determining the values of this variable include net farm income, size of family, purchasing power of the dollar, etc. As we go at random from farm to farm on the first of the year, the chance that the cost of living at the end of the year will be any particular value of course is not the same. Here also if the first condition of simple sampling is to be met, the universe must be restricted to a stratum of farms with similar net income, size of family, and so on. Again, no farm should be included in the sample because another farm is.⁸

Just as a static population of attributes may be sampled, so may a static population of the values of a variable. Thus if we have cost of living figures for 10,000 farms for a certain year, we may draw from the list a sample of say 1,000 by the random method, or if the list is stratified and we prefer, by the stratified method, as

⁸ In Poisson sampling for variables in a dynamic universe, or in stratified sampling for variables in a static population, if feasible the number of members drawn from any stratum should be proportional to the population of the stratum times the standard deviation of the values of the variable in the stratum around the mean of the stratum.

Discussions of sampling that should be of special interest to sociologists are given by Bowley in the *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, September, 1936, pp. 474 ff., and by Jensen and others in the *Bulletin de l'institut international de statistique*, tome XXII, 1ere livraison, 1925, troisieme partie, p. 359 ff.

⁶ This, however, is still another type of sampling, discussed in the last reference given at the end of the paper as "purposive" sampling, the unit being not an "event" but a group of events.

⁷ Yule, op. cit., chapter XVII.

already described, without regard for the causal situation that produced the figures.

In summary, it has appeared that perhaps the chief reason for the infrequency in sociological research of cases of sampling a dynamic or causal universe which seriously attempt to meet the requirements of the mathematical theory of simple or Poisson sampling is the complexity and unknown nature of the situations with which sociologists commonly deal. If much scientific control or predictability is to be gained over these situations, they must be broken down into much simpler units. The standard methods of sampling a dy-

namic universe may then be applied, and the device of the standard error of sampling may validly be used for the testing of hypotheses. Under these conditions, the Poisson method of sampling, often necessarily preceded by exploratory or non-representative sampling, seems best adapted for most sociological problems. The sampling procedure now most often used by sociologists is that of random sampling a static population of events. This method is satisfactory only so long as sociologists are interested in historical description.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE TEACHING OF SOCIOLOGY

At the Birmingham meeting of the Southern Sociological Society three papers were presented to the section on the Teaching of Sociology. The papers gave emphasis to the teaching of sociology in secondary education. Harold D. Meyer, Chairman of the Committee, presented the first paper on (1) "The Certification of Teachers" and (2) "The Training of Teachers." The second paper was presented by Belle Boone Beard,—"A Study of the Content of Courses in Sociology in the Secondary Schools of Eleven Southern States."* D. G. Stout read the third paper, on "In-Service Aids to High School Teachers of Sociology."

The papers indicated a growing interest in the subject of sociology on the part of secondary schools. At the present time very little is being done to certify teachers in this field. There is little evidence to show that any special attention is being paid to training teachers for this subject at the present time. In the field of course content there is a wide variety of subject matter being taught in the name of sociology, social studies, or social sciences. Many practical ways in which departments of sociology could help the high schools in enriching their offering in this field were brought forward. The following recommendations were offered:

1. That a committee be appointed to collaborate with the Commission on Curriculum Problems and Research of the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, to study carefully together the many aspects of this problem; and

2. That a committee be appointed from the Southern Sociological Society to confer with the committee on the teaching of sociology from the American Sociological Society in the interest of this field.

The Society voted to continue the committee on the teaching of sociology with a special committee to be appointed to study the teaching of sociology in the secondary schools and follow out the suggested recommendations.

*This paper in its entirety is printed in the *Bulletin of Sweet Briar College*, "Research Studies and Reports," May 1937, Vol. XX, No. 2, p. 21.

PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

SOME CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL CASE WORK*

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INTRODUCTION

EVERY technical and professional field during the course of its development acquires concepts whose connotations and specific meanings are peculiar to itself. Engineers converse in a language replete with mathematical formulae; physicians speak of basal metabolic rates and electro-cardiograms; and lawyers attach specific meaning to "objection," "brief," and "cross-examination." Although professionally young, social workers also use in their speaking and writing conceptual terms having particular significance to social workers alone.

The advantages of a professional vocabulary are obvious. It is conducive to more accurate thinking. Speed and ease of expression result from the continued use of professional terms. Upon an examination of the professional vocabulary of the social workers, certain conditions appear. First, social workers have borrowed terms from other professions without using them in their original explicit meanings; secondly, there is apparent a loose and uncritical acceptance of these terms by social

workers. The latter is particularly true of students who are just entering the field of social work and are rapidly exposed to a mass of technical literature employing words and phrases which are not sharply defined.

In this study we are attempting to discuss a selected number of social work concepts with the hope of coming to an agreement about their meaning. The word *concept* as set forth by Eubank involves a combination of two things: (1) On the content side it stands for a distinctive idea; (2) on the linguistic side it stands for the term which is the verbal symbol of that idea.¹ The difficulty in social case work lies in the discrepancy between these two component elements of a concept. Whereas linguistically the terms are common parlance, there is a baffling heterogeneity in reference to content.

The beginning of any scientific procedure, such as classification of descriptive data, implies an acceptance of the constant terminology peculiar to that discipline. In developing an outline to be used as a basis for the evaluation of social case records, certain terms involving concepts

* We are indebted to the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota whose fluid research funds made this study possible.—*Authors.*

¹ E. Eubank. *The Concepts of Sociology*, p. 28—D. C. Heath Co., N. Y., 1932.

were employed.² It was necessary to analyze these terms carefully, both as they appeared in the dictionary and as they were used in social case work theory and practice. It was found that there was a departure from the dictionary definition in many of the terms. They have come to mean more than definitions, inasmuch as they have been conditioned by the experience of social workers and the development of social work. These terms, therefore, are not merely definitive but also have conceptual meaning.

CONCEPTS

PROCESS, METHOD, TECHNIQUE.³ Process, method, and technique are three concepts often used interchangeably and synonymously but erroneously. *Process*, as commonly employed in industry, refers to the various forms of treatment to which certain raw materials are subjected in the effort to utilize these raw materials in as many finished forms as possible. *Process*,

² Evaluation outline prepared by students in a seminar in advanced case work at the University of Minnesota. Mimeographed, 1936.

³ *Technique*. 1. (pop) A characteristic way of achieving a given end by specially skilled manual and other bodily activity as distinguished from mere verbalization. 2. (exper) The specific way or means of securing data or of working upon an experimental problem. Technique may involve method, procedure, apparatus, and (psych) the individuality of the experimenter or the observer. It is limited to the conduct of research as distinct from the treatment of results. Warren, *Dictionary of Psychology*. Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1934.

Method. 1. A systematic and general manner of working, especially in the endeavor to reach scientific truths. 2. A special manner of working in science. Warren, *ibid*.

Process. 1. A change or a transformation of activity in any object or organism as contrasted with the constitution or structure of that object or organism. 2. The manner in which a change is effected. 3. Any sensation or other content observed as a mere occurrence without reference to its meaning or value. Warren, *ibid*.

as used in social case work, usually means the general procedure by which social case treatment is effected. Indiscriminate use of this word to mean either *method* or *technique* brings on the confusion in concepts referred to in the introduction.

An analogy can be drawn to illustrate graphically the demarcations of content which are mutually exclusive in these concepts. A certain cadenza in the Beethoven Emperor piano concerto consists of a series of notes played rapidly in succession and involves a difficult fingering of the left hand. Now there are the A and B schools of piano-forte. Teacher A plays the concerto passage with a certain particular fingering; teacher B plays the same passage with another fingering. These two *ways* of playing the same passage constitute two separate *methods*. A concert pianist, employing either A or B method, plays the passage brilliantly, with mechanical perfection. His manner of playing, his skill of performance in the method constitute the *technique*.

Process means orderly action in its simplest form. There is no connotation of good or bad in the concept of process. Eubank uses the concept of action and process interchangeably, distinguishing, however, between action as random movement, and process as orderly, related and sequential movement.⁴ Small uses the concept in terms of a collection of occurrences, each of which has a meaning for every other, the whole of which constitutes a sort of becoming.⁵

An example from a case may clarify this point:

1/2/31. Mr. A refused to attend citizenship classes at the Lowell Evening High School. Visitor tried to explain to Mr. A that his welfare would be

⁴ Eubank, *op. cit.* Ch. XIII, p. 226.

⁵ Small, *General Sociology*, p. 513—Univ. of Chicago Press, 1905.

aided by obtaining citizenship papers. Mr. A was adamant. Finally Visitor convinced Mrs. A through suggestion that Mr. A. should attend these classes.

1/9/31. Mrs. A notified Visitor over telephone that Mr. A was attending class regularly.

The *process* here, roughly speaking, is giving Mr. A the opportunity for securing an education. The *method* is getting him to attend evening school through suggestion. The visitor may have advised or threatened Mrs. A; each of these would constitute another method. The skill with which the methods are employed constitute technique. If the case worker through suggestion can rekindle within Mr. A his early ambition to become an educated person, then a method has been used skillfully, or with *technique*. There are degrees in the actual performance of any method, i.e., one worker may employ the same method more expertly than another. However, *technique* as employed in social case work has a positive connotation and implies a skillful performance. Referring to the cited case of Mr. and Mrs. A, the visitor skillfully suggested to Mrs. A that she convince her husband that it would be desirable to begin school.

As a social case work concept, we can then define *process* as answering to the description of orderly action in treatment attempted either by or for the client; *method* as the way or means by which the action is effected; and *technique* as the degree of skill, the finesse, called into play in advancing that *method*.

FACTOR.⁶ Factor is a common word in social case work that has acquired a par-

⁶ *Factor*. 1. (Math) One of two or more quantities that, when multiplied together, produce a given quantity. 2. One of several elements or causes that produce a result, as energy, courage, and perseverance were factors in his success. Funk and Wagnall. *New Standard Dictionary of the English Language*.

1. One of the elements, circumstances, or influences that contribute to produce a result; a constit-

ticular conceptual meaning. The breadth of any given hypothesis regarding a case work problem is predicated on a number of factors. In isolating the approach to the problem by considering only one factor, we fail to have enough factors to effect treatment. We lose focus and regard the factor as a causative element rather than as a contributory one. That is, instead of a factor merely influencing the course of case treatment of a particular problem, it is really considered as causative in relation to that problem.

To illustrate, we may consider the concept of factor in relation to a pyramidal structure of case treatment. At the base are all the possible factors involved, and as the case treatment progresses, we may eliminate those factors antagonistic to the pyramidal development so that, when the apex of the treatment pyramid is reached, the goal is achieved on the basis of relevant factors. However, actual case work practice tends to lose sight of this desired pyramidal development and many factors are thus carried along in case treatment that have no structural and functional relationship to the apex of treatment goal. Thus this concept in essence is the process of reducing and refining the many factors at the outset of treatment into a few tested and treatment effecting factors as the case progresses. An approximation of the treatment goal can only be reached by such an elimination.

Although every factor in social study and social treatment has logical relation, the factors retained are selected not because they fit an hypothesis, but on the contrary, the hypothesis grows out of the social factors retained. It is the skill of

uent. 2. (Math) A quantity by which a measure must be multiplied or divided in order to express in other terms. Webster. *New International Dictionary*. Second Edition.

the case worker which brings them into a perspective.

SITUATION.⁷ *Situation*⁸ as a concept employed by social case workers today refers generally to the sum of the various facts which together represent a total picture of a client. However, it is used more in the sense of "setting," "dilemma," or "circumstance" than in the dictionary definition of the term and is broader both in meaning and connotation than "environment," including internal as well as external stimuli. *Situation* covers all factors, such as financial or economic, cultural, social, and psychological. It embraces all elements which show one client to be a case separate and distinct from another.

For the A family, the configuration of factors in describing the situation was as follows:

Situation: The A family was first known to FWA 10-26-34, when Mr. A went himself to the main office and requested assistance with 'the budget and to plan payments on bills.' He was emphatic about the fact that he was not asking for financial assistance but for budgetary services only. He was employed at the time as a porter in the barber shop of the Men's Recreation Center, earning approximately \$80.00 per month including tips, and was more than \$250.00 in debt to a dozen or more creditors, all of whom were pressing for payment.

Beside Mr. A, the family consisted of Mrs. A, 33, and Mary Lou, 4, an adopted child—an offspring of an illicit union between a Negro man and a Caucasian married woman. Mr. and Mrs. A had no children of their own and took this means of making their

⁷ *Situation.* 1. The stimulus-pattern which affects an individual at a given moment or during the receptive period. 2. The environment and the organism in that environment at a given moment. 3. Place or locality in which a given object exists. Warren, *op. cit.*

⁸ Eubank in *The Concepts of Sociology*, p. 106, defines the term as "the various selves into which (a person) is divided vertically, so to speak, by the succession of events, experiences, and situations in which he participates.

married life complete. Mrs. A had no work outside the home and it was through her determination that the wage assignments were made effective. Later on 'she had sold Mr. A on the importance of budgeting and has made him agree to the plan.'

The concept *situation*, as employed in case work refers to a particular individual patterning of events and existent factors in relation to some specific personal or family situation. It is a recognition of Gestalt in things economic, social, emotional, and intellectual.

INFORMATION.⁹ The term *information* involves a different set of concepts. It relates to knowledge. The definitions of information given below show clearly that it consists in the assimilation of facts rather than in the facts themselves. If we subscribe to this definition of *information*, we will avoid the pitfalls inherent in considering it factual or as evidence to be relied upon. There is a tendency for many social workers to give credence to any bit of acquired knowledge without recognizing that information of itself only entitles them to their own ideas about any fact. This lethargy of case workers probably accounts for their failure to test information before making it the basis of an hypothesis.

Consider but a few illustrations taken from case records. The following excerpts

⁹ *Information.* 1. Knowledge acquired, derived, or inculcated, as by observation, by reading, or study, or in conversation. 2. Timely or specific knowledge respecting some matter of interest or inquiry. 3. (Philos) The act or process by which any object impresses itself upon the mind so as to become an object of knowledge. Funk and Wagnall, *op. cit.*

1. Act or process of informing as communication of knowledge. 2. Knowledge of a special event, situation, or the like. Facts ready for communication or use. Webster, *op. cit.*

1. Factors or ideas acquired by an individual in any manner, such as observation, experiment, reading, oral instruction. 2. Implications concerning the content of consciousness. Warren, *op. cit.*

have been used as information both in diagnosis and treatment. "Mr. K still threatened to go home to his mother." . . . "Before his marriage, Mr. K had been a 'rounder.'" "It was only through the influence of his brother John that Mr. K had finally decided to marry her. For a year after their marriage they did not live together. Mr. K had purposely quit a job so that he would not have to support his wife." Or, Mr. A "tried to ape the rich men he saw at the Men's Recreation Center. . . . He liked to gamble, play golf, and wear good clothes. . . . Mrs. A said it had not been unusual for Mr. A to lose \$70.00 an evening gambling."

The information in these instances is largely judgmental rather than factual. Information used by case workers as such is a combination of essential facts colored by the worker's interpretation of them.

BEHAVIOR.¹⁰ The concept of *behavior* is generally accepted by case workers without any great variations in meaning. They have added to its dictionary definition the psychiatric concept that it is purposive and symptomatic. Along with this psychiatric interpretation, has developed consciously or unconsciously the habit of recording only the *behavior* that tends to deviate from the normal—those actions that stand out as queer and which may possibly be labelled as liabilities.

¹⁰ *Behavior*. 1. Act or manner of behaving, either absolutely or in relation to others; mode of conducting oneself. 2. Action or reaction in relation to environment. 3. (Biol) That which an organism does, involving action and response to stimulation; conduct. 4. (Psych) The individual's activities, considered as eventuating either visibly in muscular movement or invisibly in glandular secretion. Webster, *op. cit.*

1. Manner of conducting oneself, whether good or bad, especially in external relations of life; also personal conduct or the course of action toward others. 2. Manner of action under given circumstances. Funk and Wagnall, *op. cit.*

An interesting exception to this practice is to be found in the application of the Kenworthy ego-libido analysis of behavior. The separation of behavior into its constructive-destructive and positive-negative aspects has been a distinct contribution to social case treatment. This is true in spite of the fact that the method is subjective and the categories are not susceptible to accurate assignment.

Referring again to a case record we find that "Mr. K believed that Mrs. K might eventually lose her mind entirely. He could not understand her extreme nervousness at all times and great fear of the dark." . . . "Mrs. K referred to the anxiety caused her by not knowing why she was born . . . Mr. K complained of Mrs. K's tendency to nag."

While there is less confusion in the use of this concept, an emphasis upon its negative aspect may be equally as dangerous as any chaotic thinking. Constructive treatment cannot be based upon liabilities.

SUBJECTIVE.¹¹ The word *subjective* has come to be a term of opprobrium given to social work methods primarily by the other scientists. The opprobrium possibly has its genesis in the use of social case records in research. Social workers tend to be defensive about such criticism and attempt to justify themselves by saying the fault is inherent in the basic data. It is interesting to note that the best answer to this criticism has been made by the sociologist Reuter, who has shown that subjective methods in research have positive and constructive values.¹² The

¹¹ *Subjective*. 1. Not open to verification by other investigators. 2. Not admitting of record by physical instruments. 3. Dependent on the individual organism. Warren, *op. cit.*

¹² E. B. Reuter, "An Evaluation of the Subjective Method in Research." *Journal of Educational Sociology*, October, 1935.

prediction tables made in probation and parole have shown that case records have scientific value in spite of their subjective nature.¹³

Generally, there are three ways in which this term is employed in social case work practice. Two of them are associated with the connotation of opprobrium. The first of these refers to subjective attitudes of case workers toward the client and his situation. It signifies a tendency to identify projectively; that is, to project the case worker's reactions and attitudes upon the client.

The second of these "frowned-upon" meanings refers to subjective methods in research. The dictionary definition of *subjective* describes the term as "Not open to verification by other investigators." In this sense, there is stigma attached to the term because of the unreliability and lack of validity of data gathered. Precise instruments of measurement and controlled observation are deemed fundamental to research; other forms of research regardless of their significance and their content fall short of the standards set by the social scientists. However, Reuter states that one fruitful hypothesis, one idea, is worth more than a library of concrete investigations and reports.¹⁴

There is a third meaning of this term which has been received with acclaim and warmth. It is in regard to subjective process recording that we find it receiving acceptance and recognition. Robinson distinguishes between two types of essential processes. "A classification of essential processes which may be made . . . is (1) those processes that have to do with altering the material environment in order to meet the client's needs and (2) those that have to do with re-education of the

client's point of view or habits or attitudes or the changing of attitudes of other people toward the client."¹⁵ Later, in discussing this moot question of objectivity and subjectivity in case recording, Robinson states, "The worker's point of view, her philosophy of life, her own adjustment to life, are an essential part of her equipment and constitute part of her method in every piece of case work. But we are still in the stage of regarding these as personal factors in equipment and of wishing to exclude any recognition of them from our case records. A hang-over of self-consciousness restrains us from mentioning ourselves in the case record. Is not our refusal to recognize and analyze these personal factors an indication of the subjectivity and not the objectivity of our present level of case work and of record writing? We will never succeed in objectifying these personal factors by ignoring them but rather by trying to record and analyze them as impartially as we do all other factors that enter into treatment. Only when we have objectified and analyzed them to the same extent that we have the methods by which we manipulate the environment and when by doing so some of these processes have become standardized, can we afford to eliminate them from our records."

Subjectivity then, in process recording means critical self examination of one's own work in the changing of client attitudes. In reference to the first two concepts of subjectivity, it is possible that they are really forms of intensive self-evaluation and as such, are of considerable value in scientific study.

¹³ Ernest W. Burgess, "Is Prediction Feasible in Social Work?" *Social Forces*, June, 1929.

¹⁴ Reuter, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ Virginia Robinson, "An Analysis of Processes in the Records of Family Case Working Agencies." Pennsylvania School for Social Service, Series 1, No. 2, 1921, July p. 2.

OBJECTIVITY.¹⁶ The simplicity of the dictionary definition gives no clue to the importance social workers have attached to this term. There is probably no other word except possibly transfer, that has so many different meanings to the social case worker. It is considered sometimes as synonymous with impersonality. Sometimes it is considered as the ability to identify with the client through the mechanism of introjection. Impersonality means not allowing one's emotions to enter into the situation. Identifying through introjection in its simplest terms means viewing the situation in as nearly the same light as the client does, seeing, feeling, and understanding his emotional and affective responses. To project one's own feelings, etc. on the client in relation to treatment is an undesirable form of identification. If this type of identification is meant to be lack of objectivity, well may the opprobrious connotation be applied. However, in relation to one's own attitudes toward one's own emotional reactions, a critical examination, a probing into conscious and unconscious personal responses, is, in truth, a valuable form of evaluation surely qualifying as an objective procedure. On a rating scale for social workers, objectivity has been defined as a "professional relationship showing a grasp of a case work situation and an ability to represent it in a realistic and practical way, unbiased by prejudice and temperament."¹⁷

JUDGMENT.¹⁸ Social case workers are primarily concerned with *judgment* in its

dictionary sense. Webster describes *judgment* as the mental act of judging; the operation of the mind, involving comparison and discrimination by which knowledge of values and relations is mentally formulated. Funk and Wagnall (psych) define *judgment* as the mental act or attitude of decision with which the process of observation, comparison, or ratiocination is terminated; a true judgment always possesses to some degree the following characteristics: (a) it is not a mere fusion or mere association of sensations or ideas; (b) it always involves a peculiar affective or emotional element to which the term *belief* or *conviction* has applied; (c) it always asserts an activity of consciousness.

Karpf in *The Scientific Basis of Social Work* emphasized the importance of *judgments*.¹⁹ It was found that a great deal of descriptive material in case records was judgmental in nature. People were described as "odd," "peculiar," and "abnormal"; clothes were referred to as "shabby," "neat," and "immaculate"; and individual behavior was characterized by terms such as "vulgar," "refined," "polite," and "excited." The inclusion of these items of descriptive nature in

The application of a concept to a given situation or object. The second is more frequent in psychology, includes *evaluation* (in which reference is made to a series of standards of beauty, right, goodness, or economic worth. Warren, *op. cit.*

1. The pronouncing of an opinion or decision of a formal or authoritative nature; also the opinion or decision given, censure, criticism. 2. (Logic) The formal expression embodying a logical conclusion; a proposition viewed as a statement of something believed or asserted. Webster, *op. cit.*

1. The act or faculty of affirming or denying a conclusion, whether as a based upon a direct comparison of objects or ideas, or derived by a process of reasoning. 2. The result of judging. Funk and Wagnall, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ Karpf. *The Scientific Basis of Social Work*. Columbia Univ. Press, N. Y., 1931.

¹⁶ *Objectivity*. 1. Not dependent on the special bias or judgment of the individual observer. Warren, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ Leahy-Fenlason Rating Scale for Social Workers.

¹⁸ *Judgment*. 1. Mental act of relating two concepts, accompanied by the belief or assertion of some objective or intrinsic relation between the two. 2.

case records revealed a basic tendency on the part of case workers to include in their diagnostic and treatment recording, judgments of a personal nature based on the case worker's own sense of values and as such, reduced in no small measure, the scientific value of the records. In an analysis of judgments made by graduate students evaluating social case records, it has been found that judgments tend to be based on trivial observations which are seldom tested and seldom corrected when evidence shows that they have been unwarranted.²⁰

The following examples from case record evaluations illustrate this point:

"He was a peculiar looking child who had an odd looking head."

"Mr. A seemed to think that Mrs. A gave a lot of her time to her relatives. They got more than their share of her attention."

"Visitor thought he was probably a different type from Mrs. Jones."

"Visitor believed there was some rivalry between the Jones family and the Humboldt family."

"Mother is of medium build with a plump round face and bushy curly hair. She is comfortably dressed and wears clothing that seems to be of better quality than might be expected of the average working man's wife."

"All indications are that family leads a rather unified home life."

Recent attention given to case recording has shown the possibility of relating *judgments* to treatment. Experiments in subjective recording and interpretive analysis show that effective use can be made of *judgments* when connected with the conscious mental processes experienced by the worker during the treatment relationship. *Judgment* in this positive sense is a dynamic element in treatment. *Judg-*

ment in the negative moralistic sense should have no place in a social case worker's thinking.

EVALUATE.²¹ From the time that Dr. Richard Cabot flung down his challenge that social workers examine critically the work that they were doing, *evaluations* have been the order of the day. The concept of *evaluation* seems rather clear and is explained by the definition of *evaluate* as given in the dictionary. Evaluation in social case work is made difficult by the lack of any standards. Karpf clearly showed that not only were norms lacking but that an appreciation for the need of norms was equally non-existent.²² The definition of *evaluate* in the sense of ascertaining the value or amount of is a type of *evaluation* that is subject to experimentation. The best example in social case work is Ellery Reed's scoring system for the evaluation of social cases. An effective plea for a statistical measurement of social case work was made by Wayne McMillen who discussed the subject at the 1929 National Conference of Social Work under the title "Discovering New Tools of Social Measurement." The value of McMillen's article is that it encourages one to use even an imperfect tool for the sake of perfecting it. He stands opposed to the easy acceptance of most social workers of the idea that objective measures cannot be applied because of the subjectiveness of the basic data. Reuter has shown that even subjective methods have scientific value. His thesis is that all research is fundamentally subjective, that the

²¹ *Evaluate*. 1. To ascertain the value or amount of; to appraise carefully. 2. (Math) To express numerically. Webster, *op. cit.*

To determine the relative significance of phenomena of the same sort in terms of some standard. Syn. appreciate which implies a report as well as conscious reorganization of the data. Warren, *op. cit.*

²² Karpf, *op. cit.*

²⁰ Unpublished study of University of Minnesota graduate students under Anne F. Fenlason.

plan, problem, selection of tools, observation, choice of data, seeing of relations and discovery of relationships are all subjective processes leading to inference and *conclusions* which are processes consisting of constructive imagination and logical thought.²³ He believes that the distinction between objective and sub-

jective processes relate to something larger than method. The basic distinction is between types of problems and data rather than types of method. He sums up his article by stating that in the present state of procedure, as has been previously stated in this paper, one fruitful hypothesis, one idea is worth more than a library of concrete investigations and reports.

²³ Reuter, *op. cit.*

GUIDANCE OF THE PUBLIC MIND*

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GUIDANCE of the public mind is so intangible that I am relieved to be limited to guidance in the interpretation of public welfare in the few suggestions which I can make. Perhaps we need first to define what we mean by public welfare as the term means different things to different people. Some think of public welfare in terms of public education, public health, measures of social security, and a broad general state of well being for everyone. Others think of public welfare only as it relates to the narrowest sense of the physical well being of humanity, in terms of food and shelter.

We are perhaps all agreed that the public is the whole unit of population, but it is well nigh impossible to get an agreement as to what constitutes "well being" or welfare. As Robert Kelso has so aptly put it,

Your statesman defines well being as that state of perfection in which the greatest good is accruing from national life to the greatest number of those who make up the nation. He is vague as to what he means by the term "greatest good." Your economist defines this "summum bonum" to mean the maximum production of wealth; the greatest guaranty of food,

shelter and work; and the opportunity to reproduce with a rising birth rate. Your socialist must see equality of outlook and privilege and, so far as possible, an equality of goods, society being to this end highly organized to protect the weak as well as the strong. To which proposition the eugenic objects, contending that the protection of the weak will not in the long run mean the greatest good. These various factions are declared worldly by the ecclesiastic who sees human well being only under the dominance of religious creed and a more or less rigid code of morals.

But Kelso concludes with the statement that the idea of individual happiness is basic in our concept of progress. So well being would perhaps be that mode of life, made possible by education and legislation, which brings the greatest measure of individual happiness to the entire body politic. It seems to me that we fail in the beginning in our task of interpretation to the public mind, if we do not accept this definition which is broad enough to be of interest to all, rather than to the relatively few beneficiaries of public aid.

How, then, do we accomplish guidance of this thinking? Thinking in terms of most men sincerely wanting the well being of their fellows according to this formula? Specifically group thinking, because obviously education which will result in action, must be the result of

* Presented at the meeting of the Southern Sociological Society in Birmingham, Alabama, April 2, 1937.

mental processes directed through group channels, producing mass feeling.

Guidance of thinking can be attempted in many ways, but it is motivated principally by what we have chosen to call "feeling content." If all men can be made to feel that the welfare of their brothers determines their own welfare, the first step in interpretation is successfully accomplished. Men do not always believe what they see, or hear, unless it can be related to their own experience. The social legislation passed in this country was made possible by the relative discomfort of a majority of our people. Although all men were not affected to the point of discomfort, all were affected to the point that emotions were touched, or an unvoiced fear experienced.

Inevitably we must face the fact that a public mind, motivated too much by emotional appeal, does not choose wisely. America has passed most of her remedial legislation under emotional stress, and the result has not always been good. So we must have a carefully planned program of guidance of the public mind in interpreting not only the usage of measures already in existence, but needed changes, and unmet needs.

This program to be effective, even if planned nationally, must be local in application. National planning should come in conjunction with, or after, state, county and city study of local need. Self study and consequent consciousness of unmet need is the only way communities will retain a feeling of responsibility for, and pride in, correction of conditions which tend to destroy well being.

Self study of a community must be initiated by strong leadership with local prestige in order to accomplish the interpretation which is one of its major objectives, through immediate local participation. Surveys made by national authorities, are often invaluable in the

information they present, but valueless because of the difficulty in securing local acceptance. An illustration of this was the Brookings Institution survey made in Alabama in recent years. This survey was very fair and presented facts of great significance to the people, but because it caught them more or less unaware, and because local participation in reaching conclusions was not practicable, it aroused in many sections a defensive instead of a coöperative attitude. Consequently, much of its value has never been realized, or capitalized. Surveys guided by outside skill, but securing participation of the "patient" through local sponsorship, committee groups, etc., present an opportunity for immediate interpretation, or progressive interpretation, not afforded by the other type.

In large centers studies of local conditions are usually initiated by the leadership available through councils of social agencies or community chests, but this point is not important. Community self study can be effectively begun by any responsible group with the necessary skill. The important point is how the information shall reach the public mind, guiding it in the desired channels, after conclusions have been drawn by the participating groups.

All groups such as business and industrial groups, civic clubs and church groups, prominent responsible individual citizens and public officials have to be reached. The primary responsibility for interpretation must rest upon some one person, or some specific participating group which represents the hub. In a program of interpretation of public welfare this should be the executive of the planning group, working through the staff, through coöperating social agencies, through board members, and then into the wider circle of educational, religious, and civic forces which affect the general

public and finally resolve themselves into pressure groups which can bring desirable legislative action. The method of reaching these groups is of prime importance. It is generally conceded that nothing is quite as effective as the spoken word. The best illustration of this has been the "fireside talks" which our President has used in reaching the nation.

The press is a tool practically as effective as the spoken word, because of its wide circulation and mass appeal. The country is still full of many people who only "know what they see in the paper." Newspapers as a whole have been remarkably fair, particularly in their editorial attitude, in interpreting social work policies.

The motion picture presents a practically uncharted field for social work and public welfare interpretation. It must be skillfully used, because the American public does not really want to be educated when it has paid to be amused.

Although we are concerning ourselves in this discussion with methods of guiding the public mind as it relates to public welfare, this does not mean simply the interpretation of needs and policies of those agencies in the community supported by tax funds. It means every group concerned with community well being, no matter how financed. We realize that difference in source of support, creates a difference in the attitude of the public, but interpretation of social need should be presented as a composite picture, in which alleviation or correction is one coördinated effort through both public and private social agencies. Private agencies have been as slow as public agencies in recognizing this primary principle of inter-dependence. Happily this is changing, and is a forward step in social agency thinking.

Because they have felt independent of public opinion, until comparatively re-

cently, tax supported agencies have not been as eager to interpret their services as the private agencies. Not having to face the search light of an annual campaign for funds, they have failed to keep participating groups aware of their needs.

Every state Department of Public Welfare should have a well organized division of public information which could utilize information gathered from various counties in a planned year-round program of interpretation through the press, radio, and state wide meetings of varied interests.

Let no one suppose that the public mind is entirely guided by any planned program of interpretation of need and the best way to meet it, disclosed by a study, even though the entire community through some miracle, could participate in the gathering of facts. Policies, already in effect, have a tremendous bearing upon your prominent citizen and your man on the street. He is critical of the expenditure of the tax dollar, just because it is his dollar, and he still has a sense of ownership, having perhaps parted with it unwillingly. As many of these policies are national and do not seem to fit into the local picture in a manner pleasing to him, he is sure that they are the result of "politics," and therefore doubly suspicious. To offset this, we need national studies as well as local ones. It was suggested by the American Association of Social Workers, through its division on Government and Social Work that a non-partisan committee be appointed to make a thorough study of relief and unemployment policies. Similar studies have been made in England by the Royal Commission, and have seemingly been the means of inspiring confidence, because they have given constructive criticism, and commendation where indicated.

On February 5th, a resolution was introduced in the Senate authorizing the President to appoint such a commission. This resolution provides for an inquiry conducted along court lines. If adopted, the inquiry may deteriorate into just one more investigation, unless its membership contains persons who are not only non-partisan, but thoroughly familiar with varying conditions in the localities which they will study. Their task of establishing a national minimum standard of performance, of need, and of relief to be given, is a delicate one, but holds great possibilities for interpretation of public welfare necessities, if the personnel inspires confidence.


The task which confronts them is one with which public welfare boards all over the country have struggled, but on which they have not unanimously agreed. This cannot be entirely overcome, because relief which would be considered adequate in Alabama would be totally inadequate in New York, and W.P.A. policies entirely suited to labor cannot always be made to fit the white collar class.

The very existence of these local boards has been an important interpretative link between the public welfare department and the tax paying public. As they have struggled with problems and acquired knowledge, they have pleaded for aid and for understanding. Unfortunately, national leaders have failed to avail themselves of the counsel which these local leaders might have given and as a consequence many public welfare boards have lost some of their most valuable members who did not care to be used as mere rubber stamps or pilloried for conditions for which they were not responsible. This was a serious loss to the cause of interpretation.

Strong agency boards and functioning

committees are needed by the public agencies just as much as by the private ones. Coöperation on the part of private agency boards with the public department in the interpretation of policies, which good community planning will necessarily promote, can only partially offset the lack of a strong public welfare board, because the executive of this department sorely needs an influential board to deal with appropriating bodies in the interpretation of need. However, a wise executive will see that members of the appropriating bodies are included in board personnel. Helping to stretch the cloth which they have provided is in itself excellent education for public officials.

A measuring rod for accomplishment in interpretation is lacking. The success of annual campaigns for funds is presumed to be a measuring rod for private agencies, but every honest executive knows that the success of a chest campaign is determined largely by the emotional appeal of a relatively small number of agencies and the effectiveness of the leadership of the appeal organization rather than the result of community wide knowledge of actual conditions. The willingness of public appropriating bodies to provide adequately for health, education, and relief is supposedly a measuring rod for the completeness of public understanding, but here again honesty compels us to admit that it may only be the result of the education of a few powerful citizens. Nevertheless, we can comfort ourselves with the conviction that perfection is impossible, and be happy indeed to be a member of any community where the accomplishment of a modicum of understanding has been reached, and where to a few fine spirits the welfare of one's fellow man is a matter of personal concern, resulting in unselfish effort.



MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

Contributions to this Department will include original articles, reports of conferences, special investigations and research, and programs relating to marriage and the family. It is edited by Ernest R. Groves of the University of North Carolina, who would like to receive reports and copies of any material relating to the family and marriage.

TEACHING MARRIAGE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

ERNEST R. GROVES

University of North Carolina

FOURTEEN college years ago a group of seniors visited the President of the University of North Carolina, asking that a course be offered that would help them prepare for marriage. They stated that, although most of the men expected to marry, this was the only life enterprise that the college ignored in the training it offered as a preparation for the adult career. The men had been stimulated to make this request of the head of the University by lectures that had been delivered on the campus by Chloe Owings, at that time associated with the American Social Hygiene Society.

The men had so often heard that the purpose of college education was to prepare for life that they merely thought that they were calling the attention of the administration to the fact that at one point the college program was not meeting their needs. They apparently regarded their petition as neither strange nor revolutionary but merely a strengthening of the curriculum. They expected to find Harry W. Chase, then president of the University, sympathetic, and, fortunately for their purposes, this proved true.

So important did their proposal seem,

and so well was their case presented, that not only was the teaching and the educational significance of their program realized, but the research aspects were appreciated and incorporated in a co-operative arrangement with the Institute for Research in Social Science for which the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial was willing to make a special grant.

Although the students had no ulterior motive, seeking only an assistance that they took for granted the college was prepared to give, their proposal did in fact make a new demand on the college and one that could be met only by an innovation in the academic routine. The course they asked for was new in two respects: it meant adding a new objective to the academic program and constructing new educational material. By the first of these, the college in its instruction accepted a responsibility in the training for life that had been absolutely ignored. Many years previously Herbert Spencer had recognized education's neglect of matrimonial experience and had expressed his amazement at the omission.

When President Chase agreed that the course in marriage would be developed for the seniors, this decision had meaning

beyond the giving of a course never before offered by a college. The offering of this original instruction meant breaking through academic tradition at a point where it was enforced by an ancient and strongly supported social taboo, the last obstruction separating the college program from a complete contact with the life-career needs of the students. From this viewpoint a course in marriage was revolutionary, and yet it was so inevitable, on account of the enlarging college function that was taking place as a result of social pressure due to changing conditions and the increasing hazards of matrimonial experiences in modern life, that, looking back upon it, it now seems strange only that it was so long delayed.

If the students had little realization that they were widening the function of the college in asking for the course in marriage, they were still less conscious that what they sought was an innovation as a content of instruction. It would have been easy to build a course for them that would have brought together sociological theories as to the origin of marriage, discussions of the history of marriage, and ethical counsel pointing the way to matrimonial success. This was not what the men wanted because it provided little practical help in planning their marriage career, and it was this assistance in working for their own happiness that they sought. Their motive had appeared in their plea to the President when they asked that as the college prepared them to earn a living, to be good citizens, to enjoy and appreciate culture, so also that it help them in another major undertaking in life, marriage.

Nowhere was there a concentration of the material that had to be gathered to give content to such a course as they wished. Instead, the facts were widely scattered in compartment specialties.

Marriage was not a science although its experiences and its interests found expression at least occasionally in various sciences. The best that could be done at first in getting the course started was to bring together various scientists who had an incidental interest in marriage and let them interpret marriage from their angle of study. Experience proved that this led to a scattering of attention, made continuity difficult, and also encouraged an emphasis of specialization. It became evident that if the needs of the students were to be adequately met, the instruction in marriage must be delegated to some individual instructor who, even though his chief interests were along other lines, would accept responsibility for the teaching and the development of the course. Although this change proved an advantage, those of the faculty who were interested in the innovation became convinced that the new course needed to be assigned to some one as a definite, instructional specialty.

It became evident to Dr. Howard W. Odum, head of the Department of Sociology in which the course in marriage had been placed, that if the expectations of the students electing Marriage were to be met in a thoroughgoing way, an instructor should be appointed who would make marriage his specialty and become responsible for developing the instruction that would meet the needs of the students. Since such an assignment was itself an innovation, the person appointed could have been a worker in any one of several fields of science such as biology, psychology, psychiatry, or medicine. I was given the responsibility chiefly, no no doubt, because of the interest I had already taken in the development of college courses in the Family. This type of instruction, which was already rapidly growing among colleges, was preparing

the way for marriage preparation and was in its purpose and point of view nearest to the sort of thing that the men at the University of North Carolina were seeking.

This decision not to continue the marriage course as a side issue for some one whose chief interest lay elsewhere but to make it a definite faculty specialty was itself an innovation and one likely in the long run to appear as significant as the fact that the course was given. It reveals the seriousness and the sincerity of both the Department and the Administration in their attempt to develop for the students the instruction to which they had committed themselves. It is important to remember this occurred ten years ago, when the pioneering period of instruction for marriage could hardly be said to have started. Even now when this stage in marriage instruction in the colleges is near its end and such courses are rapidly becoming an academic convention, we still find even large universities hesitating to allow the work in marriage to become a specialty and instead treating it as an adjunct to the program of a teacher whose professional interest is in some other field.

Dr. Odum had been careful to gather from the students who had elected Marriage frank and detailed statements of considerable length as to what they expected from the course, and this I had to help me build the course when I took it over as my specialty in 1927.

The men had made clear that they desired two things from the course—information and counsel. They wanted facts and insight that would assist them in preparing for successful marriage, and although there were great differences in expression and in emphasis, there was a general agreement as to the topics they believed the course ought to treat. These

when classified were "Courtship," "Choice of a Mate," "Engagement," "Finances," "Marital Adjustment," "Domestic Adjustment," meaning problems of relationship outside the realm of sex, "Conception and Pregnancy," "Birth Control," and "Divorce."

This last topic, divorce, has come to have a very insignificant place in the course, having been crowded out by the students' interest in the other problems. It appeared in these written statements undoubtedly because at the time it was so constantly talked about and the students listed it because they wanted help in avoiding it. As the instruction has matured it has seemed that the purposes of the students, so far as divorce is concerned, are best met by giving them insight that will help marriage to function. Divorce has been treated in the text the students have used, but it has not been given any definite place in the class teaching, only coming up occasionally in relation to some other problem.

Since, as will later be explained, each year the course somewhat changes in the effort to adapt to the desires of a particular class, venereal disease has sometimes been a specific topic interpreted by the specialist in medicine while in other years it has been merely incidentally considered in a manner similar to that of the problem of divorce. The women students have been persistent in their desire that venereal disease be given special discussion. This appears to come from their belief that they should know more about it than they do.

The instructor found these statements from the students, showing just what they expected to get from the course, a great advantage in building the new instruction. It is doubtful whether students gain much assistance in preparing for marriage by listening to an emphasis

of desirable prerequisites for marriage such as unselfishness, patience, constancy, and the like, however important or indispensable these virtues are. This type of interpretation seems a side-stepping of a causal, functional analysis of human behavior through a verbalizing description of desirable traits, the balancing and gaining of which the students understand no better than before hearing the exposition. For example, it is easy but unrevealing to say that the spirit of self-sacrifice is necessary for successful marriage. To be content with such an assertion, however forcefully presented, is to ignore the actual motivations and reactions of human nature in action that can make even self-sacrifice the chief menace to a wholesome marriage or family life. It therefore seemed best to make the class period a fact-giving, insight-bringing discussion and to provide counsel chiefly through conferences that would permit definite application to a concrete situation. This would reduce to a minimum the risks that are unavoidable in any hit-or-miss general counsel giving.

This program has required a considerable amount of time for individual conferences in which all sorts of family, courtship, and marriage problems have been talked over. Advice has not been given when problems needing medical or psychiatric advice have arisen but the student has been encouraged to find a qualified specialist. Only in an elementary and general way have problems of homosexuality, using the term in its strictest precision, appeared, on account of the conviction that such difficulties require for any hopeful outcome the skill of an experienced psychiatrist. I have come to think that these maladjustments are the most pathetic and the most hopeless of all the tragic experiences that have appeared in consultation.

It was both a stimulus and an advantage to know so clearly what the students wanted in their course in marriage. It was easy to see that the course would have to be developed by gathering the material the students demanded from its sources, wherever found. Once gathered, it needed to be systematized and simplified. This last task meant that it had to be presented in the layman's vocabulary. The test of the possibility of a college course in marriage was whether this necessary information could be extracted from various sciences and adapted to the understanding of a miscellaneous, non-professional group of students. It was with reference to this that the advantage of a course in the charge of one person as compared with one given by a group of specialists appeared.

At this point, however, the question naturally arises in the mind of the reader, "Is it possible for any individual instructor to deal with problems that are so widely distributed in the various sciences?" This query comes from forgetting the nature of such a course. Better understanding of marriage is its constant purpose and the instructor is not seeking to interpret any topic discussed with the meaning that it has in one of the various fields of science but as it needs to be known by the layman who expects to encounter it in his marriage experience. This distinction can perhaps best be realized by taking a specific problem and showing how it fits into the scheme.

Both the men and women students are seriously interested in pregnancy. Most of them expect to be parents and all of them are eager to have specific questions regarding pregnancy answered. They do not wish to know about pregnancy in the same way that the doctor studying medicine desires to understand it. Their

questions gather about not the function of the obstetrician but the responsibilities of the husband and the wife. They want to know what sort of care the pregnant woman should expect from a modern, efficient physician; what signs of pregnancy they may expect; how they can avoid the emotional and physical hazards of the husband and wife relationship during the period of pregnancy; whether or not intercourse during pregnancy is proper and wise and under what circumstances it will be prohibited by the doctor; the probable cost of having a baby; the advantages and disadvantages of going to a hospital or having the delivery at home.

Such questions as these can be answered even though the information itself is lodged in a particular division of medicine. The students are also in need of such information. No one well acquainted with any considerable amount of marriage experience can have doubt of that. Emotional divorcement, unwholesome sex fellowship, health, and even in some cases the survival of the wife, are involved.

In cases not a few the willingness to marry and have children may depend upon replacing morbid suggestions and ignorance by a sense of security that can come only by knowing the safeguards and resources of the present-day science of obstetrics. The student's point of view and his need could rarely be seen and met by a specialist in the science who might visit the class for a lecture or two on the subject, but the day-by-day instructor, close to the thinking of his class, knows what is wanted. He knows also that he must take these questions to the literature and bring back the answers.

But suppose that a question arises in class discussion for which he cannot find an answer in the literature as known to

him or which he cannot interpret as is necessary to deliver a clear understanding to the students. In such cases he must have access to a specialist who, because of his interest in the undertaking, is willing to coöperate. This policy of having a group of highly-trained specialists, willing to give of their knowledge when the need arises, has proven one of the wisest developments of the course in marriage as started at the University of North Carolina.

During the ten year period that I have taught the course I have had this help from an increasing number of interested specialists. At first I depended primarily upon certain medical specialists in the city of Durham and members of the staff of the Duke Medical School in addition to the members of the Medical School of the University of North Carolina. I do not believe that an adequate course in preparation for marriage can be taught without such support. This coöperation has gradually grown and at the present time the following are willing to furnish information in their fields when it is needed. This means that any question that arises in class discussion that calls for expert knowledge can be answered in at least a week and usually in two or three days. The list of these advisers is in itself impressive.

Clinic Service: Miss Gladys Gaylord, Executive Secretary, Maternal Health Association, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio.

Psychiatry: Arthur Ruggles, M.D., Chairman, National Committee on Mental Hygiene, Butler Hospital, Providence, Rhode Island; Abraham Myerson, M.D., Harvard and Tufts Medical Schools, Boston, Massachusetts.

Child Guidance: Dr. Phyllis Blanchard, Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Dr. Ada Hart Arlitt, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Biology: Dean C. F. Jackson, University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire; Dr. Raymond

Pearl, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.

Population: Dr. Warren S. Thompson, Oxford, Ohio.

Law: Dr. John S. Bradway, Legal Aid Clinic, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

Birth Control: Eric C. Matsner, M.D., Medical Director, American Birth Control League, Inc., New York City.

Medicine: W. Rancey Stanford, M.D., Durham, North Carolina; LeRoy Parkins, M.D., Boston, Massachusetts.

Obstetrics: Robert A. Ross, M.D., Duke Medical School, Durham, North Carolina.

Gynecology: Emil Novak, M.D., Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, Maryland.

Urology: Roger Graves, M.D., Boston, Massachusetts; William Coppridge, M.D., Durham, North Carolina.

Household Economics: Dr. Benjamin R. Andrews, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City; Dr. Margaret G. Reid, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa.

Social Statistics: William F. Ogburn, Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

Consultation: Rev. Oliver M. Butterfield, Lecturer, Author, Consultant, Marriage and Family Problems, New York City; Dr. Robert G. Foster, Advisory Service to Women, Merrill-Palmer School, Detroit, Michigan.

Religion: Dr. L. Foster Wood, Secretary, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, New York City; Rev. Edgar Schmiedeler, Director, Family Life Section, National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D. C.

Sex Education: Dr. Maurice A. Bigelow, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City; Dr. Winifred Richmond, St. Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, D. C.

Women's Interests: Grace L. Elliott, Author, New York City.

Heterosexual Problems: A. A. Brill, M.D., New York City.

College Administration: President James L. McConaughy, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut.

Social Psychology: Charles A. Ellwood, Professor of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

Neurology: Raymond S. Crispell, Neurologist, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

Home Economics: Helen Atwater, Editor, Journal of Home Economics, Washington, D. C.

Parent Education: Ralph P. Bridgman, Director, National Council of Parent Education, 60 East 42nd Street, New York City.

The reader must understand that none of these men and women assumes any responsibility for the course as it is taught the students but merely stand ready to suggest literature that the instructor needs to read to deal with some specific problem that has arisen or to give factual statements when this seems desirable. The number of such coöperators who serve as authorities for the course at the University of North Carolina is greater than ordinarily would be needed because of the development there of graduate work in the field of marriage and the family.

From the first year of my teaching at the University of North Carolina two principles have been maintained. The first was that any matter that could not be clearly and definitely handled in the class could not be treated at all. The idea was that nothing could be more mischievous in such a course than vagueness, double-speaking, or any discussion that would leave the student in the haze of doubt. Nothing so far has come into the class-hour that could not be treated except birth control in some of its aspects, in the earlier years, but it is conceivable that in giving a course in marriage it might be thought by a college for some reason that certain topics ought not to be discussed. In such a case, I should announce in the beginning of the course, were I teaching it, that they would be omitted. This policy is respected by the students even when they are not in accord with it.

The other principle that has been persistently followed also has been my insistence that the students permit me to anticipate problems that I knew they ought to consider, even if they were not included in the list of those sought by any particular class. For example, the men would not have thought of the care of the infant as a matter of concern to them. When they are led to see how much they can help in the difficult first days, when

the wife comes back with her baby from the hospital, and how their attitude and understanding may influence the wife's feeling about pregnancy, they realize that it is something that deserves attention.

No instructor in marriage can afford to reduce his instructional strategy to the inexperienced desires of the student. Neither can he afford to disregard the students' interests. To protect from this mistake I have a small committee, elected early in the course, which provides the means by which student sentiment can quickly and directly get expression. In spite of the fact that questions interrupting the lectures are welcomed and encouraged always and occur in every period, there are occasionally suggestions and criticisms that are not likely to be brought out during class discussion but may be carried to a committee member, when it is understood that the source will remain anonymous. The committee also helps in gathering information that needs to come from the students themselves.

The students particularly like to have illustrations from case histories in addition to the conferences that accompany the giving of the course after the first two or three weeks, for at the beginning only emergency problems are welcomed. There is a considerable and continuous correspondence of persons who write in for help and information because of marriage or marital difficulties. From these sources material illustrating almost any point of discussion is in the hands of the instructor. It is understood, however, that no case material coming from the campus is ever brought to class in the year that it occurs. Were this not faithfully observed, the students would hesitate to come for consultation lest they later might listen to an analysis of their own difficulty. Usually no material is mentioned in class that has been gathered from campus conferences until at least two years have passed. Oc-

currences that have been widely known among the students are not referred to for a longer period.

The students are not encouraged to use the conference opportunity for parasitic support or the mere satisfaction of emotional rehearsals. They are encouraged to write out their problems and bring their statements with them, because this helps clarify their difficulties and their needs. They are asked not to come except in serious difficulties until they have been in the course long enough to have the background necessary to present their problems clearly and maturely.

After the course had been given two or three years a peculiar problem arose which needed consideration. So many students were electing the course who already because of their specialty had a full schedule, or who asked to sit in on it without having any credit, that it seemed necessary to make a distinction in requirements. When as many as thirty students were taking Marriage without daring to ask for credit, because they could not do much additional reading, so much was required of them in their own specialty, it seemed necessary to find some way by which they could, without burdening themselves too greatly, receive credit.

The solution was the division of the class into two types—those who did a minimum of outside reading and were called credit students and those who did much more outside reading and were known as readers. Each student was free to make his choice. Some of the brightest men graduating from the University wisely chose to be credit students, even though this meant that they could not get high marks, because, although they wanted the advantage of class discussions, they knew they had not time to do very much outside reading. The tendency each year has been for many of those starting as credit students to change over. This has come

from their finding interest in the literature offered and, realizing that they were reading more than they had expected, deciding to become readers.

The class has always been taught quietly, as nearly as possible as persons naturally talk when they are together in serious conversation. This has been made possible by a happy choice of meeting place, for a noisy classroom would have changed the entire atmosphere of the instruction. I have felt that any crusading, even if only expressed through vocal emotionalism in one's manner of speaking, would defeat the purpose of the course. It is my judgment that unless this is taken seriously by the instructor in any course in marriage his leadership is likely to appear as preaching rather than fact-giving in the spirit of science.

Every care also has been taken to prevent any kind of spectacular publicity. Naturally it has been impossible to avoid newspaper and other forms of publicity, but fortunately this has generally been constructive and sympathetic rather than exploiting. Some attempts to establish courses in marriage have been frustrated by an immature eagerness to break into the headlines.

There are certain questions that have been asked again and again by those who have sought information concerning the course at the University of North Carolina. One of these has been the attitude of the administration. Both President Chase and later President Graham, the head of the Department of Sociology, the Dean of Administration, and the faculty, as far as they have been interested, have treated the course in marriage just as they have any other. Nothing could have been more helpful. The administrative heads have undoubtedly taken a personal interest in the development of the course, but they have been wise enough to let it alone so

far as the college routine has been concerned. Any policy that would have marked it off as something different from the other courses would have ruined, in the minds of the students, its fundamental purposes. The administration in no instance has ever attempted to influence the course or to protect it. The instructor has been accorded the same freedom that has belonged to every other teacher on the staff of this extraordinarily mature university.

Another question that has been frequently asked is, "What is the attitude of parents?" So far as I know the reactions of parents, they have been of two types. One has been the approval of the course given by parents who have attended discussions of the class. This has been more frequently mothers than fathers, but in both instances in the men's class and the women's class, visits of parents have been followed by expressions of interest in the instruction. The other contact with parents has come from letters or visits of mothers or fathers who have wanted to get their sons or daughters in the class when they were not eligible. Parents have written or stated, for example, that their son or daughter was not going to continue after the sophomore year at the University and they wanted an opportunity to be given for the election of the marriage course. If there have been other reactions, they have remained unknown to the instructor. Some college administrators do not seem to realize how parents have changed in recent years in their realization that the one-time program which has often been called the conspiracy of silence regarding matters of courtship, sex, and marriage is no longer workable. Many parents from personal experience have come to feel the need of any help that can be given their sons or daughters who they know are passing through an unusually

critical type of adolescent graduation. If this common welcoming by parents of any influence that will mature and guide their youth was more generally appreciated by those in charge of college programs, marriage courses would be developing even more rapidly than they are.

One of the most common questions asked by those interested in this type of instruction is, "How many American colleges and universities are giving courses in marriage?" It is impossible to say in any definite and authoritative way. Instruction for marriage appears as a part of courses that have various titles, sometimes not revealing clearly what is offered. In contrast with these are other courses that emphasize marriage in the title but give it very little practical and frank attention in the actual teaching. There are evidences, however, that show that instruction for marriage is increasing rapidly. One is the fact that the text *Marriage*,¹ product of the teaching at the University of North Carolina and written to encourage the development of courses in marriage, was in use the first semester of the present year in some fifty-five colleges and universities. In a study made in 1935 by Cecil E. Hayworth of "Education for Marriage among American Colleges,"² 225 col-

leges were giving 234 courses which in whole or in part dealt with preparation for marriage and family life. It is certain that the development of courses in preparation for marriage has influenced courses on the family, and where two distinctly different types of courses are not given, some of the practical problems of marriage get a degree of attention in most of the courses on the family. However, it does not follow that this always means a specific attempt to help students prepare for marriage. The third evidence of the increasing attention in the college program to the need of preparing for marriage is the quantity of articles and editorials appearing in newspapers, popular magazines, church papers, and scientific periodicals, backing up actual courses in operation or advocating the development of such instruction.

The nature of the course is sometimes misunderstood by people interested in it who think of it as sex education. It is true that sex has an important part in the development of the course and is necessarily treated frankly and realistically. The purpose of the instruction, however, is to prepare for marriage, and marriage success is not conceived of as merely good sexual adjustment. Human marriage is a very complex experience and the course tries to do justice to this fact. It is this conception of marriage that makes possible the reaction of some of the alumni who have said that aside from the value of the course as a preparation for matrimonial experience, they have come to think of it as having proved one of the most helpful courses that they have elected as a means of insight into life and its problems. Certainly no one could do justice to the topic of marriage in a course narrowly organized, content merely with the giving of sex information. Marriage is a supreme test of character, and any adequate preparation

¹ In addition to this text the following books of which I have been author or co-author have been influenced by the course in preparation for marriage, and some thirty articles. This literature has been in part directed to the general reader and in part to the specialist: *Wholesome Marriage*, *American Marriage and Family Relationships*, *Parents and Children*, *Wholesome Parenthood*, *Introduction to Mental Hygiene*, *Sex in Marriage*, *Sex in Childhood*, *The Family and Its Relationships*, *The American Family*, *Readings in the Family*, *Understanding Yourself*, and *Readings in Mental Hygiene*. Another product of the course has been a considerable correspondence with those who having taken the course and later married have wished some specific information.

² *Journal of the American Association of Colleges*, November, 1935, pp. 478-481.

for it must provide insight and incentive to maturity and to justice in addition to the familiarity with pertinent facts gathered from a wide area of science.

Another question frequently asked is, "What value has the course had when tested by later, actual marriage experience?" Alumni attitude is indeed the proper test of the functioning of a course in preparation for marriage, and now that I am ending ten years' teaching of undergraduate men to give all my time to graduate work, aside from the class for women that I plan continue to teach, and that over a thousand men and women have had the instruction, an effort will be made by Professor

Robert Beaty, of the University of Florida, to find out how the marriage course has functioned. However, nothing so reveals the strength of educational traditionalism as the thought of some that any type of instruction that attempts in a new and practical way to grapple with the actual problems of life needs such testing, and their failure to recognize that courses that are continued year after year, and often required because they have in times past been safely embedded in academic routine, should receive the same scrutiny. It is in this reaction that the ineffective, irresponsible and unintelligent aspects of the college program come to the surface.

MIGRATORY DIVORCE*

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THE spectacle of states of a federal union vying with one another for the privilege of purveying divorces to the citizens of sister states would seem both obscene and astounding did not familiarity blunt our capacity to react to it. But although we can view the business with more aplomb than might be manifested by the Man from Mars, migratory divorce—to employ the convenient euphenism—still retains a hold upon the interest not only of students of the family and of the law and its processes but of the public at large. Moreover, that familiarity with the existence and general characteristics of this peculiar institution may

have served to deter inquiry into its particulars. It is on the assumption that this may be true that I have undertaken to discuss some of the questions which migratory divorce poses: Why do people seek such divorces and where? Is the migratory divorce decree valid and what are its legal consequences? What possibility is there of extirpating the traffic? What appraisal should be placed upon the institution?

Each question deserves a monograph in response; any attempt to discuss them all within the confines of a single article is open to the charge of superficiality. In this predicament, I am obliged to seek the refuge of all writers of all survey articles: the hope that a little knowledge will whet the reader's appetite for the more abundant store that can be obtained from more comprehensive studies of the subject.

Before inquiring why people seek migratory divorces, perhaps it would be well to

* This paper was read before the Third Annual Short Course in Conservation of Marriage and the Family, held at the University of North Carolina, July 5-9, 1937. Much of the material has been summarized from the issue on "Migratory Divorce" in *Law and Contemporary Problems* of which the author is editor, and all references in the text and notes to *Law and Contemporary Problems* are to this particular issue.

define that term—at least for the purposes of this article. A migratory divorce is a divorce granted to a person who has left his home in one state and resorted temporarily to another state for the express purpose of obtaining a divorce from its courts. Strictly, of course, the term does not include the divorces which the Mexican courts are happy to grant to applicants by mail. The mail order divorce is an exotic which presents many of the same problems that are raised by the migratory divorce and I shall not always have occasion to differentiate between them. It is, however, important to differentiate between the migratory divorce and the divorces granted to persons whose migration is not ephemeral. Not infrequently, following the *de facto* dissolution of a marriage, one or the other spouse will leave the home state to establish a home elsewhere, possibly to seek a livelihood or perhaps merely to "go back to Mother." Later this spouse seeks a divorce in the state to which he or she has repaired. Probably the most difficult legal questions are presented by precisely such cases.

I

It is largely a matter of common knowledge why people migrate for divorce. The principal reason, of course, is the fact that the states to which they go provide less exacting grounds for the granting of decrees than do the home states from which the migrants come. For this reason New York with its strict divorce law furnishes a large supply of grist to the divorce mills. South Carolinians keep the Georgia courts busy. The county in which Augusta is situated exports marriages and imports divorces and, as a consequence, has had the highest ratio of divorces to marriages of any county in the nation.¹

¹ U. S. Bureau of the Census, *11th Annual Report on Marriage and Divorce* (1934) Table 15. See also

Another reason for migration is that the divorce mills will often grant decrees more promptly than the courts of the home state will grant them on the same grounds. This feature appeals to those restive spouses for whom time may be of the essence. Another attraction of the migratory divorce is that it leads to less publicity in the home town press. It may be doubted, however, whether the Reno divorce court operates much more mechanically than do the divorce courts of those states which do not cater to divorce migrants.

Some people, I suspect, go to the divorce mill because it is becoming to be regarded as the thing to do. In the days when the Paris divorce mill flourished, a French decree was regarded as having a certain social *cachet*. Still other persons may migrate simply because newspaper publicity has familiarized them with the fact that divorces can be obtained in the divorce mills, and they are reluctant to consult local lawyers to learn their legal rights in their home states. Not long ago a photograph was taken at a Nevada "dude ranch" of a group of paying guests who were awaiting their divorces. This picture, with an informative caption, was widely published in the newspapers. A guest at the ranch told me that subsequently the ranch owner, a woman, was flooded with letters from women in all parts of the country, inquiring how they might secure divorces in Nevada. This episode is a commentary, and a sorry one, on the degree of confidence with which lawyers are regarded, at least by the poor and ignorant, in their own communities.

Brearley, "A Note Upon Migratory Divorce of South Carolinians," 2 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 329, 332 (June, 1935). Washoe County, Nevada, in which Reno is located, does a thriving trade in marriages as well as divorces; hence its ratio is lower than that of Richmond County, Georgia.

Yet economy is not one of the attractions which the divorce mill offers. Even a mail order divorce will cost more than a divorce obtained in the home town. The usual rate charged for a Mexican decree is \$125. If, however, you do not apply for a divorce at that rate, some of the soliciting offices will write to inform you that the large volume of business has made it possible for them to offer you the special reduced rate of \$100.²

Despite its enterprising competitors, Reno is still the center of the migratory divorce industry. Nevada ousted the Dakotas as the principal source of easy divorce early in this century. For many years, it was necessary to reside in Nevada for six months before suit could be instituted. In 1931, however, Arkansas endeavored to wrest from Nevada its primacy by enacting a law requiring only 90 days residence. Fearing the competing attractions of Hot Springs, the Reno divorce lawyers and hotel proprietors hurried a bill through the Nevada legislature reducing the residence period in that state to six weeks. Idaho also adopted a 90-day law in 1931. But Idaho has not been a significant figure in the competition for the divorce business. The creation of a luxurious winter resort in Idaho, announced with much fanfare this year, will doubtless attract many who prefer winter sports to sun bathing or dude ranching as the anaesthetic for their marital operations.

In 1935 Florida adopted a 90-day law, and evidently Florida competition is be-

ginning to be felt seriously in Nevada. During the past session of the Nevada legislature, a bill was considered which would reduce the residence period from six weeks to three. The lawyers would not suffer from such a change but the hotel proprietors would. Evidently the latter was the stronger group, for the bill did not become a law.

Both Havana, Cuba, and Yucatan, Mexico, have sought to attract some of the migratory divorce business, but suffer under the handicap of high transportation costs. The Mexican border states have specialized in the granting of mail order decrees—with the hearty coöperation of certain American lawyers (chiefly in Texas) who solicit the business from their compatriots (lawyers and laymen alike) by circulars and newspaper advertisements and turn the litigation over to Mexican correspondents. During the 'twenties, the wealthy sought French divorces, but a housecleaning in the Paris bar proved fatal to the business.

II

Strictly, the legal difficulty which the migratory divorce presents does not lie in the evasion of the more stringent divorce laws of the home state. If the migratory divorce decree were granted by a court having jurisdiction, the fact that it resulted in such an evasion of the laws of the home state would not affect its legality. Under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution,³ the home state would be obliged to recognize and give effect to such a decree. The difficulty arises from the fact that the decrees granted are not valid, and hence not entitled to recognition, because the courts which grant them lack jurisdiction.

The term "jurisdiction" is more often

² See Bergeson, "The Divorce Mill Advertises," 2 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 348, 351 (June, 1935). If a case is forwarded by a local lawyer, the fee charged by the Texas correspondent is usually \$80, the local attorney charging as much more as the traffic will bear. Mexican law offices in New York City charge \$225, payable in installments, the final installment being payable "upon the tendering of the certified copy of the final decree of divorce duly translated into English." *Ibid.*

³ U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, Section 1.

used than understood. With lawyerly caution, I shall refrain from defining it. Instead I shall proceed in the law teacher's fashion by resorting to hypothetical cases. Suppose a man in California owes you \$100. So long as he stays there, and will not consent to the institution of the action, you cannot obtain a judgment against him on that claim in North Carolina. The court will hold that your action is *in personam*—against the person—and that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant since he was not served with process in this state. However, if your debtor were so bold as to come to this state, you could have process served upon him during his stay here, and, even though he were to leave the state immediately after, that would not affect the court's personal jurisdiction over him or the validity of the judgment it might ultimately enter. On a personal claim of this nature, you can sue a defendant wherever you can catch him. Moreover, he can consent to be sued in advance of the institution of the action or even after it has begun, and, in such case, the judgment will be valid even though no process was served in the state.

Suppose, however, that you and Mr. A of Hollywood, California, own land in North Carolina in common. Suppose that you wish to have this land partitioned in a judicial proceeding. You could institute the partition proceeding in a North Carolina court, and it would be carried through even though Mr. A were never to consent to the action nor to leave California. Such a proceeding is said to be *in rem*—against the thing. Personal service is not required even though it is Mr. A's interest in the thing rather than the thing itself that is actually affected by the decree. If the land in question were in California rather than in North Carolina, you could not obtain the partition decree in North Caro-

lina even though Mr. A were present here and were to consent to the institution of the proceeding. In such a situation it would be said that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. The proceeding being *in rem*—against a thing—that thing must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Now let us consider a divorce action and assume that Mr. and Mrs. A of North Carolina have fallen out and wish a divorce more promptly than North Carolina will provide it on the grounds available. Courts proceed by analogy in developing the law. Should they follow the analogy to the personal action and permit the divorce to be brought wherever Mr. A lets Mrs. A's process server catch him? The courts have decided against such a policy. They hold that the interest of the home state in the marriage relationship is so great that the mere presence or consent of the parties is not sufficient to give any other court before whom they may appear jurisdiction to dissolve this relationship. Instead, the courts have followed the analogy to the action *in rem*. They have treated the marriage relationship as a thing, and have insisted that this thing be properly before the court. If the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, then, still following the analogy, the courts do not require that the defendant be personally served or consent to the action. Service by publishing a notice of the action will suffice.

This is not the first time that judges have thingified a concept. Reification, to use a more elegant word, is an intellectual tool that is often abused—and not alone in law—because its metaphorical character is not always realized. In the law of divorce jurisdiction, it has led the courts to focus their inquiry upon the question where this thing, the marriage relation, is located.

The point at which the courts have decided that the marriage relation is located is the domicile of the spouses.⁴ Consequently, only the court of the domicile can give a valid decree of divorce. Personal service, appearance, or consent of the defendant will not validate the decree of any other court. Hence it is important to inquire where one's domicile is in the eyes of the law.

"Domicil" is one of the numerous chameleon terms of the law which take their color from the legal questions in which they are employed, and, since a determination of domicile is involved in a variety of legal issues, its definition is peculiarly treacherous. In contemplation of law, every person has a domicile and, at any given time, only one domicile. One's father's domicile is conferred upon one at birth; one retains this domicile until, after attaining majority, one achieves a "domicil of choice." This is effected by the coincidence of physical presence within a state with the intention to remain there indefinitely, in other words, to establish a home. One who goes to a place with a view to spending a limited period of time there, even though he may have no intention of returning to his previous home, does not thereby become domiciled at that place. He is a resident there but not a domiciliary.

It is evident that any doctrine which rests so heavily upon a person's intent must be elusive and uncertain in application, and so it has proved with domicile. No doubt it was partly to assure adequate proof of domicile that plaintiffs have been required by most divorce statutes to have

resided one or more years within the state before instituting divorce actions. In the divorce mills, these time limits are retained in drastically truncated form, but no genuine effort is made to prove domicile.⁵ The function of the residence requirement in such states is no longer legal but economic. It does not guard against the simulation of domicile; it merely assures the hotel proprietors of a minimum of trade.

The courts have distinguished motive from intent and have held that the mere fact that one migrated to another state for the purpose of obtaining a divorce there would not preclude him from obtaining a domicile if his intent was to establish a permanent home in the jurisdiction to which he had gone.⁶ However, it is evident that the seeker after migratory divorces who spends 43 days in Reno with the intention of packing up and departing as soon as the necessary document is obtained is not domiciled there. He has complied with the statutory requirements as to residence; he has perjured himself before an acquiescent bench and bar to establish color of domicile; but he has not obtained a decree which will withstand attack in another state. There the fact that the Nevada domicile was simulated can be proved by the other spouse; it is a fact upon which the Nevada court's juris-

⁴ In Nevada, the legislature seemingly endeavored to dispense with the requirement of domicile by an amendment to the Nevada statute in 1915, but the State Supreme Court by an interpretative *tour de force* continued to find the requirement in the statute. *Walker v. Walker*, 45 Nev. 105, 198 Pac. 433 (1921). If this interpretation had not been made, the Nevada statute might have been held unconstitutional as contravening the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Interpreted to require domicile, the statute itself becomes invulnerable. Lip service is accorded its requirements in the Nevada divorce courts, while in substance they are disregarded. See Ingram and Ballard, "The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada," 3 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 302, 305 (June, 1935).

⁵ *Williams v. Osenton*, 232 U. S. 619 (1913).

⁶ In civil law countries, it is true, the nation of which the spouses were citizens or subjects was chosen as the situs of the marriage relationship. This choice, however, could not be satisfactorily applied to a federal nation such as the United States or the British Commonwealth of Nations since in such a nation the problem is to determine where, within the federation, is the seat of the marriage relationship.

diction to grant the decree depended and "jurisdictional facts" are open to question in the courts of sister states. Finding the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction, the court of the second state will rule the Nevada decree void. Needless to say, a mail order decree is subject to the same treatment, the principal difference being that proof of its invalidity is simpler.⁷

A decree of a court lacking jurisdiction is said to be a nullity. Let us see some of the consequences which result from that proposition. Suppose Mrs. A returns from Reno to North Carolina. Upon her arrival her husband sues her for divorce. Her Nevada decree divorcing him would be no protection to her. Suppose, instead, Mrs. A after her divorce were to die and Mr. A were to claim a share in her estate as her husband. Here again Mr. A would be successful. Suppose, next, that Mrs. A marries B in North Carolina and an indignant solicitor prosecutes her for adulterous cohabitation. The prosecution will lie. Suppose, again that Mrs. A marries B but her new husband abandons her. She brings suit against him for non-support. He will have a perfectly good defense on the ground that she is still married to Mr. A. Suppose a still further unpleasantness—Mrs. A marries B and has children. Their legitimacy will be subject to question.⁸ So, too, will the legitimacy of Mr. A's children should he marry C in

reliance upon Mrs. A's divorce. All these results are consistent with the theory of the nullity of the void divorce. Why, then, do people persist in getting the void decrees?

The obvious and, I think, sufficient answer is that however such decrees may be regarded by the courts, they are not regarded as social nullities. The status of the person who marries after obtaining such a decree from a divorce mill is obviously far superior socially to that of a person who, dispensing with all legal formalities, merely commences to cohabit with another person. Moreover, paradoxical as it may seem, a void decree of divorce has significant legal consequences. Suppose our Mrs. A, after her return to North Carolina, repents and sues Mr. A for non-support. Although her divorce decree would be a nullity in an action brought by Mr. A, nevertheless, the court of any state will hold that the decree obtained by Mrs. A will preclude her from asserting her marital rights against Mr. A. The decree, the court will solemnly announce, is null and void, but Mrs. A, by reason of having sought that decree, is estopped—will not be heard—to assert herself as Mr. A's wife. Suppose again that Mr. A, learning of Mrs. A's trip to Reno, heaves a sigh of relief and proceeds to wed a California girl. Later, after a second divorce, Mr. A seeks to succeed to the right of a husband in the first Mrs. A's property. In that event he will find himself estopped. Having married upon the strength of the invalid decree, he will not be heard subsequently to attack its validity.⁹

Some decisions suggest that one who merely files a formal answer in a divorce

⁷ The plaintiff not having been physically present in the jurisdiction granting the decree, lack of domicile can be proved by reference to this factor alone and no inquiry need be made as to intent. Interestingly enough, the mail order decrees of the Mexican State Courts are of doubtful validity in Mexico itself. The Federal Supreme Court has several times ruled against them. See Summers, "The Divorce Laws of Mexico," 3 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 310, 313-316 (June, 1935).

⁸ In a number of states, statutes provide that the children of void marriages are legitimate. In such states, of course, the invalidity of a parent's divorce decree would not affect the status of children born of a subsequent marriage by that parent.

⁹ For a discussion of the doctrine of estoppel, see Harper, "The Validity of Void Decrees," 79 *U. of Pa. L. Rev.* 158 (1930); Harper, "The Myth of the Void Divorce," 2 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 335 (June, 1935).

action brought at a divorce mill will by that fact become estopped to contest later the validity of the decree. If this doctrine should become well-established, it will have a very significant effect. Over half the divorces obtained in Reno are obtained after formal answer has been filed, a percentage far higher than will be found in any other jurisdiction. These formal contests accelerate the granting of the decrees, but they do not add to their validity. But if the mere filing of an answer may serve to operate as an estoppel, then both parties will be precluded from attacking the decree, and, except insofar as rights of third parties are concerned, that legal nullity, the void decree, will be pragmatically valid.

One of the favorite devices of lawyers whose clients wish a speedy divorce is to have the spouses enter into a separation agreement and a property settlement preceding the flight to Reno of one of them. The settlement and the doctrine of estoppel combine to render unlikely any further litigation. I should add incidentally that for the granting of a decree for alimony it is essential that the court have personal jurisdiction over the defendant spouse.

As I pointed out earlier in this paper, many divorce decrees are granted to migrant spouses whose purpose in migrating was not merely to obtain a divorce but to obtain a home in another state. Here the problem becomes difficult for the spouses may have different domicils. The convenient device of treating the marriage relation as a thing and locating that thing in the state of the domicil becomes awkward when two domicils are involved. Courts given to the unwitting practice of reification have strived manfully in the effort to locate this concept in one domicil or the other; some have followed the Pudd'nhead Wilson technique of dividing the relation between the two states and allowing either

state to shoot its half of the dog. Analysis of the relevant decisions would call for a paper twice the length of this and would serve only to demonstrate that the law on the point is both uncertain and unsatisfactory.¹⁰ A brief reference to some of the problems may suffice to indicate why a spouse may be married in one state while divorced in another.

A complicating factor in this situation is the rule of law regarding the domicil of a married woman. The common law rule, still followed in England, was that a wife's domicil was always the same as her husband's. Almost a century ago, however, American courts decided that a wife could obtain a separate domicil where her husband's conduct justified her in leaving him.¹¹ Thus, where a husband is guilty of cruelty, the wife can obtain a domicil of her own and sue him there for divorce. But later, when she seeks to rely on that decree in subsequent litigation with him, he may assert that he was not in fact the wrongdoer and that his conduct did not justify her departure. If her domicil depends on his wrongful conduct, then that conduct becomes a fact on which the court's jurisdiction depends. Unless the husband was at fault, the wife did not acquire an independent domicil and hence the court had no jurisdiction to grant a decree at her suit. If, upon examining the "jurisdictional facts," the second court refuses to accept the finding of the first court with respect to the husband's alleged fault, then the wife has no recourse but to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,

¹⁰ Leading law review articles on the subject are Beale, "Haddock Revisited," 39 *Harvard L. Rev.* 417 (1926); McClintock, "Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction," 37 *Yale L. J.* 564 (1928); Bingham, "Matter of Haddock v. Haddock," 21 *Cornell L. Q.* 393 (1936).

¹¹ The leading case recognizing the wife's power to obtain a separate domicil is *Ditson v. Ditson*, 4 R. I. 87 (1856).

asserting that the court of the second state has failed to respect the full faith and credit clause by failing to reach a proper conclusion with respect to the jurisdictional fact involved in the first action. Obviously the Supreme Court is a fantastic forum for the determination of such an issue.

It should be noted that there is no difficulty in a husband's obtaining a new domicile independently of a wife who refuses to follow him. Suppose a husband moves to Connecticut, leaving a wife behind him in New York. Later he obtains a divorce from her in Connecticut. Subsequently, she sues him for divorce in New York. Is the New York court obliged to respect the Connecticut decree and dismiss the wife's suit? This was the question raised before the Supreme Court of the United States in the famous case of *Haddock v. Haddock*, decided in 1906.¹² The Supreme Court held in the *Haddock* case that the divorce decree obtained by the husband in Connecticut was not entitled to full faith and credit in New York. The Supreme Court accepted the finding of the New York court, contrary to that of the Connecticut court, that the husband had been at fault and that the wife's domicile did not follow his to Connecticut. As a consequence of this decision, the validity of a decree obtained by a husband who migrates to a new home without his wife is as uncertain as the decree obtained by the wife who does likewise. Uncertain, that is, in any state other than the state which rendered the decree; in that state the validity of the decree is unquestioned.¹³

¹² 201 U. S. 562 (1906).

¹³ Since the plaintiff is a citizen of the state in which he is domiciled, that state is said to have the right to determine his status even though its decree need not be recognized by the state of which the other party to the status is a citizen. Another anomaly of the *Haddock* case is its recognition of the validity of decrees granted at the domicile of one of the spouses

It should be said, however, that many states are willing to recognize by comity the decrees of other states even where recognition is not compelled by the full faith and credit clause. Nevertheless, those states which, like New York, will act only under constitutional compulsion are the states which tend to be strictest in their requirements for divorce and therefore are the states from which migration most frequently occurs. The result is that where the remedial operation of the doctrine of comity could do the most good it is not applied.

Even though jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, the divorce granted by a court before whom only one spouse is present opens up a possibility of injustice which is very real. In such cases the statutory requirement for the institution of the action can be usually satisfied by giving notice of the pending action by publication in the legal advertising columns of newspapers, an almost certain guaranty that the information will *not* come to the attention of the person to whom it is directed. Actual notice of the pending action therefore depends on the decency of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff desires to inform the absent spouse, he or she may do so, except where the latter's whereabouts actually are unknown. But in many cases of hostility, this will not be done. As a result, a matter vitally affecting the absent party may be disposed of in an *ex parte* action.

Studies conducted by the Institute of Law at Johns Hopkins of the operation of the Maryland and Ohio divorce courts show that this situation is far from infre-

where the other spouse was served with process within that state. 201 U. S. at 570. Where the plaintiff spouse has remained in the state where the parties were domiciled together as man and wife (the "matrimonial domicile"), the decree of the court in that state will be entitled to recognition under the full faith and credit clause. *Id.* at 569.

quent.¹⁴ In fact, cases of divorce without any knowledge of the proceeding by one party are far more numerous, if less publicized, than the true migratory divorces.¹⁵ It is difficult to see how this problem can be met without resort to some new machinery in our courts. Such machinery has in fact been developed in Detroit. The Detroit courts were resorted to by a large number of alien workers who had left wives abroad and had come to Detroit in search of employment. Absence did not make the heart grow fonder, especially when it had to overcome immigration barriers and steamship fares. The number of *ex parte* divorces sought by these workers grew so large that a new office, called the "Friend of the Court," was created as an adjunct to the Detroit divorce court. In cases of this character the Friend of the Court, working in coöperation with the International Migration Service, a philanthropic society, intervened in the proceeding and secured a stay until an opportunity had been granted for the Service to investigate the status of the absent wife. Frequently, it was found that she had no knowledge of her husband's intentions, and, quite possibly, if they had been carried out, she would have remained in ignorance. The intervention of these agencies does not always result in denial of the divorces sought, but it does assure proper notice and the making of proper arrangements for the support of the divorced wives.¹⁶

¹⁴ The whereabouts of the defendant were unknown in 15.6 per cent of the divorce actions instituted in Ohio. Marshall and May, *The Divorce Court—Ohio* (1933) 67-73.

¹⁵ Migratory divorces are estimated at about 3 per cent of all divorces. Cahen, *Statistical Analysis of American Divorce* (1932) 78.

¹⁶ For a discussion of the Detroit procedure, see Wainhouse, "Protecting the Absent Spouse in International Divorce: The Detroit Experiment," 2 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 360 (June, 1935).

III

The Detroit experiment is not typical of efforts to cope with the migratory divorce problem. Regarded as an unmitigated evil, migratory divorce has long been the target of reformers, but they have sought its extirpation rather than the prevention of injuries incidental to it. In the 1880's, agitation for federal action gave rise to a federal investigation which, typically, produced no results. In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt called a conference of Governors to study uniform state laws on the subject. The conference was equally unproductive. The *Haddock* case in 1906 was the culmination of a series of cases in which the Supreme Court of the United States made clear its disapproval of, if not the law applicable to, the institution. Beginning about 1910, agitation for a constitutional amendment authorizing Congress to enact a federal divorce law was pressed, but, aside from the perennial introduction in Congress of resolutions to that end, this movement has been barren.¹⁷ The Commissioners for Uniform State Laws drafted a Uniform Divorce Act and, when that was ignored by virtually all states, drew up a Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act, aimed directly at migratory divorce. Vermont alone adopted the latter act, and then, at its next legislative session, repealed the measure.

On the basis of this experience, I think it may be safely predicted that we shall not solve this problem either by uniform state action or by federal action. There is no more likelihood of Nevada's abandoning its lax divorce practices than there is of Delaware's tightening up its corporation laws. Such action would be at great economic sacrifice. Moreover, there is no

¹⁷ For a depiction of the movements for uniform state or federal divorce legislation, see Lichtenberger, *Divorce* (1931) C.VIII.

conviction of sin to inspire it. Doubtless most Nevada citizens are convinced that they are doing a service to the nation in providing a place of escape for the matrimonially burdened.

Can the courts or legislatures of the states from which the migrants come do anything to stop the business? The courts have pronounced the migratory decrees invalid without deterring resort to the divorce mills. True, they have taken back much that they have said by developing the doctrine of estoppel. But the abandonment of the doctrine of estoppel would give sanction to judicial dislike of migratory divorce at the cost of actively aiding and abetting flagrant injustices.

The courts have granted injunctions at the suit of deserted wives, ordering husbands not to apply for divorces elsewhere. The courts have also granted declaratory judgments at the suit of wives whose husbands have already divorced them elsewhere, the judgments declaring the plaintiffs still to be the lawful wives of the defendant husbands. From a practical standpoint, it is open to doubt just how useful these remedies are.¹⁸ Moreover, they will never be invoked where the divorce is an amicable one, and such it is in the majority of migratory cases.

The state's power to prosecute for bigamy¹⁹ or adulterous cohabitation the

¹⁸ The injunction is of consequence as a deterrent only if the erring spouse wishes to return to his home state. The declaratory judgment may serve to clarify the status of the plaintiff spouse and aid in the future assertion of claims to property. The law relating to these remedies is treated fully in Jacobs, "The Utility of Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Migratory Divorce," 2 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 370 (June, 1935).

¹⁹ By marrying in the state granting the divorce, the divorced spouse will avoid the commission of bigamy as that offense is normally defined, since it is the act of contracting the marriage which constitutes the crime and, *ex hypothesi*, the second marriage would be legal where contracted. However, some states

husband or wife who marries after a migratory divorce exists unimpaired by the doctrine of estoppel. Occasionally where the guilty spouse has succeeded in outraging public opinion in his home town and is pursued by a vindictive wife, the prosecutor will act. Actuarial studies would, I suspect, reveal the risk of such prosecution to be slightly less than the danger of death by lightning. Suppose a local Savonarola became district attorney and brought action in every such case. I think the refusal of juries to convict would discourage him before the electorate had a chance to vote him out of office.

It is such considerations which cast an air of unreality over any speculation as to what the legislatures of the home states might do to penalize the divorce migrant. Any such measure as might be devised would require the support of a determined and an indignant public. This simply doesn't exist today. Reno inspires far more jests than jeremiads.

Perhaps a qualification might be made as to the mail order divorce. The mail order divorce lacks most of the color of legality which inheres in a Nevada decree. Moreover, it is obvious that the judicial machinery provided by the domestic divorce mills, however well-oiled and geared for mass production it may be, can, if properly invoked, operate to prevent gross injustice. No such assurance exists in the case of the mail order divorce. Finally, the mail order divorce traffic is the product of persistent solicitation of business by Mexican and American lawyers, directed chiefly to the ignorant and the poor. In many instances, I have no

define bigamy to include the act of cohabitation following the second marriage and, in such states, assuming the divorce to be invalid, a prosecution for bigamy would be sustained. In most other states, prosecution could be instituted for the lesser offense of adulterous cohabitation.

doubt that poor people are persuaded to pay more for invalid Mexican decrees than they would have had to pay for valid decrees in their home courts. The only mitigating circumstance is that in those states where decrees can be obtained on only one or a few restricted grounds, the mail order decree does equalize the position of the poor who cannot afford the trip to the divorce mill with the position of the well-to-do who can.

Assuming that the mail order divorce traffic should be stamped out, the task is a practicable one. The Federal Government in the exercise of its power over the mails and other forms of interstate and foreign communication could deal quite effectively with the traffic. Already, I understand, a committee of the New York bar has been working for federal legislation to this end.

The prospects are that we shall live with the migratory divorce traffic for some years to come. I see only one sure method of eliminating it, and that is through a change in the divorce laws of those states which now supply the grist for the divorce mills. Given an opportunity for relatively simple, dignified divorce proceedings at home, the number who would migrate for divorce would not be large. Once the number of divorce seekers had fallen to a low level, even the divorce mills might decide that the business did not pay sufficient dividends to justify continued lack of legal respectability. But many years must elapse before this situation comes about. In the meantime, we have the migratory divorce. How shall we appraise it?

IV

Of course, to the persons to whom all divorce is evil, any means of facilitating divorce will be condemned. They can, however, obtain some comfort from the fact that reliable estimates

have placed the volume of migratory divorces no higher than 3 per cent of all divorces.²⁰ The opening of new divorce mills since these estimates were made and the augmented mail order traffic have perhaps increased this percentage. Yet certainly 5 per cent would still be a liberal estimate.

Impossible to calculate but nonetheless significant is the influence which these widely-publicized divorce centers have had on resort to divorce without resort to migration. My guess would be that Reno has caused many more divorces than its courts have granted.

Suppose, however, that one looks at the institution of divorce with a more tolerant attitude. Are the characteristics of migratory divorce such that it should nonetheless be singled out for condemnation? I have already pointed to some of the legal defects which inhere in the migratory decree. Yet I do not think that one is justified in viewing the situation thus created with alarm. So far as the law reports evidence, the number of instances in which these defects have actually caused trouble is small, however distressing that trouble may be when it arises.²¹

That the mechanical *ex parte* procedure

²⁰ See Cahen, *loc. cit. supra* note 15.

²¹ It might be supposed that the legitimacy of children would be the source of considerable litigation arising out of the migratory divorces of their parents. In the thirty-year period ending in 1935, less than half a dozen cases of this character seem to have been reported in the American Digest System covering all the reported decisions (chiefly of appellate courts but including courts of first instance in New York State) during the period. While cases involving other issues are more numerous, the number under no heading is large. Perhaps, since property disputes are the principal inspiration of litigation, we must wait until the principals in migratory divorces have had an opportunity to grow old and die before we shall find a volume of cases commensurate with the potential legal troubles that migratory divorce breeds. I am skeptical, however, that a marked increase will be noted; after all, there were migratory divorces aplenty at the turn of the century.

followed in the divorce mills may result in injustices and hardships in individual cases is certainly not to be disputed. However, the number, and I suspect even the proportion, of such cases is probably smaller than that of the cases of hardship and injustice arising in *ex parte* non-migratory cases. There are divorce mills aplenty outside Nevada, Arkansas, and Florida, even though their grist is solely of domestic origin.

One aspect of the migratory divorce problem is not often discussed but is I think worthy of consideration. The laws relating to divorce are obviously an important part of the legal structure of society. How healthy for that society is it that those laws can be evaded by the thinnest sort of legal subterfuge? If such evasion may not harm the family, still what does it do to the law? The problem is accentuated by the fact that, by and large, this evasion is possible only for the well-to-do.

I think there is cause here for concern, but not for great anxiety. Viewed in its relation to the problem of law's functioning in society, the phenomenon of migratory divorce is but one of a great many instances where the law is called upon to play a dual rôle. On the one hand, it is required to preserve a symbol cherished by a people; on the other hand, it is required to furnish a means of preventing that symbol from standing too much in the way of

the desires and practices of everyday life.²² The symbol of the united family, joined by God and dissoluble by man only in extreme cases, has long been part and parcel of American ideology. But changing ways of life have made fidelity to that symbol increasingly inconvenient. The symbol is not destroyed; instead, it is carefully preserved and lawyers and judges are called upon to exercise their wits to evade it. Migratory divorce is one of their solutions. It is distinguished from other instances of the same process in this and other fields of the law only in that the geographical division of the symbolic and practical functions renders the dualism too obvious to be ignored.

There is one question which I believe should be posed to himself by every person who thinks about migratory divorce, for, while he cannot well answer it, its exploration will carry him close to the nub of the problem. The question is this: What would happen, over a period of years, if tomorrow the divorce mills of Nevada and its rival sister states were to close, and no other states were to carry on the migratory divorce business?²³

²² For a stimulating discussion of the relation of law and symbol, see Arnold, *Symbols of Government* (1935).

²³ Professor Ernest R. Groves' penetrating article, "Migratory Divorces," 2 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 293 (June, 1935), is recommended to those who wish to pursue further the sociological implications of the institution.

RACE, CULTURAL GROUPS, SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE SOUTH*

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THIS discussion of the situation in the South is from the standpoint of two economies: an "agricultural economy" and an "industrial-commercial economy." The term "agricultural economy" as used in this paper indicates an economic situation in which agriculture is dominant and towns in the area are more or less trading centers which supply the needs and demands of agriculture. The term "industrial-commercial economy" indicates an economic situation in which industry and commerce are dominant and the rural areas are more or less adjuncts of the towns.

In the ante-bellum period an "agricultural economy", the plantation, was dominant. In that period there tended to be conformity, as it related to race and class, between the economic order, the political order and the moral order. We have at the present time the rise of an "industrial-commercial economy." Here we find non-conformity between the economic order and the political and moral orders as they relate to race and class. The problems of adjustment of race and class in the present period concern securing

more conformity between the economic order and the political and moral orders. The changes in the political order and the moral order have not kept pace with the changes in the economic order.

CONTRAST OF THE ECONOMY IN 1860 WITH THE ECONOMY IN 1930

A comparison of the situation in the South in 1860 when an agricultural economy was dominant with the present time when an industrial-commercial economy is tending to become dominant, brings out a number of interesting and important facts.

The Economy as it Existed in 1860. The population of the South, 10,258,692, was preponderantly rural, 93 per cent. From the Potomac River to Texas, there were only 63 urban centers; that is, towns with 2,500 inhabitants or more. Throughout the South there were no towns in which industry was dominant. The chief towns were ports. There were seaport towns such as Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, and river port towns as Memphis and Vicksburg on the Mississippi, and towns located at the head of navigation on the Atlantic Seaboard rivers as Richmond, Virginia; Raleigh, North Carolina; Augusta, Macon, and

* Presented at the meeting of the Southern Sociological Society in Birmingham, Alabama, April 3, 1937.

Columbus in Georgia; and Montgomery, Alabama.

The Industrial-Commercial Economy in 1930. In this economy the rural areas have become subordinate to the towns. Political control, to a very large extent, has likewise shifted from the plantation to the town. Almost all political offices, even in the rural areas are held by individuals living in the towns. There are today in the South, from the Potomac River to Texas, excluding Oklahoma, 763 urban centers with a population of 10,494,724. The total combined population, in 1930, of Atlanta, Birmingham, and Memphis, 783,187, was greater than the entire urban population in the South in 1860, which was 755,326. The towns dominate the economic order. Agriculture is more or less directed from the towns. It is the Chambers of Commerce that see to the providing of Agricultural Demonstration Agents for the counties and assist in prescribing what these agents shall do, the particular phases of farming upon which they will lay emphasis.

Since 1860, industry has come to the South. This has been accelerated by the development of coal and iron industries in the mountain areas from West Virginia to Alabama; the development of the oil and gas industry in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; the development of the heavy industries manufacturing with its chief center in Birmingham; the development of tobacco manufacturing in Virginia and North Carolina; and the development of textile manufacturing from Virginia across North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia to Alabama.

THE ORIGIN IN THE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY
OF DISCRIMINATIONS AND DISTINCTIONS
BASED ON RACE AND CLASS

The South is taking stock of herself. She finds that in many ways she is lagging behind the other sections of the country.

It appears that one of the main causes of this lag, economic and social, is due to the imposing at the present time of rules and regulations based on race discriminations and distinctions. These rules and regulations originated in the ante-bellum period as a part of the agricultural economy.

The discussions about the ante-bellum situation in the South general referred to the Negro, the planter, and the poor white. It was seldom that there was any reference to a middle class of whites. This was particularly true in popular discussions. There were, nevertheless, in fact three classes of whites: an upper class, consisting of planters, some of the ministers, physicians, and lawyers, and some of the merchants and factors; a middle class consisting of farmers, some of the ministers, shop keepers, tradesmen and artisans; and a third class referred to as the poor whites. This last class consisted of small farmers, squatters, landless whites, and a small number of laborers found in cities.

Social controls were devised for conserving and promoting the interests, economic, political, and social, of the planter class. These controls were external and internal. External control, as attempted by the South, was mainly political in its aspects and consisted of the efforts of a conscious minority group to achieve and maintain advantages, mainly economic, through political manipulation and domination. Internal social control, from the standpoint of race and class, was always a difficult problem. This was because of the three more or less diverse elements in the white population with opposing interests. There was also the presence of a large group of subjected and exploited alien people, the Negroes. The problem of internal control, on the one hand, was mainly through force to keep this alien group in its place; on the other hand, through manipulation, to control the interests and aspirations of the middle

and poor white classes. Part of this manipulation consisted in emphasizing white solidarity. It is probable that this idea was first urged for military purposes and that later it was used to emphasize the superiority of whites, the inferiority of Negroes, and the importance of keeping the Negro in his place. This explains in part, at least, why the economic interests of the poorer whites were subordinated; why their class consciousness remained undeveloped while at the same time their ideas of racial superiority attained a high degree of development.

A FRONTIER STATE OF MIND

This manipulation by the planter class of the middle and poor white classes, with respect to the Negro, was mainly through what may be designated as a fear complex, a frontier state of mind.

When one considers the plantation of the present day, he may not know or understand that as an institution it developed on the frontier. The characteristics of the plantation originated and were conditioned by the frontier situation. The original frontier was the Atlantic Seaboard. The frontier, through the years, was gradually pushed Westward. When all the whites on the frontier, either in Virginia or South Carolina, were taken together they were a minority group when compared with the slaves within and the Indians without. The fear of dangers within and without was ever present from the first Seaboard settlements in the seventeenth century through the frontier expansion of the plantation area in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A striking feature of this frontier state of mind as it relates to the Negro is its persistence long after the danger has passed. This persistence finds expression today in such terms as "Negro Domination" and "White Supremacy."

THE MORAL ORDER IN THE ANTE-BELLUM PERIOD

As a part of the development of the plantation as a frontier institution, there arose a moral order, the chief end of which, on the one hand, was to justify slavery, and, on the other hand, to indicate what should be the conduct of whites towards Negroes and of Negroes towards whites. This moral order conserved the interests of the planter class and became an instrument of control of the poorer whites and Negroes. The moral justification for slavery was based upon Divine authority. The Negro, because of the curse of Ham, was stamped as an inferior being who should forever be in bondage to the descendants of Shem and Japheth.¹ Abraham, the chosen servant of the Lord, was the owner of hundreds of slaves. There was nothing in the New Testament calculated to disturb the conscience of an honest slave holder.² It was maintained that it was advantageous to the Negro, a heathen from Africa, to have been brought to America and through slavery to come under the beneficent influence of Christianity. It was not a sin, therefore, but

¹ It is of interest, when one reads Genesis 9/24-27, to find that the Bible does not say that God cursed Ham but that Noah, after awakening from his drunken sleep pronounced the curse which was as follows:

24—"And Noah awoke from his wine, and knew what his younger son had done unto him.

25—"And he said, Cursed be Canaan, a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren.

26—"And he said, Blessed be the Lord God of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant.

27—"God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant."

² There were theologians who through a literal translation of the original Hebrew of the Bible, drew conclusion that the Negro had a different and lower origin than that of the whites. This also indicated that the Negro was an inferior being. *Dr Bow's Review* 29: 129-136; 30: 530.

a righteous act, to hold the Negro in slavery and treat him as an inferior.³

The conduct of whites towards Negroes and of Negroes towards whites was in the main from the standpoint of public opinion, from the standpoint of law, and from the standpoint of ecclesiastical authority. From an ecclesiastical standpoint hope of rewards in the hereafter was held out to the Negro: if he were content with his lot; if he were faithful in his work; if he were obedient to his master; if he were loyal to the welfare of his master.

From the standpoint of public opinion it was right for whites to: treat the Negro as an inferior; keep him in his place; protect him as long as he remained in his place; inflict punishments commensurate with the degree to which he might get out of his place; require him to be orderly and submissive; inflict punishments commensurate with the degree to which he might become disorderly and insubordinate. And for the Negro to: be respectful in his attitude toward whites; remain in his place; be orderly and submissive; be loyal to the whites—report things which would endanger public welfare (the welfare of the whites, as for example, threatened uprisings of slaves); to defend the master class in times of insurrections and wars.

The law, with the approval of public opinion, could be used: to require the Negro, free or slave, to be submissive to the will of all white persons; to exercise power and authority through the patrol and other agencies to keep the Negro in his place; to protect the Negro as long as he remained in his place; when he committed an offense to make justice severe, sure, and swift (this a background to the lynch-

ing of Negroes in the present period); when a white person and a Negro committed a similar offense to inflict punishment of much greater severity upon the Negro than upon the white person (this appears to be the origin of the present day differences in the application of the law to whites and Negroes).

EFFECTS OF THE CONTINUANCE IN THE PRESENT INDUSTRIAL-COMMERCIAL ECONOMY OF DISCRIMINATIONS AND DISTINCTIONS BASED ON RACE AND CLASS WHICH ORIGINATED IN THE ANTE-BELLUM AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY

Industry in all of its phases, in the South, is in a national and an international economy. Its processes, its techniques, its operations are of the same kind as are universally used both throughout the nation and in other parts of the world.

Dairy farming, truck farming, fruit farming, as specialties in the South, are in a national economy. Here again their processes, their techniques, their operations are of the same kind as used in other parts of the nation. The South, in spite of its efforts, is continuing to lag behind other sections of the country. There are several reasons for this lag. Important among these are the restrictions and discriminations imposed upon the Negro in this industrial-commercial economy period in about the same way as they were imposed in the agricultural economy period.

A particular cause of this lag is that in a modified form, the agricultural system of the ante-bellum period still persists in the cotton area and extends its economic, political, and social influence over the entire South. This system still remains unreconstructed. It does not fit into the national economy. It has its own special kinds of landlord and tenant relationships which are different from the relationships between landlord and tenant in the North

³ Professor Dew on "Slavery" in *Pro-Slavery Argument*, page 452. For scriptural reference on which based see Eph. 6, 5; Col. 3, 22; I Tim. 6, 1-2; Titus 2, 9; I Peter 2, 18.

and West. The folkways and mores that accompany the system connote, in a very large degree, the continuance of an ante-bellum situation. These folkways and mores represent the persistence in the present situation of an agricultural economy with its accompanying political and moral orders which were developed under slavery.

An indication of how the ante-bellum agricultural economy still functions is revealed in the proposals to help improve agricultural conditions. In no one of the proposals for tenant relief is there indication of a definite effort to do away with the outmoded agricultural system instituted in 1866. The proposals are to take tenants out of the system. Granted that relief might be brought to hundreds, even thousands of them by means of land ownership projects or in other ways, there would still remain within the system a great body of tenants and the system itself would continue.

Wage Differentials and the Low Economic Status. The system of controls based on race brought over from the ante-bellum period have much to do with the present low economic status of the South when contrasted with other sections of the country.

Important here are wage differentials. These wage differentials and the causes for the same are discussed at length in Odum's *Southern Regions*.⁴ Among the causes are: lack of invested capital; the balance of trade against the South; freight rate differentials; differentials in skills and workers of machinery; South not as efficient as the North in its use of its capitalization and its mechanization. Another cause noted was cheap labor. It was also noted that income and wages in the South range uniformly from 30 to 50 per cent below the

national level. Wages in the Southeastern section of the South are from 20 to 30 per cent lower than corresponding wages in the Northeastern part of the country. Unskilled occupations which could be entered by farm youths without apprenticeship showed a differential as high as 80 per cent in other sections over the South.

The differentials recognized by the NRA have been long standing and even greater in extent than those set up by that body. It appears that the root of the cause of wage differentials in the South has its basis in agriculture or to be more specific in cotton production where, following emancipation, remuneration for services rendered by the Negro was based on the lowest minimum pay. Wages for Negroes in other occupations in this post-bellum period were largely fixed by this agricultural standard. These wages were below what were paid to whites. Thus a set of differentials were set up. One set related to differences in remuneration based on race for services rendered. The other set, growing in part out of the first set, was differences in remuneration for services rendered by white persons in the North and white persons doing the same work in the South.

Differentials in the South, based on race, are of two forms. The one is the direct differential where there is a difference in the remuneration received by whites and Negroes in the same occupations and rendering identical services. This is a more or less general practice in the trades and professions; particularly in the teaching profession. The other differential may be considered as indirect. This is where there is a difference in the remuneration received by whites and Negroes rendering identical services, but reported in different occupations. To illustrate: in the same business establishment a Negro employee and a white employee are render-

⁴ Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States*, pp. 49, 439, 441, 471.

ing identical services but are receiving different rates of pay, the Negro employee being listed and paid as a porter, the white employee being listed and paid as a clerk.

The forcing of the great mass of Negroes to a low standard of living because of the lack of an adequate income affects the entire Negro group and has given rise to the belief that "it is quite natural for Negroes to live on less than whites doing the same type of work." This belief formed the chief basis for the arguments of some firms in the South employing Negroes for exemptions from the applications of the NRA code.

It is of special importance to note that the "wage differential operates to withhold from the South the same measure of buying power and recovery which it provides for other sections. 'It helps to keep the South poverty stricken, underprivileged, poor black, and poor white sections of America. It operates not only against a Negro man or woman working in a laundry but directly against every Southern wage earner, every Southern merchant, every Southern lawyer, and doctor. It damns them all to sectional poverty in a rich nation.'"⁸

THE EFFECTS OF "KEEPING THE NEGRO IN THE DITCH"

Years ago Booker Washington urged the cooperation of whites and Negroes in a common effort to aid the South to take her proper place in the national economy. He stated that white and black, in the South, must rise or fall together. Then he uttered the epigram that "you cannot keep a man in the ditch unless you remain down there with him." What he meant by this epigram was that to the extent the South imposed restrictions and discriminations upon the Negro to that extent would the

South itself be prevented from making the economic and social progress that she should make. The years that have passed since Booker Washington made these statements have demonstrated the truth of his assertions. The field of politics is a striking example.

The Negro and the Vote. As already pointed out political dominance has shifted from the country to the town. In spite of this shift, the race-class features of the ante-bellum and reconstruction period "white supremacy," "solidarity of the white race," still to a large extent determine the rules and regulations of the Democratic Party in the South. Participation in affairs political is still in the main limited to white persons, laws enacted and rules formulated are intended to disfranchise the Negro. These laws, in general, have been effective in keeping the Negro out of politics but in so doing they have also kept three-fourths or more of the whites out of politics as far as voting is concerned.

Although the Negro, in the main, is excluded from participation in politics, he is nevertheless included in quotas for Federal representation and in all other instances where population quotas are involved; as, for example, apportionment on a population basis of Federal and State funds for education and other purposes. Because of the presence of the Negro, a one party system, democratic, prevails throughout the South except in the States of West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Contests between candidates for offices, except in the aforementioned States, are not in the general elections but in the primaries. The results of the primaries are tantamount to election to offices.

The exclusion of the Negro from participation in politics has resulted in differentials in public services for Negroes

⁸ Macon, Ga., *Telegraph*, August 3, 1933.

and for whites. The general practice is to provide a less proportionate public service for Negroes than for whites; as for example, in the apportionment of funds for the education of Negroes and whites; in the public services of municipalities provided for the Negro sections of towns; to restrict or exclude entirely the use by Negroes of libraries and other facilities provided for the general public.

There were many surprising results connected with the vote in the last presidential election. One result was that Southern democracy found itself somewhat in a class with the Negro. It was a minority in a national democratic party. It had rules and regulations concerning the Negro voting the democratic ticket that were not set up by the national democratic party. The vote of the Negro in the last presidential election has been extensively commented upon. It is estimated that more than a million Negroes voted the democratic ticket. This is a number about equal to the total democratic votes cast in six States having disfranchisement laws; namely, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia.

No Special Reason for Changing Qualifications for Voting. The Negro is dividing his vote. Perhaps this is an example that might, with advantage, be followed by the "solid South" in dividing its vote into liberal and conservative democrats if it did not want to divide on a democratic and republican basis. Such a division might permit a larger number of Negroes to vote in the South. In this connection it is of importance to note that there would be no special reasons for changing legislative acts fixing qualifications for voting if these acts were impartially applied without regard to race. The white man's primary appears to be on the way to the discard: first, because of the preponderance of judicial decisions against it in the

Federal courts; second, because this primary sets up regulations for voting that apply to only a small sector of the national democratic party; for in the other 38 states of the nation there are no such regulations.

Poll Tax Greatest Hinderance to Voting. The greatest hinderance to voting in the South is the poll tax. This was a device instituted for keeping the Negro from voting. Fortunately or unfortunately, it has also been applied to whites. An interesting comment on its application to whites appeared in the Birmingham Post of March 26, 1937, under the caption "Citizen Won't Vote Because of Poll Tax." This was a letter to the Post signed H. M. G. In stating his objection, he said:

I refuse to pay a poll tax. Call it stubbornness or stinginess if you will but I know that it is neither of these. I simply cannot find it within my principles as an American to have to pay for the privilege of casting a ballot.

Many persons of intelligence and high position have been crying out against the cumulative phase of Alabama's poll tax. I will not stop there. I wish to raise my voice against any form of poll tax. Only 10 States cling to this unjust form of taxation. Thirty-eight others give the voting privilege free as it should be given.

IS THE NEGRO IN THE SOUTH MORE
NATURALLY A REPUBLICAN THAN
A DEMOCRAT?

The Negro is thought of as traditionally being a republican and that only under particular circumstances as the recent depression does he become a democrat. One can raise the question whether the Negro in the South may not after all be more naturally a democrat than a republican; that is, politically, he would if permitted to do so more naturally go with the white people of the South than against them. This would be in line with what the Negro did during the war between the States, with his fidelity to the people of the South, to

that part of the country where he belonged. It would also appear to be borne out by the economic history of the Negro in the South since his emancipation. The fact that when given opportunity the Negro divides his vote between the democratic, republican, and other parties is not something to be considered as exceptional. It is probable that if the Negro had been left to himself during the reconstruction period and if the democratic party in the South had received him, he would have gone with the white people of the South and there would have been two parties in the South instead of one.⁶

THE CHANGING SITUATION

The South, along with other parts of the world, is being greatly affected by the rapidity of the changes which are taking place. There are economic changes resulting from new inventions, a greater use of machinery, more rapid communication, the shifting of trade relations and other causes. These economic changes are accompanied by social changes. There must be adaptations to meet the needs of these

⁶ Some substantiation for this conclusion is borne out by the following: when plans for the political organization of Negroes in South Carolina were being made following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a number of them met and appointed a Committee to go to Washington to get the advice of Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens. Pains were taken to keep the plans of the Committee secret from native whites and carpet baggers. Sumner and Stevens advised the Committee to tender the leadership of the Negroes to native whites of the former master class of conservative views. This plan was frustrated. The Negro in South Carolina, as in other parts of the South, eventually went almost solidly to the republican party. Affidavit furnished the writer on December 14, 1917, by two former South Carolinians, Whitfield McKinley, former collector of customs, District of Columbia, and Kelly Miller, Dean Emeritus of Howard University, Washington, D. C. The source of their information was from Francis L. Cardoza at one time Secretary of State of South Carolina in the reconstruction period.

changes. The South, in addition to the problems of adjustment that confront the North and European countries has its own peculiar problems of race and class that have to be adjusted to the needs of a rapidly changing situation if the South is to take its proper place in a national economy as well as a world economy.

One of these adaptations must be made to meet the growing class consciousness developing in the middle and poor white classes. Along with this growing class consciousness is an awareness of the identity of economic interests of whites and Negroes. There is the tendency for working class whites and working class Negroes to get together on a basis of economic interests. We have examples of this in industry, particularly in coal mining, likewise in agriculture where the sharecroppers and farm tenants unions include both whites and Negroes. Here we have the tendency to cooperate as against the old traditional antagonism between the poor white and the Negro.

While, at the present time, there may not be any great amount of this getting together of working class whites and Negroes on the basis of economic interests, the very tendency itself is significant and highly important. This tendency upsets a tradition of the South that racial solidarity must be maintained at any cost. This tendency works to change the symbiotic relationships of race and class from an antagonistic basis to a cooperative basis.

To meet the needs of a rapidly changing economic and social situation, the South must have greater and newer forms of cooperation. In the social field there have been efforts at cooperation between upper class whites and upper class Negroes, as exemplified by the Commission on Interracial Cooperation. We have just noted the tendency for economic cooperation

between working class whites and Negroes. The greatest benefit would come if there were a general cooperation between whites and Negroes, upper class, middle class, and lower class. Booker T. Washington envisioned some such cooperation as this when he said that whites and Negroes should work together for the best interests of the whole South.

In the economic field where agriculture traditionally has been antagonistic, opposed to industry and commerce, a new economy "agricultural-industrial-commercial" is developing. Here the prime objective is cooperation instead of antagonism. Industry and the Farm Chemurgic Council are taking the lead in this matter by cooperating to find new uses of agricultural products, particularly in the field of industry.

At the present time, agriculture has, in the main, a two fold emphasis: the production of food and clothing for man, and foodstuffs for animals. In this new economy there would be a three fold emphasis in agriculture,—the two already mentioned and a third, the growing of products for use in industry. This new innovation calls for: (1) new uses of old products as cotton in road building, starches, oils, and other products from the peanut and the sweet potato; (2) the use of waste products as okra stalks, cotton stalks, and cotton linters, this latter now being used in the making of insulation boards; (3) the use of products growing in an area but not being used, as for example, the use of slash pine in the manufacturing of paper; (4) the introduction of new plants into an area, as for example, the introduction of the soy bean and the tung tree into sections of the South, the latter for manufacturing tung oil now largely used in industry and in the main imported. The former in addition to use as forage is also made into a lacquer for painting automobiles.

It is estimated that the new industries which are arising as the result of the use of agricultural products in industry, will give employment not only to a greater part of the surplus population of the South, but would divert thousands of farmers now engaged in cotton growing and other unprofitable pursuits to the more profitable growing of products for industry. Among the new industries that are already developing as the result of the growing of agricultural products for use in industry are: paper mills, sweet potato starch mills, tung oil plants, and power alcohol plants.

It was pointed out at the beginning of this article that at the present time, there is non-conformity between the economic order and the political and moral orders as they relate to race and class. It was also noted that the problems of adjustment of race and class in the present period would have to do with securing more conformity between the economic order and the political and moral orders. The major reason for this non-conformity is that the changes in the political and moral orders have not kept pace with the changes in the economic order.

The political and the moral orders are still to a large extent governed by the traditions and customs of the ante-bellum period and tend to resist change. The Southern political order does not fit into the national political order, nor does the Southern moral order fit into the national moral order. They are still attempting to maintain differences based on race; while at the same time the economic order with its industrial dominance is more or less impersonal and is operating to place on the same level all of the individuals in a particular class regardless of race. It is this non-conformity between the economic order and the political and moral orders which is one of the main causes preventing the South from taking its proper place in a national and international economy.

As the new economy, agricultural-industrial-commercial, comes more and more into the South, there will be greater and greater conformity between the economic order and the political and moral orders. The evils surrounding the production of cotton, both economic and social, and growing out of ante-bellum folkways and

mores, will tend to be eliminated. There will be a new basis of relationship between landlord and tenant. This new economy will provide a situation in which there will be not only economic cooperation, but also cooperation between race and race, and between class and class, so that the interests of all the people will be conserved

BOOM PERIODS IN THE HISTORY OF AN INDIAN TRIBE

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CERTAIN real estate experts are arguing at the present time that our economic system is on the upswing. They say that a great boom, in real estate at least, is coming and that those with a financial weather eye had better take notice and act quickly. While an inquiry into the cultural development of an obscure Indian tribe can hardly be of benefit to these Wall Street prophets, there is a certain relevance between their speculations and this study.

The cyclical trend of modern-day economic affairs, and indeed, of western civilization in general, has been noted and traced by several historians and economists. Archaeologists and ethnologists have found that primitive cultures also may undergo periods of exuberance and animation and then lapse into relative quiescence again. The Plains Cree, an Indian tribe in Canada, have gone through three such periods since their first contacts with white men.

The tribe is now settled on thirty-four reserves scattered across the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. In the years just before the allocation of reserves, they lived on the northern edge of the great prairie country. They then were a fighting people who spent the year around on the plains hunting buffalo.

There is good reason for believing that the Plains Cree were recent arrivals into the northern plains, coming originally from the forest regions bordering on Hudson Bay where still live the Woodland Cree. Documentary evidence, comparative analysis, and the testimony of living informants all indicate that the Plains Cree broke away from the great body of forest Cree and displaced the former inhabitants of the northernmost sector of the plains area.

The Cree are mentioned in the reports of the Jesuit missionaries to the New World as early as the year 1640, and by the end of the seventeenth century they were well known to the French and English traders. Because of the early contacts, there is a good deal of documentary material on the Cree, and their activities through two centuries may be traced.

From an examination of the early accounts and from more recent testimony, it becomes apparent that there were three periods in the history of the Plains Cree during which they expanded in numbers and territory, extending their influence to distant tribes, and usually adopting many new cultural forms.

In each case the stimulus that set the culture going at full tilt was the direct result of the introduction of a European complex. The impact of white culture

upon native peoples is commonly envisaged as a disintegrating and dispiriting force. And indeed, when primitive cultures are suddenly confronted with the whole array of the European stock in trade, they eventually go to pieces. The Cree, however, did not come into intimate contact with the whites until long after their first acquaintance with them. Thus some of the Cree were able to experience several times the impetus which native societies usually receive when first presented with the artifacts and customs of civilization.

The three factors that successively brought about an efflorescence of Cree culture were: first, the introduction of the gun and the fur trade; secondly, the acquisition of the horse; lastly the building of the railroads. The advent of the Hudson Bay Company at the end of the seventeenth century actuated the first period of expansion and thrust some of the Cree out onto the plains. Those Cree who remained on the prairies acquired horses from the tribes to the west of them toward the end of the eighteenth century. This circumstance produced another condition of cultural animation. At the close of the nineteenth century the transcontinental railroads were laid across Canada. During the decade following, Plains Cree culture flourished. This time it was not a matter of territorial expansion but of cultural growth. The easy means of communication afforded by the railroad brought the tribes into closer connection than had before been possible, and many traits were taken from and taken over by the Plains Cree.

All of these factors operated on an aboriginal level. That is, the changes they brought about occurred within the matrix of the native culture and did not too violently disrupt the old way of life. They did not undermine and invalidate the

aboriginal customs and institutions but rather gave them new emphasis and renewed intensity. And in every case, when the first flush of energy spent itself, this vitality was largely lost.

The process may be clearly seen in the history of the fur trade. During the seventeenth century the felt hat for gentlemen came into vogue in Europe. Beaver fur made the best felt, and the pressure of the demand for fur led to the establishment of trading posts close to the Cree. The richness of Cree country in this commodity and its ready accessibility to the markets through Hudson Bay, paved the way for a large scale fur trade. The Cree themselves were well adapted to the demands of a trapper's existence. Being aboriginally a hunting people, scattered in small groups over a wide territory, they became maximally efficient beaver trappers. They were also a canoe-using people and were readily able to utilize the network of waterways in their terrain to transport the raw materials to the posts.

Since they were the first recruits for the fur trade west of Hudson Bay, they were the first to receive guns. This fact, together with their ability to travel long distances by canoe made it possible for them to overrun the Saskatchewan basin and push some of the tribes in their path into the Rocky Mountains. To quote from Henry Kelsey's journal of 1690,

But now of late they hunt their enemies,
And with our English guns do make ym. flie

and their enemies fled until they too obtained guns and turned the tables on their pursuers.

Those of the Cree who remained in the woodlands and trapped for the Hudson Bay Company, before long became highly dependent on the Company, and their economic subservience made for their cul-

tural debilitation. But certain of the Cree who ventured far afield came onto the plains and stayed there. These became the Plains Cree. Now we cannot say definitely that no Cree ever were on the plains before the days of the fur trade, but certain it is that the Plains Cree as a tribal group came into being as a result of their propulsion westward by trade. They were readily able to secure a foothold on the plains because of their superior armament.

The sum total of the earliest contacts with Europeans was a cultural effervescence whereby the Cree burst far beyond their previous limits. Those Cree who came onto and stayed within the plains area escaped the demoralization later experienced by the Wood Cree. It seems that these Cree of the plains continued to operate pretty much along the woodland patterns at first. They lived in small familial groups and hunted or trapped in the forest manner. The buffalo did not immediately provide for all their needs because the Cree were not yet closely adjusted to the plains environment. The factor, that precipitated a change and transformed them into a truly plains people, was the horse.

Although La Verendrye saw horses among the Cree in 1738, it was not until 1784, according to Umfreville, that they acquired a considerable number of animals. Then followed a dynamic period in Plains Cree history. As they grew more adept in the use of the horse they became more efficient in the buffalo hunt and acquired a greater degree of mobility. The new economic surplus available from the buffalo chase and more rapid overland travel enabled them to come together in larger numbers. The many small groups of Plains Cree became welded into several bands. The presence of what might be called an urban situation facilitated the

development of such plains phenomena as warrior societies, the collective buffalo hunt, and larger war parties. The Plains Cree, in their quest for horses and glory, harassed the peoples about them. Again the installation of a European trait complex caused this tribe to push forward its cultural and territorial frontiers.

The disappearance of the buffalo put an end to this phase of the cycle and threw the tribe into a state of disorganization. They were making a poor sort of adjustment to the new situation when the injection of another stimulus of European origin created an upsurge in Plains Cree life. This time it was the laying of the transcontinental railroads across Canada. Economically the natives were benefited by the influx of workers, soldiers, and settlers from whom they derived an income in several ways. But in addition the Plains Cree took to riding on the trains to visit distant bands of their own people, or of other tribes, whose reserves were close to the railroad lines. The visitors came back home with a knowledge of new dances, new games, new moccasin types which were soon taken over by the rest of the band. The stream of novel procedures infused new interest into the tribal culture, especially into the ceremonial organization. Again the injection of a European stimulant gave new vigor to Plains Cree culture.

It may fairly be said that these three events, the introduction of the gun and fur trade, of the horse, and of the railroad, supplied the basic mechanisms or motives for those changes in Plains Cree culture since the first contact with Europeans. Coming about a hundred years apart, these forces galvanized the Plains Cree into exuberant activity and served to bolster rather than to break down the previous cultural forms.

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspects of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY AS A GOVERNMENT CORPORATION*

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AN OUTSTANDING development in the recent administrative experience of the United States Government has been the increased use of government corporations in carrying on the public business. The popularity of the corporate device has been due to the fact that, as noted in the recent Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, incorporation of a government agency is generally considered to make possible "freedom of operation, flexibility, business efficiency, and opportunity for experimentation" to an extent "not often obtainable under the typical bureau form of organization."¹ The administrative advantages which the Committee considered characteristic of the corporate form of organization when used for governmental purposes may be grouped

into four classes. First, government corporations are customarily financially autonomous units, with a financial structure and financial powers approximating those of private corporations. Second, incorporation of a government agency has usually operated to give it a semi-private status and to confer upon it some degree of freedom from the statutes, regulations, and procedures which are binding upon ordinary government agencies. Third, the corporate form provides a convenient means for limiting sovereign immunity when the government undertakes a business enterprise. Fourth, the corporation affords opportunity for regional decentralization and local autonomy.

The Tennessee Valley Authority was set up as a corporation with the definite expectation that its administrative effectiveness would thereby be increased. President Roosevelt in his message to Congress on the subject suggested the creation of "a corporation clothed with the power of government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise."² The congressional conference report on the TVA bill contained these words: "We intend that the corporation shall have

* This article summarizes a portion of a dissertation prepared at the University of Chicago, entitled "The Tennessee Valley Authority: A Study in Corporate Administrative Methods."

¹ "Administrative Management in the Government of the United States" (Washington, 1937), pp. 38, 39. For a discussion of government corporations, see H. A. Van Dorn, *Government Owned Corporations* (New York, 1926); M. E. Dimock, *Government-Operated Enterprises in the Panama Canal Zone* (Chicago, 1934).

² *House Document 15*, 73d Cong., 1st sess.

much of the essential freedom and elasticity of a private business corporation."³

The TVA, after four years of experience in the administration of a regional development program, has failed to achieve this goal. Although the corporate device has been effective in establishing the Authority as a decentralized regional agency, the corporation has for the most part been denied, or unable to use, the three other types of administrative advantages mentioned above. The following discussion of the Authority's experience in these three fields not only throws light upon the problems of a most interesting organization, but also helps to make clear the potentialities and limitations of the government corporation as an administrative agency.

THE FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE CORPORATION

The financial structure and powers of a government corporation constitute the chief features distinguishing it from the ordinary government bureau, and they make possible the principal administrative advantages inhering in the corporate type of agency. The use of capital stock instead of annual appropriations, the power to issue bonds and to spend revenues, the adoption of commercial methods of accounting and financial reporting, the right to be judged by annual reports and balance sheets rather than by a minute scrutiny of detailed transactions—these characteristics are of great value when the government undertakes to administer an economic service or a proprietary enterprise. By the same token they are quite likely to be valueless in connection with a non-commercial enterprise, whose program is not autonomous and self-supporting, and which is without revenues sufficient to carry the operations after the original grant of capital. Yet the TVA program is

precisely of this latter character. During its first three years, the corporation expended \$99,413,313.95 on its varied projects of dam construction, electricity production, fertilizer and agricultural development, and regional planning.⁴ Against this total expenditure, the only important revenues were those from electricity operations, amounting to \$2,585,209.60.

With a program of this nature, there obviously has been no opportunity for adopting commercial methods of financing. The corporation of necessity has relied upon annual appropriations from Congress, and has been subject in most respects to regular appropriation procedure. Its budget is prepared annually on the basis of the governmental fiscal year, and estimates of requirements are submitted to the Bureau of the Budget for review and revision.⁵ Beginning with the fiscal year 1936, the financial needs of the TVA and three other "self-supporting or self-contained units of the Government"⁶ have been carried in the United States budget by means of an annexed budget, from which only the net appropriation requirements are carried over into the budget summary. The desirability of annexed budgets for governmental units of this type is well recognized, but in the case of the TVA the revenues are so small in comparison with the expenditures, and the corporation's budget is so completely out of balance,

⁴ The total is allocated by the TVA as follows: dam construction, \$81,345,549.79; electricity program (gross), \$10,039,317.32; fertilizer and agricultural development, \$5,078,867.42; national defense, \$2,035,965.14; and regional planning projects, \$913,614.28. See *Annual Report*, 1936, pp. 123, 127.

⁵ Required by Executive Order No. 7174, September 4, 1935. However, the TVA had voluntarily submitted to Budget Bureau control long before this order was issued.

⁶ The Post Office Department, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the District of Columbia. See *The Budget*, 1936, pp. xiv-xv.

³ *House Report* 130, 73d Cong., 1st sess.

that the value of an annexed budget is almost entirely theoretical.⁷

In the first two appropriations to the TVA, regular procedures were not followed, largely because of the emergency situation. The initial appropriation of \$50,000,000 was made available until expended, without the usual fiscal year limitation.⁸ The second grant of funds was a \$25,000,000 allocation by the President from emergency appropriations.⁹ But beginning with the fiscal year 1936, regular procedures have been adopted. The TVA appropriation is regularly carried in one of the deficiency appropriation acts. The directors of the corporation appear before the congressional appropriations committees with itemized estimates of financial needs. The appropriation finally agreed upon by Congress is voted to the TVA in a lump sum, but the corporation recognizes its obligation to allocate funds on the basis of the estimates approved by the congressional committees.

The original TVA Act authorized the corporation to issue bonds for the construction of dams, steam plants, or other power facilities.¹⁰ The corporation has never sought to raise funds under this provision, for the sound reason that the corporation did not expect revenues sufficient to finance these bonds until the power program had a chance to establish itself.¹¹ When the TVA Act was up for amendment in 1935, the corporation suggested that the

bond provision be revised to permit the TVA to issue bonds for the purpose of acquiring private electric distribution systems. Congress, however, substituted a provision merely permitting the TVA to issue bonds for the purpose of extending short-term credit to municipalities or other public agencies wishing to acquire distribution systems. The original bonding section was also allowed to remain. Neither of the bond authorizations is adapted to the needs of the corporation, and its directors have disclaimed any intention of issuing bonds.¹²

Revenues received by the corporation may be used in its program, and are not required to be covered immediately into the Treasury, as is the customary government practice. Although proceeds must be turned over to the Treasury at the end of each calendar year, the corporation is authorized to withhold such sums as are necessary in the operation of its dams and reservoirs and in conducting its business enterprises. Since the revenues are not sufficient for these purposes, there are no net proceeds for covering into the Treasury.

Because of its inadequate revenues, the corporation has been able to build up no reserves in the usual sense. The closest approach is the peculiar \$1,000,000 continuing fund which Congress authorized the corporation to maintain in order "to defray emergency expenses and to insure continuous operation."¹³ In practice this merely means that the corporation must never draw on the last million dollars of its annual appropriation, except to meet threatened emergencies.

The TVA Act contains no provision relating to amortization of the govern-

⁷ It is recognized that this situation will be changed when power revenues become more substantial and the construction activities taper off.

⁸ Public No. 77, 73d Cong.

⁹ Authorized by Public No. 412, 73d Cong.

¹⁰ This provision was included at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, as a result of his experience with the Port of New York Authority. See 77 *Congressional Record* 2662.

¹¹ Statement of Mr. Lilienthal, Hearings before House Military Affairs Committee, "Tennessee Valley Authority," 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 68.

¹² Hearings before House Subcommittee in charge of Deficiency Appropriations, "First Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1936," 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 348.

¹³ Public No. 412, 74th Cong., sec. 10.

ment's investment in the corporation's dams. However, Congress has shown on several occasions that it expects a substantial return on this investment, and the subject will no doubt eventually be dealt with by legislation. The corporation has made public a detailed amortization plan by which the annual net revenue from the sale of power would return the total estimated cost of the program within 50 years from the date of completion of the structures and development of a market for the power output (estimated at from 1940 to 1950).¹⁴

The TVA has not been able to issue the customary corporate financial statements. In its first annual report a balance sheet was presented which did attempt to follow commercial practice.¹⁵ Standard classifications were used, and expenditures which did not create physical assets, such as those for planning and research purposes, were excluded from the balance sheet. The next year, however, the attempt to follow commercial procedure was abandoned. A so-called "balance sheet" was issued, but it was nothing more than a report to Congress on the use of appropriated funds.¹⁶ In 1936 this fact was recognized by changing the name of the statement to "statement of application of funds."¹⁷

The problem of adopting commercial accounting methods arises chiefly in connection with the power program. The Authority has readily conformed to the congressional requirement that it adopt the uniform system of accounts for public utilities prepared by the Federal Power Commission. Of far more importance than the accounting system, however, is

the question of allocating capital costs which is raised by the multiple-purpose nature of the Authority's dams. The establishment of a valuation for Wilson Dam (which supplied all TVA power for the first three years) has recently been made and approved by the President, but the Authority has as yet been unable to allocate the value of the property between flood control, navigation, power, and other purposes served by the dam.¹⁸ Pending determination of the costs chargeable to power, there has been no definite valuation base with reference to which the corporation could fix its power rates, nor has it been possible to issue profit and loss statements or to depreciate the major power properties. The fact that the Authority, as a government agency, can charge off a part of the cost of its capital structures to navigation and flood control constitutes the gravamen of the private utilities' charges that the TVA is an unfair competitor and that its rates are not "yardstick" rates.¹⁹

In summary, it should be made clear that the financial structure and practices of the Authority cannot be understood, and that the situation as above presented may be misconstrued, unless it is realized that the TVA is not a commercial organization and cannot be judged as one. The failure to comprehend this fact underlies most of the attacks which have been made on the authority's financial operations. In its broadest terms, the Authority's task is that of unified water control in the interests of regional development. Power, which absorbs most of the public interest in the TVA, is constitutionally and actually an incident in the larger program.

¹⁴ Hearings, "First Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1936," *op. cit.*, pp. 278-79.

¹⁵ *Annual Report*, 1934, pp. 56-57.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1935, p. 63.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1936, pp. 122-23.

¹⁸ Letter from Vice-Chairman H. A. Morgan, *Congressional Record*, July 8, 1937, p. 8915.

¹⁹ C. E. Troxel, "The TVA Potpourri," *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, XVIII (1936), 231-40, is representative of this viewpoint.

Revenue from this source has not been expected, and should not be expected, to carry the cost of all the corporation's activities, even with the recent rapid growth in power sales. The TVA program, in its motivation and characteristics, is governmental rather than commercial, and the adaptation of the corporate form of organization to this program has required that most of the typical corporate financial characteristics be abandoned.

THE CORPORATION'S STATUS UNDER FEDERAL LAWS

The general conduct of government business is controlled by a great number of statutes adopted for the praiseworthy purpose of preventing misuse of public funds, but which, because of their strictness and the formalism they impose, too often bind government administration in red tape and sacrifice efficiency to scrupulous legality. Although the obligation of a government corporation to adopt the administrative procedures specified by federal statutes and regulations for other government agencies is a question on which there is great confusion,²⁰ the general tendency has been to regard the mere fact of incorporation as giving an agency a special status and freeing it from the procedures binding upon unincorporated government agencies. This freedom has been one of the substantial administrative advantages in the use of the corporate form.

Corporate immunity of this sort, insofar as it has been rationalized, rests upon the theory that incorporated agencies are semi-private in nature, not carrying on enterprises of the regular governmental type, and so deserving of exceptional treatment. The Panama Railroad Company was the first American government owned corpora-

tion in recent times. This enterprise, after its purchase by the government in 1904, was permitted to proceed with much the same type of administrative practices developed in its previous experience as a private competitive concern. Questions as to its administrative powers were largely determined by reference to the principles of private corporation law.²¹

Again, the government corporations created during the World War assumed that their corporate form released them from regular government procedures in order to expedite essential public services. Most of these war-time corporations were liquidated before their status could be questioned, but the Emergency Fleet Corporation continued in existence, and became involved in a number of controversies which required the Supreme Court to give official interpretations of its nature and powers. In a leading case the Court held that the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 did not apply to the corporation chiefly because of the corporate status of the agency. The Court said:

Indeed, an important, if not the first reason, for employing these incorporated agencies was to enable them to employ business methods and to conduct their operations with a freedom supposed to be inconsistent with accountability to the Treasury under its established procedure of audit and control over the financial transactions of the United States.²²

Thus the Supreme Court recognized in this case, as well as in several others,²³

²¹ 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 508.

²² *Skinner and Eddy Corp. v. McCarl*, 275 U. S. 1 (1927).

²³ A suit against the corporation was held not to be a suit against the United States in *Sloan Shipyards v. U. S. Fleet Corp.*, 258 U. S. 549 (1921); employees of the corporation were held not to be employees of the United States in *United States v. Strang*, 254 U. S. 491 (1920). On the other hand, the corporation was held to be a government department under the Post Roads Act in *Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union*, 275 U. S. 415 (1928); and defrauding the corporation was held to be equivalent to defrauding the United States in *United States v. Walter*, 263 U. S. 15 (1923).

²⁰ See O. P. Field, "Government Corporations: A Proposal," *Harvard Law Review*, XLVIII (1935), 775.

that government corporations had a special and semi-private status merely by reason of their corporate form of organization. Even the Comptroller General was willing to treat the Fleet Corporation as a private corporation when it was actively engaged in the shipping business, although he held it to be a government agency when it was carrying on non-commercial functions such as are common to other government agencies.²⁴

When the TVA was created, its officials, taking note of the experience of the earlier corporations, assumed that the Authority enjoyed some degree of freedom from regular federal statutes and administrative regulations. The corporation never maintained that it should have the freedom of a private agency, but it did contend that, because it was a corporation, "the acts of Congress relating to contracts, expenditures and accounting and budget control, which refer only to government departments, agencies and/or bureaus, are not legally applicable to or binding upon it."²⁵ The Authority took the position that "upon all questions of its status, powers, and duties, the Act of Congress by which it was created and which constitutes its charter is controlling, and that wherever the letter or spirit of that Act is in conflict with general statutes or Government regulations, such statutes or regulations must yield to the basic law."

In spite of this contention, the Authority did in practice attempt to conform "with all general statutes and Government regulations governing the use or expenditure of public funds insofar as such compliance does not substantially interfere with the efficiency of our operations." Thus, in the important field of procurement, the system adopted was based upon

that used by the Navy Department; government forms were employed, and the necessity for advertising, competition, and award to the lowest responsible bidder was recognized. However, corporation officials assumed that they had a degree of discretion which could be exercised when good business judgment demanded it, and, relying upon this interpretation of the corporation's powers, they made a number of purchases by methods which were apparently at variance with the procedures prescribed by federal statutes as interpreted by the Comptroller General. For instance, low bids were rejected in cases where a slightly greater expenditure would secure a much superior product or one with excess capacity, where the experience of the low bidder was inadequate, where it was desired to secure different makes of equipment for comparative purposes to guide future buying, where previous experience had proved the low bidder's equipment to be unsatisfactory, and so on.

Similarly in other fields the Authority established administrative procedures which appeared to contravene general federal statutes. Because the Authority was subject to suit in the courts, it adopted a procedure for handling claims brought against it, so that as many cases as possible could be settled by compromise out of court. In the regular government service claims can be finally settled only by the Comptroller General.²⁶ The corporation carried on its extensive land acquisition program entirely with its own personnel, and did not act through federal district attorneys, nor condemn land through the Department of Justice, nor secure the Attorney General's approval on the title of all lands purchased, as the statutes require regular government agencies to do.²⁷ Printing services were occasionally secured from private firms, al-

²⁴ *House Document 111*, 71st Cong., 1st sess., p. 44.

²⁵ Quoted from unpublished TVA reply to the Comptroller General's audit report for the fiscal year 1934.

²⁶ 31 U. S. C. A. 71.

²⁷ 40 U. S. C. A. 255-257.

though the general requirement is that printing for government agencies be performed at the Government Printing Office.²⁸

Corporate practices of this type were finally challenged by the Comptroller General, whose audit constitutes the principal method by which federal statutes are enforced upon regular government agencies. This audit is not, of course, a commercial audit, but primarily an examination of each expenditure to determine whether it was made pursuant to congressional authorization. Because of this fact, the relationship between a government corporation and the General Accounting Office is the most important single factor determining the degree of administrative freedom which the corporation will be able to attain. The typical American government owned corporations have not been subject to the Comptroller General's audit.²⁹ The TVA Act, on the contrary, did make the Authority's operations subject to such audit, but the language of the act seemed to indicate that it was to be an annual audit of a commercial nature such as a private firm of accountants would conduct, rather than the regular governmental continuous audit.

When the TVA commenced operations, the Comptroller General, who had consistently opposed the granting of any unusual privileges to government corporations, requested the TVA to submit its accounts to Washington for the regular audit. He subsequently agreed, however, that a postaudit in the field was required

by the statute. The TVA's accounts for the fiscal year 1934 were audited in this manner, and an audit report submitted to Congress, which took exception to over \$2,000,000 of the corporation's expenditures on the ground that general federal regulatory statutes governing the use of funds had not been followed.

This audit report was made public in April 1935, just as Congress was engaged in preparing amendments to the TVA Act, and centered congressional attention upon the corporate status of the Authority. Proposals which would have definitely confirmed the Comptroller General's audit control over the corporation and its obligation to comply with general federal statutes were defeated by Congress,³⁰ but no language was added which would clarify the ambiguous audit provision in the TVA Act. Thus the two parties were left to fight out their own battle.

In September 1935 the Comptroller General discontinued his field audit of Authority transactions for the fiscal year 1935, which was then in process, and demanded that the TVA submit its accounts to Washington for the regular government audit. As justification for requiring this changed procedure, the Comptroller General pointed to a phrase in the Authority's appropriation for the fiscal year 1936 which provided that all moneys available to the corporation should be "covered into and accounted for as one fund."³¹ It was his contention that the phrase "accounted for" entirely changed the status of the funds available to the TVA, and made the regular accounting procedure applicable.

This position seems untenable, considering the fact that the TVA had itself suggested that this provision be inserted

²⁸ 44 U. S. C. A. 111.

²⁹ This is true of the Inland Waterways Corporation, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Panama Railroad Company. The Merchant Fleet Corporation had its accounts audited by the Comptroller General, but Congress specifically required the audit to be of a commercial nature (42 Stat. L. 444; 44 Stat. L. 1083).

³⁰ H. R. 8632, 74th Cong., sec. 13; 79 *Congressional Record* 9853-54.

³¹ 49 Stat. L. 597.

merely in order to simplify its bookkeeping, and that Congress had explicitly refused to adopt an amendment making the TVA subject to the regular government audit. However, the Comptroller General was in a superior strategic position, since he possessed the power to cut off the corporation's funds through refusal to countersign accountable warrants drawn by it upon the Treasury. On January 6, 1936, the TVA agreed to meet the Comptroller General's terms, and to submit its accounts, with all supporting vouchers, contracts, and other papers, to the General Accounting Office for audit. Accounts are now submitted on a monthly basis, as in the regular government departments.

Questions as to the Authority's procurement methods were also raised before Congress in 1935, and in both houses attempts were made to enact legislation requiring the TVA to follow government purchasing statutes and procedures,³² but they were defeated. Instead, an amendment was inserted in the TVA Act requiring awards to be made on the basis of competitive bidding, except in cases of emergency, in the securing of repair parts or supplemental equipment, and in the procurement of supplies or services not exceeding \$500. The Authority was also authorized to take into account, in comparing bids, such factors as quality, time of delivery, and the bidder's experience and responsibility. The amendment was a reasonable re-writing of Section 3709 of the *Revised Statutes*, and seemed to give complete support to the Authority's contention for greater freedom in purchasing operations.

In actual practice, this amendment has not been so effective as might have been expected. All Authority contracts are

³² 79 *Congressional Record* 7298; H. R. 8632, 74th Cong., sec. 13.

filed with and examined by the General Accounting Office, which considers that Section 3709 is still applicable to the TVA, and requires that regular government standards and procedures be used. Specifications must be broad enough to convince the Comptroller General that full competition is permitted, and he has held up awards where the specifications appeared to limit competition. The chairman of the TVA board has publicly protested against the "red tape" and "bureaucracy" of the corporation's purchasing procedure,³³ but the purchasing officials are reconciled to the Comptroller General's review. Compliance with his regulations is at all times a foremost consideration in procurement, and in all cases where he has raised questions concerning TVA purchases he has finally approved the transactions.

In the field of personnel, the Authority has not had so much difficulty in maintaining its freedom from regular government procedures, since the TVA Act specifically exempted the Authority from the operation of civil service laws. To prevent abuse of this freedom, the act required the selection and promotion of personnel to be on the basis of merit and efficiency. The Authority has been notably successful in developing a system of recruitment under these provisions which blends the merit principles of the civil service with a degree of flexibility, speed, and concentration upon fitting the individual to the job which the civil service system has not achieved. TVA recruitment methods differ from those of the civil service in placing greater emphasis upon the discretion and judgment of supervisors and less upon examinations and mechanical standards. However, examinations are given and registers established for certain types of positions, and every effort is made to

³³ Address before TVA employees, July 29, 1936.

develop useful objective standards for judging applicants.

Although exempt from the Classification Act, the TVA has maintained its salary schedule in close relation to regular federal levels. On November 18, 1933, the President issued an Executive order applicable to the TVA and nine other emergency agencies, establishing a compensation plan with 19 grades and no provision for salary steps within grades. The Authority took the position that compliance with the schedule was optional, on the ground that the TVA Act left the fixing of compensation to the discretion of the TVA board of directors.³⁴ Actually, however, the schedule was adopted for positions below \$4,000, but in the higher brackets some additional gradations were inserted.

As the TVA outgrew its emergency status, the defects of this salary schedule became apparent, and in January 1937 it was superseded by one which more closely approached the Classification Act schedule, entrance rates being the same in all except four grades. Salary steps within grades were also provided, but under a different plan from that used in the classified service, where there are customarily seven steps in a grade and annual advances are dependent upon the employee's securing the required efficiency rating. The new TVA schedule covers the Classification Act salary ranges with only three steps in a grade, and advancement from the entrance to the standard rate is automatic after a year of satisfactory service.³⁵ Employees rated by their supervisors as unsat-

isfactory at the semi-annual rating period are required to be transferred, demoted, or dismissed. It should be added that in the actual process of classifying positions, the TVA attempts to follow federal practices closely, and to rely upon the standards and methods of the United States Civil Service Commission.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES OF THE CORPORATION

The only important governmental immunity which the corporation does not enjoy is immunity to suit. In the field of taxation, the Authority's properties share the regular federal exemption from state and local taxation.³⁶ However, section 13 of the TVA Act provides for payment to the states of Alabama and Tennessee of 5 per cent of the gross proceeds from power generated at dams in the two states, and these payments are regarded as in lieu of taxes. Under this provision the TVA paid, during its first three years of operation, to the state of Alabama the sum of \$101,822.54.³⁷ Since the completion of Norris Dam the state of Tennessee has also begun to share in these payments. The TVA has recognised that 5 per cent of the gross power receipts is not equivalent to the taxes paid by private utilities, which were found to average about 12½ per cent of gross revenues. The Authority therefore set up in its accounts for taxes an additional 7½ per cent, so that its advantage in this field would be offset, at least for bookkeeping purposes.³⁸

As a federal instrumentality, the Authority has felt that it could not submit to regulation and control of its power operations by the utility commissions in the

³⁴ The President apparently agreed with this interpretation, for in his second Executive order (No. 6746, June 21, 1934) on the same subject the TVA was not included. In a similar fashion the Authority contended that the Economy Act was not applicable to its employees, but voluntarily made the required reductions in salary.

³⁵ The maximum rate may be awarded only for exceptionally meritorious service.

³⁶ "State Taxation and Regulation of the Tennessee Valley Authority," 44 *Yale Law Journal* 331 (1934).

³⁷ *Annual Report*, 1936, p. 127.

³⁸ Hearings before House Military Affairs Committee, *op. cit.*, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 74.

states where it operates. When the Alabama Public Service Commission was asked by the Alabama Power Company in 1934 to approve the sale of certain of its properties to the TVA, intervening coal and ice companies alleged that the TVA had no right to engage in the public utility business in Alabama except in subordination to the state laws, and that the Authority had no intention of seeking a certificate of convenience and public necessity or otherwise subjecting itself to the laws of Alabama as a utility. The Commission, although approving the sale, held that the Authority was "a utility as defined by the statutes of Alabama, engaged in a proprietary business and not a governmental function, and is therefore subject to regulation as a utility under the laws of Alabama."³⁹ Controversy over this ruling was resolved when the Alabama legislature passed an act defining federal agencies such as the TVA as non-utilities, over which the Commission should have no jurisdiction.⁴⁰ Likewise in Tennessee the legislature removed the Authority from the control of the state commission.⁴¹

CONCLUSION

From this brief discussion it is apparent that, in most fields, the corporate status of the TVA is no longer of substantial administrative value. Its financial powers, its administrative procedures, and its immunities are typically governmental rather than corporate. The Authority's experience has demonstrated the inadvisability of giving a corporate form of organization to a non-commercial enter-

prise. It should be noted that when a corporation was first suggested in connection with utilization of the Muscle Shoals properties, it was planned as a commercial organization selling power and manufacturing fertilizer. The regional planning functions and the non-commercial activities given the Authority by the TVA Act destroyed the original justification for the use of the corporate form and made it impossible for the TVA to operate with the administrative freedom characteristic of earlier corporations.

Although generalizations can hardly be made on the basis of one case, the Authority's experience does call attention to important alterations in the privileges and powers of government corporations within the last few years. The mere fact of incorporation no longer suffices to withdraw a government agency from the operation of federal statutes or to secure the relaxation of regulations in the interests of administrative flexibility and freedom. The earlier corporations made good their claims to administrative freedom for a number of reasons. For one thing, the scarcity of such agencies made it easier for them to secure exceptional treatment. Since statutes regulating federal agencies never specifically mentioned government corporations, it was possible to argue that such corporate units were excluded. Again, the Comptroller General's post was not created until 1921, and it took that office some time to develop a policy with regard to government corporations.

All these conditions have now changed. The extensive use of the corporate device by the New Deal has made the corporation as familiar a government agency as the independent commission. Statutes dealing with the management of the federal service are now regularly made applicable in specific terms to corporations owned by the government. Finally, the Comptrol-

³⁹ *Re Alabama Power Co.*, 4 P.U.R. (N.S.) 233, 259, July 14, 1934.

⁴⁰ Alabama, *Laws*, 1935, Chap. 1.

⁴¹ Tennessee, *Acts*, 1935, Chap. 42; see *Re Tennessee Public Service Co.*, 5 P.U.R. (N.S.) 449, 456, October 25, 1934.

ler General has developed a firm policy of making no exceptions in dealing with corporate agencies. The result is that corporations can now expect exemption from the civil service, from government audit, from statutes relating to the expenditure of funds, or from any other regular government obligations, only if Congress makes definite enactments to such effect.

This development should not be regretted, however, even by those who have been most sanguine as to the administrative potentialities of the public corporation. If the present civil service system is defective, if government purchasing procedures limit administrative discretion unduly, or if the Comptroller General's audit is unsound in principle and undesirable in effect, then the proper course of action is to remedy these defects throughout the entire federal service, rather than to exempt a few incorporated agencies from their requirements.⁴² But if it is agreed that incorporation should not be employed merely for the purpose of escaping government regulations, the device clearly remains as a valuable instrument for giving financial autonomy and release from governmental immunities to enterprises of a commercial or proprietary nature.

Finally, it should be pointed out that

⁴² These reforms are included in President Roosevelt's plan for administrative reorganization, and embodied in S. 2700, 75th Cong.

although the TVA has in most respects been unable to profit by its corporate status, in certain ways its form of organization has aided in the prosecution of its program. The fact that the Authority was set up as an *ad hoc* corporate entity, outside the regular departmental system, has given it an unusual opportunity to explore the possibilities in the development and administration of a regional program by a decentralized governmental agency. The Authority's task has been easier because its center of gravity has been within the Tennessee Valley. Decisions have been made, with a few major exceptions, in Knoxville and not in Washington.

As a bureau in a regular government department the TVA would have inherited departmental jealousies, preconceptions, and administrative routine. As an independent corporation it has developed an original approach to the problem of regional development, has brought a wide variety of functions within the control of one operating organization, and has won the coöperation of other public agencies in its program. It may well be that the experience of the TVA will transfer the emphasis from the procedural types of corporate administrative freedom to the more substantive types of freedom in policy making and execution, and to the potentialities of government corporations in facilitating a useful decentralization of federal administration.

LIBRARY AND WORKSHOP

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POPULATION

JOSEPH J. SPENGLER

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POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN COLONIAL AMERICA. By Stella H. Sutherland. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936. 353 pp. \$4.00.	HUMAN MIGRATION. A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS. By Donald R. Taft. New York: Ronald Press, 1936. 590 pp. \$4.00.
THE GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION. By S. Vere Pearson. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1935. 448 pp.	THE ANCESTRY OF THE LONG-LIVED. By Raymond Pearl and Ruth DeWitt Pearl. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1934. 168 pp. \$3.00.
WORLD IMMIGRATION. WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES. By Maurice R. Davie. New York: Macmillan Company, 1936. 588 pp. \$3.75.	POPULATION PRESSURE AND ECONOMIC LIFE IN JAPAN. By Ryoichi Ishii. London: P. S. King & Son, 1937. 259 pp. 12s. 6d.

Within the past decade population problems have been commanding an increasing amount of attention at the hands of social scientists and the approaches have become steadily more numerous. Three of the works under review are concerned specifically with the causes and consequences of population distribution, and one with the effect of the system of landed property upon population growth and distribution. One is concerned with new data on longevity and with new methods of interpreting such data. One is concerned with past and present population trends in Japan and with the determinants of such trends.

In her well annotated work, Dr. Sutherland describes the course and processes of settlement of the American colonies. The state of population distribution in the various colonies in the 1770's is effectively summarized in three dot maps based upon her analyses of the colonial population data and embodying a great amount of careful work. This study is of value to students of history and demography both because of the treatment of colonial materials pertaining to the then size and distribution of the population and because of the light which it throws upon the national origins and religious and occupational composition of the colonial settlers and upon Negro population growth and the factors influencing it.

Her study indicates, as have analogous studies of essentially pre-industrial countries, that the factors influencing population distribution in the eighteenth century differed appreciably from those influencing population distribution in the contemporary more industrialized world. In short, the relative importance of factors governing population distribution has changed. The colonists apparently were motivated primarily by the desire for land. Settlement was influenced then more than

now by topography, the nature of the soil, climatic and health factors, etc. Certain institutional factors, such as the type of economy, the system of land tenure, etc., were already shaping population distribution, however, but not in as marked a manner as today. It would be of value to prepare a series of studies with plenty of dot maps to depict the changing distribution of the American population and thus to facilitate the analysis of the determinants of population distribution over time.

Pearson, an English physician, deals with a variety of topics ranging from the effects of systems of land tenure upon population growth and distribution to analyses of such municipal problems as housing, sanitation, transportation, etc. He approaches all these problems from the standpoint of a single taxer for, as a disciple of Henry George, he sees in the application of George's recommendations relative to the ownership and taxation of site values in land the key to the achievement of such a growth and distribution of population as are most conducive to human welfare. Pearson would abolish private property in land and substitute for taxes on other than land the revenue which the community would derive from the land transferred to it. He supposes that site values are essentially the creation of the community and therefore belong to it; otherwise property values are to be left intact.

When taxes on production are abolished and public coffers are filled only by collecting the ground values which belong to the community, "the housing question" will no longer be the nightmare it is today. . . . Population could grow naturally and without any grievous results when the means for the multiplication and more even distribution of goods is discovered; that is, when poverty and unemployment are cured by allowing willing workers to get ready access to the earth and all that therein is, and when the producers are allowed to have and to hold all the

products of their work without deductions by tax-gatherers and landlords. . . . With that discovery nothing further need be heard of "the differential birth-rate." With it, too, sex, including the preliminary and flirtation and courting periods, would gain a freedom which is difficult in the society of today. . . . The full advantages of a big family—no longer a burden to anyone—would come to be realized. . . . Reasons for separations and divorces would grow fewer. . . .

The studies of Davie and Taft in part overlap, in part supplement each other. Davie devotes two chapters and parts of several other chapters to immigration into foreign countries and to their immigration policies. In the remainder of the work he is concerned with immigration into the United States, with its ethnic and other characteristics, with its various effects upon American society, with the factors affecting the adjustment, assimilation, and naturalization of immigrants, and with the changes in American immigration policies. The approach is sociological and statistical, the point of view is "liberal." The clarity and comprehensiveness of treatment coupled with the extensive and reasonably selective bibliographies make this work well suited to courses dealing primarily with immigration. Unfortunately there is little analysis from the purely economic point of view and little consideration of the relation between the migration of human factors and the migration of either goods or non-human factors of production.

Taft's study, obviously designed as a textbook, is more inclusive than that of Davie but more incomplete in respect to purely American immigration problems. Taft deals with the legal and ethical principles whereon immigration policies may in theory be based, with the relation of migration theory to population theory, with the economic effects of immigration, with the migration experience and policies of a number of countries, and with the

mine run of topics usually included in a textbook on immigration.

It is impossible to appraise either Professor Davie's or Professor Taft's book within the space at our disposal. Taft might well have appraised and examined for consistency the various approaches in international law and ethics whereon the "right" to migrate is supposed to rest. He might also have noted the relation between such concepts of right and the legal philosophy of Western Civilization as contrasted to that of other sections of the world. Sociological writers who seek to deal with the various concepts of population "optimums" should state clearly what they mean by this term, by "overpopulation", etc., and relate their discussions of these questions to their discussions of the alleged economic effects of immigration. Sociological writers need to learn that migratory movements are closely related to the whole pattern of international movements of goods, capital, etc. The sociological approach to the study of migration suffers today, as does the economic, from the overspecialized and therefore somewhat myopic character of these two "disciplines."

The Ancestry of the Long Lived is the first of what is to be a series of reports regarding longevous persons. These reports are based upon the extensive materials on the length of life collected at Johns Hopkins University under the direction of Dr. Pearl. As one has come to expect of Dr. Pearl's studies, the problem is carefully posed, the material evidence is adequately described, and the results, conclusions, etc., are formulated concisely but guardedly.

The evidence clearly indicates that since only about one-seventh of the extremely longevous persons studied were bred from shortlived or average-lived ancestry, and six-sevenths from parents

one or both of whom was longlived, heredity was an important determiner of longevity in the population studied. Quantitative measures of the influence of heredity have been determined.

The authors do not attempt to describe the mechanism of the inheritance of longevity or to explain it in simple Mendelian terms. Their position, similar to that of E. S. Russell whom the senior author anticipated, is as follows:

Longevity (duration of life) would appear to be biologically a rather fundamental attribute of the organism. Indeed it may reasonably be regarded as a single numerical expression of the integrated effects of the forces that operate upon the individual, innate and environmental. It not only may be, but is in fact, affected adversely or favorably by environmental circumstances of the most varied sorts, but also it is closely bound up with the biological *constitution* of the individual, and biological constitution in man is a very highly complex matter indeed. These considerations, coupled with the absence of evidence for any discontinuities of variation in its expression however analyzed hitherto, lead us to maintain for the present an open mind as to whether longevity in man is really inherited according to any Mendelian theory, however complicated. Finally it is well always to remember that Mendelian inheritance is *au fond* a theory of *alternative* inheritance.

Dr. Ishii's historical and statistical study of the growth of the Japanese population, based almost solely upon Japanese materials and including over a hundred tables and extensive annotation, is the best study of its kind yet to appear in English. I shall simply present certain of Dr. Ishii's findings which, to be fully understood, need to be examined in context.

The various estimates of the Japanese population suggest that their number grew fairly steadily from about 3.7 millions in the ninth century to about 18 millions in the sixteenth century when their number and density exceeded that of most European countries. Population grew rapidly

after 1600 when a period of prolonged peace began. This growth continued until the beginning of the eighteenth century when the population, now numbering about 26 millions, began to fluctuate about this figure, increasing to about 27 millions by 1852. While the ultimate check to growth lay largely in the inelasticity of the state of the arts and the economy based thereon, the immediate checks assumed both the form of famine, flood, pestilence, etc., and abortion, infanticide, and sexual immorality, each inspired by the prevailing family limitation psychology.

With the Meiji reformation in 1868, the whole economic and demographic situation was changed. The economy began to expand, particularly after the Sino-Japanese war. Population growth began to be looked upon with favor and efforts were made to suppress abortion and infanticide. Despite the fact that Japan began to import foodstuffs in the late 1890's it was not until after the World War that the desirability of further population growth began to be questioned. The birth rate rose steadily from 22.8 in 1872-75 to a peak of 36.2 in 1919, thereafter declining to 31.7 in 1931-35. The death rate rose from 17.9 in 1872-75 to a peak of 26.8 in 1918, declining to 17.9 in 1931-35. At present, natural increase, about 14, is nearly three times what it was in the 1870's. Net reproduction, nearly 1.5 in 1921-25, is exceeded only by that in Russia. The population, 34.8 millions in 1872 grew to 69.3 in 1935, two-thirds of this growth occurring in the present century. This growth has concentrated primarily in industry and in cities which since 1898 have absorbed nearly all the nation's population growth. During the next 25-30 years the population will increase to 80-90 millions; each year about a half million will have to be

added to working population, that is, to the non-agricultural population since inelastic agriculture is not only not absorbing population but is actually giving up numbers.

Dr. Ishii weighs the various alternatives open to the Japanese people. Agriculture offers little if any relief as an employment provider, discontent among the agriculturalists already being very pronounced. The problem of securing a food supply is not one of inadequacy of food resources, however, but one of establishing such a balance between the rural and the urban classes in Japan and between Japan proper and her colonies as will permit agriculture to be profitable. Pre-

sumably high cost agriculturalists in Japan will have to be displaced into the urban population and food will have to be imported in a greater degree from her colonies if balance is to be established. Colonization and migration offer only limited relief; even such migration as takes place is partly offset by Chinese and Chosenese migration to Japan. While birth control (which is being increasingly sanctioned and diffused) will serve ultimately to check growth, Japan's major immediate relief must be obtained through industrial expansion which in turn requires expanding foreign markets. Dr. Ishii is not very optimistic, however, concerning the immediate future.

THE BOOK SPEAKS

RUPERT B. VANCE

University of North Carolina

SEVENTY YEARS OF IT. By Edward A. Ross. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936. 341 pp. \$3.00.

From the last of the founding fathers, the only surviving "system-maker" of American sociology, comes this heartening and inspiring autobiography. One misses in the volume the feeling of struggle that one finds in Ward's diary. One also misses the rich subtlety of the tapestry that Dorfman has draped about the shoulders of Veblen. Straight-forward, extravert, using no literary subtleties, not even the journalistic devices that make his foreign sociological travels so interesting, Ross retraces struggles and triumphs that parallel those of sociology in this country for the last thirty-five years.

From this book the reader gets the feeling of having been in at the beginning of things. With Ross he thrills at the first glimpse of Lester F. Ward, the thinker of them all; he faces the difficulty of teaching

sociology when the only parallel readings were Spencer, Ward, and Kropotkin's articles that the librarian would not let him use. Most exciting and most straightforward of all is Ross's account of his dismissal from Stanford. With his Russian experiences and the Wisconsin investigation we get some insight in what is possibly Ross's main complex. The shamefulness of having scholars subject to bullying by business men still weighs heavily upon him. For the sociologists to sneer at reform and to condemn "value judgment" is to Ross no zeal for the purity of doctrine. It is rather a rationalization of "ducking." "There may come a time in the life of every sociologist" says Ross, "when it is his solemn duty to raise hell." He feels that sociology must continue to be a hazardous occupation.

Professor Ross admits his desire to build a system but this book is no rationalized defense of the theories he has held. No

man could be more candid in dealing with his own brain-children. Professor Ross cheerfully admits that his *Social Psychology* did not point the way for that science. He agrees that conditions change so fast that old techniques of *Social Control* are junk. He does not regret his immigration stand but he "rues the sneer," "beaten members of a beaten race" once uttered of an immigrant stock. There are other changes in views and positions candidly acknowledged. Ross coined the phrase "race suicide" that won the praise of Theodore Roosevelt; he changed to *Standing Room Only*; and he now admits that for the Western World these views do not take sufficient account of the age distribution of present populations as developed by Kuczynski, Dublin, and Lotka.

In so far as in him lies, Ross has given us the secret of one of his most amazing gifts, the flare for comparative sociology. Much of it is due to sheer vitality, mental and physical. He knows how to make

the most of contacts and conferences, and he pays tribute to the catholicity and objectivity of social scientists the world over. He has interviewed 150 international scholars about controversial social questions in their own countries and never once, he feels, has he been misled. A perfect Nordic himself, Ross has gotten over his Nordic complex and emerged with a world view, tolerant and catholic in matters of diet and manners. Only four things disturb his cultural equilibrium in viewing world folkways: foot-binding, bullfighting, Hindu caste, and the veil.

All in all this is the record of a personality, dynamic, important, conscious of personal worth and possessed of well-grounded personal integrity. I know of no better book to recommend young and aspiring students of sociology when doubts assail and he asks the question "What's it all worth?" and "What does it amount to in the end?"

TWO SOCIOLOGY TEXTS

READ BAIN

Miami University

GENERAL SOCIOLOGY. By Henry Pratt Fairchild. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1934. 634 pp. \$4.00.

PRINCIPLES AND LAWS OF SOCIOLOGY. By Harold A. Phelps. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1936. 544 pp. \$4.00.

Professor Fairchild's text is notable for its novel conception and extremely readable style. It exemplifies the fine clarity and force which characterize all his speaking and writing. The fact that he has presented a fresh and somewhat unconventional guide for the first course makes it doubly unfortunate that this review has been so long delayed and must be so brief.

The preface states sixteen innovations

which the author regards as distinctive justification for launching another text on the "already congested academic sea" (p. VII). These he does not regard as original contributions, except possibly by way of emphasis, approach, and treatment. He has avoided controversial material in an attempt to give what he conceives to be the consensus of sociologists on the various topics presented. Of course this is not compatible with a very novel approach. The result will probably occasion considerable criticism both for what has been included and left out. Granting the validity of the principles of selection on the above points, one must

pronounce it an excellent book. I expect the reactions to it will be rather strongly pro and con.

This book will not appeal to those who want a text based on the Park and Burgess concepts, who want some cultural anthropology, who want a rather comprehensive treatment of the major institutions (Under this head, family, state and religion are treated in 37 pages, while the economic institution alone receives 87 pages in addition to many other pages of indirect reference; under social control, there are ten pages more devoted to religion; education gets less than ten pages; science, as an institution, health, the press, social work, art and recreation are scarcely mentioned), who want emphasis on quantitative analysis, who want an ecological approach, or who want a historico-genetic setting.

On the other hand, the book will be highly prized by those who want a book emphasizing population problems (about 100 pages), economic matters, social change and social control based largely on the concepts of "social forces"—desires, interests, and wishes—in the Ward, Sumner, Small, and earlier Thomas tradition. Most of the subjects treated would probably command general agreement among sociologists. Their quarrel would be over conceptual questions, selection and organization of material.

The book is clearly printed and well bound; it has an excellent index, footnotes, good questions and a carefully selected bibliography which fill over sixty pages at the back of the book.

Phelps has undertaken a most ambitious task and on the whole has performed it very well. The book is essentially uncritical and avoids controversial matters in the realm of sociological theory. It does not attempt to review the historical development of the various laws and principles mentioned and frequently ascribes

them to men who have merely re-stated them, perhaps with some modification. Hence, the names associated with particular laws and theories are mostly American and English writers. These references are well documented. This will doubtless occasion considerable adverse criticism from many meticulous students of historical sociology and may result in a good deal of confusion in the minds of immature scholars who use the book as a guide. However, Phelps is not concerned with these nice problems of who stated it first and what revisions were made by subsequent scholars in various countries, nor is he much concerned with the validity of the laws and principles with which he deals. He has presented a well selected bibliography which will give the inquiring student access to these questions.

Questions of priority and genetic development are at best more or less pedantic pastimes. Scholars like Ward who are greatly worried about the originality and priority of their contributions and whether other men give them the credit they think they deserve are egotistic rather than scientific. Scholars devoted to such historical niceties are frequently more concerned with displaying their own erudition than with the important questions to which scientific social theorists should address themselves. It is refreshing to find a man who rather cavalierly dismisses these questions and devotes his space to an attempt to present the common generalizations of the subject in a systematic manner. He is much more concerned with the content of the theoretical foundation of sociology than with its genesis.

After reviewing a number of classifications of societal patterns, Phelps adopts a nine-fold scheme: Population, Ruralization, Urbanization, Industrialism, Mobility, Social Organization, Social Class

and Status, Social Disorganization, and Cyclical Fluctuations. "These patterns represent a commonsense designation of universal relationships and sequences, within which presumably are to be located societal and social laws, and their principles, problems, theories, or (should be *and*) their methods of study" (pp. 65-66). Later, he presents this scheme as a suggestion for a systematic sociology (p. 507).

Part I, Scope of Sociology and Part II, The Logical Basis of Sociology, consist of nine chapters of theoretical introduction. A law is merely "a relatively constant association between types of facts" (p. 144). These may be quantitative, qualitative and laws of functional dependence (pp. 161-162). "The principles of a science are the fundamental truths, doctrines or logic which are the foundations of its descriptions and laws" (p. 162). It is clear, as Phelps says and shows, that many, perhaps most, so-called laws are really principles and that many so-called principles are hypotheses which may or may not be valid. I would add that postulates should be distinguished from laws and principles and that all three are mixed and muddled in a most gruesome fashion in current sociological theory.

Part III is really the body of the book. It presents a great many of the "laws and

principles" relating to the nine general patterns of societal behavior mentioned above. Most of the general sociological problems are referred to in this section. Part IV consists of four chapters dealing with Trends, Prediction, Symbolic Sociology, and Changing Scope. The chapter on symbolism is one of the best in the book and should be required reading for all sociologists, especially for those over thirty-five. It shows the increasing difficulty of using language symbols for scientific purposes and discusses briefly the development of symbolism in sociology by graphics, formulae, and quantitation. In this, sociology is following the course of development which has characterized most other natural sciences.

Most readers will be forced to admit that no intelligent man can any longer seriously question whether sociology is a "real" or "true" science, and he will also be convinced that it is a natural science. For this reason I hope a great many biological and physical scientists and the more literate persons in the general public will read the book. It would also be a good thing for many who call themselves sociologists.

It has an attractive format, is typographically clean and accurate, and has an excellent index.

MENTAL HYGIENE

ERNEST R. GROVES

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY. By William S. Sadler. St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Company, 1936. 1231 pp. \$10.00.

THE NEUROTIC PERSONALITY OF OUR TIME. By Dr. Karen Horney. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1937. 299 pp. \$3.00.

BE GLAD YOU'RE NEUROTIC. By Louis E. Bisch. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936. 201 pp. \$2.00.

THE ANATOMY OF PERSONALITY. By Clements C. Fry and Howard W. Haggard. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936. 357 pp.

SO YOU'RE GOING TO A PSYCHIATRIST. By Elizabeth I. Adamson. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1936. 263 pp. \$2.50.

I KNEW 3000 LUNATICS. By Victor R. Small. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1935. 273 pp. \$2.50.

- A MIND MISLAID. By Henry Collins Brown. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1937. 219 pp. \$2.00.
- ASYLUM. By William Seabrook. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935. 263 pp. \$2.00.
- GROW UP EMOTIONALLY AND HAVE FUN. By J. George Frederick. New York: The Beaux Arts Press, 1936. 299 pp.
- MEET YOURSELF AS YOU REALLY ARE. By Prince Leopold Loewenstein and William Gerhardt. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1936. 336 pp. \$2.00.

Theory and Practice of Psychiatry. A massive book of more than twelve hundred pages. Impressive as it is in bulk, it is even more so in content, for in spite of its size there is no waste of words. It attempts a complete covering of psychiatric science in a form adapted to the needs of the non-psychiatric specialist in medicine, sociology, or psychology. It is the author's conviction that the preventive program in mental hygiene requires familiarity with psychiatric principles and practices among these allies of the professional psychiatrist. The book is a product of scholarship and of thirty years of experience. This interpretation of psychiatric thinking impresses the reader by its clarity, its tolerant, non-partisan attitude toward the various schools that seek to possess the science and its emphasis upon the emotional, personality disturbances rather than the insanities. It is this stress of neurotic experience that makes it so valuable to the sociologist.

The Neurotic Personality of Our Time has an axe to grind but one that the sociologist will be delighted to see sharpened. It seeks to do justice to the cultural relativity of all neurotic disturbances, surely a significant insight that has been neglected by the great psychiatric chieftains who have tried to build a strategy of psychiatry without much regard to the changing social circumstances that have no small part in determining the battle-

field where human impulses clash at any time and place. The present widespread disrepute of introvertive trends as compared with the extravertive is a vivid illustration of a partisanship reflecting a prevailing exaggeration of cultural values. The author focuses the neurotic struggle of our own period in the hunger among neurotics for affection and their inability to achieve it.

Bisch crusades for the recognition of the superiority of a great group of men and women that justly can be catalogued as neurotic, providing the meaning of this classification is understood. At a time when a sensitive, independent personality can hardly escape such allocation, it is good to have a forceful, interesting discussion that will help these herd-defying persons realize that to be defined as neurotic does not mean that one is destined to develop a neurosis. Although the author insists that he is a neurotic, and indeed must be, using the term as he has, he has given us one of the most healthy-minded books yet written in this field.

Human nature is too composite ever to be successfully accounted for by any one mechanistic system. *The Anatomy of Personality* warns the reader of mental hygiene that there are constitutional characteristics that also must be taken into account in any discussion of human maladjustments. The book is an interesting, popular presentation of the point of view of Kahn's *Psychopathic Personalities*, although the authors do not ignore other basic and contrasting contributions to the literature of psychiatric theory.

I Knew 3000 Lunatics, *A Mind Misland*, and *Asylum* are three attempts through books designed for popular reading to break down the still common misconception and fear of mental illness, an emotionalism which although considerably shaken of late continues to grip

many even intelligent people with the strength of a well-established taboo. The first book is the most revealing in its picture of institutional life, the second the most therapeutic, and the third the most dramatic in its portrayal of the conflicts and tragedies behind asylum walls. *A Mind Misplaced* has an unforgettable, pain-softening message for any relative or friend of a man or woman who has been committed to a hospital for the mentally sick.

Adamson seeks to give the lay reader good understanding of the science of psychiatry as it now exists and its conventional principles. When we read in *A Mind Misplaced* that the author knows a woman who has fallen into the hands of a

charlatan professing to be a psychiatrist and has spent, without being helped, nearly a hundred thousand dollars in seven years, one realizes the need of such a book as *So You're Going to a Psychiatrist*.

Grow Up Emotionally and Have Fun fulfills the suggestion of the title. It helps the reader gain self-knowledge by numerous tests while giving the suggestion that this insight must not be taken too seriously.

Meet Yourself as You Really Are has a similar purpose and uses the same method. Its questions range over an enormous territory of human experience. It will prove helpful to those readers who enjoy self-testing, provided it is not treated with neurotic intenseness as an oracular revelation of personality.

THE CHILD AND HIS HOME

ELIZABETH CRAIG AND CHENEY C. JONES

The New England Home for Little Wanderers, Boston, Massachusetts

THE ADOPTED CHILD. By Eleanor Garrigue Gallagher. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1936. 291 pp. \$3.50.

SUBSTITUTE PARENTS. A Study of Foster Families. By Mary Buell Sayles. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1936. 309 pp. \$1.75.

The Adopted Child. At almost any point in an adoption situation, the social worker stands between the horns of a dilemma. On the one side is the importance of haste in order that the child may form the early emotional attachments that will color his whole personality in the home of which he is to become an integral part. On the other side stands the importance of delay for study long enough to permit the wisest placement according to the child's apparent potentialities and opportunities presented by the adoptive home. Even before the decision for adoption has been reached in the case of the unmarried mother (which forms a large proportion of all adoption work and with which Mrs. Gal-

lagher is particularly concerned) the social worker finds herself again between two needs—that of the mother to come to a decision according to her own individuality, and that of the child for the kind of life that will offer the greatest potentialities for his development.

In her book, *The Adopted Child*, Mrs. Gallagher avoids this dilemma. She advocates the use of the "adoption nursery" and describes the practices of the Cradle in Evanston, Illinois. Beginning with her proposal that through adoption she can offer the unmarried mother "the best possible chance of happiness for her child," she refuses to consider alternatives and outlines a very definite course. Briefly, her plan is to admit the child into a nursery home and break off all ties with the mother as soon as possible after the birth. She disregards the paternal history entirely and, on the maternal side, considers of importance only such obvious

facts as the mother's education and economic position. With this information and a physical examination of the child to rule out "noticeable defects," she places the child at a few weeks or months of age in a "suitable adoptive home," withholding all information from the adoptive parents and advocating that they tell the child from the beginning that he is adopted, but that they know nothing of his parentage. They should say, "We are your people." She dispenses with psychological tests on the grounds that they are not accurate and that there are "few competent psychologists." As soon as the placement is made, all connection with the child and the adoptive parents is broken on the principle that "one has no more right to enter that home, inspect, supervise, or criticize, than one has to enter the home of any other neighbor or relative."

Throughout the book considerable criticism is directed toward social case work, apparently in many instances without an accurate understanding of its procedures. Such criticism is warrantable and inevitable in the face of the paucity of available material in the field of child-placing. When Mrs. Gallagher says, "Because a consensus of opinion among welfare workers or child-placing agencies has been established, it does not follow that it should remain unchanged . . ." one cannot help but agree. Social work has been building up a store of knowledge through its observations of personality development in varied social settings. It has been putting to use various tests and measurements drawn from the allied fields of psychology and medicine. It has been following cases for long periods of time, watching developments, and weighing results. And it is to be hoped that changes in adoptive procedure will come as fresh observations are made and new

conclusions are reached. But to cast all this experience aside, incomplete and stumbling though it may be, and to follow Mrs. Gallagher into a maze of placements of children who have come we know not whither and who will go we know not where, would seem to be a turning back to the legends of our childhood to a faith in the "happy ending," to Romulus and Remus, to Lohengrin, and to the bad fairies who stole the real baby from his cradle and put a changeling in his place. The most valuable contribution that *The Adopted Child* can make is to act as a stimulus to social workers toward a further evaluation of adoption methods. Its greatest danger lies in the confusion of fact and fancy presented to the general public as a complete guide book on the subject of adoption.

E. C.

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Substitute Parents. I was once told that the way to review a book is to ask at least three questions: What does the author try to say? Does he say it? Is it worth saying? If after reading this particular book one attempted to answer these questions, I think he would say that one senses a little confusion as to exactly what the author is trying to say. In her preface the author indicates that she is interested in the matter of the behavior of parents toward their children,—a matter which, "interests every member of the human race," since all have at least had parents if not children. She says, "the book is intended for any reader who is interested in children primarily from the parents' point of view, or anyone who cares to learn what relationships developed in foster homes may mean to foster parents as well as to children." If one does not read the preface and reads only Part I, he would think that she is trying to say that people who at-

tempt to do anything with children might well be thoughtful about what they are doing and that those who attempt such a drastic thing with a child as placing him in another family than his own ought to be especially thoughtful and careful. If this is what she is trying to say, she does say it and from what most of us can see any day we would think it needs to be said and so is worth saying. I think there is another question which can be asked and that is, does the author say it well? Many of us having very definite notions about what we wish to say, do succeed in saying a great deal that is worth while, but we express it awkwardly, or in a confused style. The present text gives this reader some sense of confusion,—a feeling that more work could have been done upon the writing of the text with great advantage to clarity. Many times the reader is not sure whether the author is talking about adoptive parents or about boarding parents. While she may have been deliberate in doing this, it remains a question whether that is the best procedure.

Clearly the text is weighted with the so-called psychiatric approach. This results in some passages which make one wonder whether they would be helpful "for any reader who is interested in children." Perhaps a quotation will suggest some of the things said above:

Even before the present psychological era set us all to challenging our own motives and those of our neighbors, it is safe to say that experienced social workers never accepted without question the statements as to motive made by applicants for foster children; nowadays, few of us would be so naïve as to do so. With the rapid permeation through large sections of society of some rudimentary notions regarding "motivations" and "mechanisms" of human behavior, we should be prepared to believe that many different forces combine to influence each of us who seeks to become a foster parent, and that the values for a child in any free or boarding home depend on qualities of heart and head in those who will care for him—their understanding of child na-

ture and of this particular child, their interest in him and in finding ways to help him, their willingness to forego anticipated satisfactions and make all plans for him contingent on his slowly emerging nature and needs.

This paragraph, with all that is good and sound in it, carried certain confusions and raises a certain question as to who really is "naïve." Some of us who were brought up by grandmothers who taught us that "many different forces combine to influence each of us" are sometimes not so much impressed by the weighty way in which some of our so-called psychiatric literature expresses some rather obvious truth. The assumption on the part of the disciples of a new religion that predecessors had no religion, may seem naïve to the latter.

The author is in much better form when on the next page, in speaking of what would-be foster parents need to know about themselves, she says as follows:

Some of the things they need to know are implied in the preceding pages about motives. Are they prepared to do what the wisest own parents have always done: enjoy each passing phase of babyhood, childhood, and youth to the full, help the youngster to enjoy or leave him free to enjoy, as he goes, all the normal satisfactions of his age, but never hold him back, or encourage him to linger, or try to force him into a mold, however much they grieve to lose their personal hold on him or would like him to follow plans in harmony with their own tasks or interests? It may be hard for foster parents of a young child to anticipate all that it will mean to release him progressively as he gains strength to seek independence, but if they are prepared to take the first steps, and if they fully grasp the principle involved, they should grow in capacity to perform their part as the child acquires power to perform his.

This is a rather large order for the average *boarding* family, but sound all the same. There are excellent passages one would quote, if space allowed, such as,

It is not about possible misbehavior on the part of the child that foster parents need to know more, if they would avert future trouble; but about the

divided loyalties, the confused affections, the overlapping memories, the peculiarly intense feeling of insecurity, which so often handicap the foster child and may spoil their own relationship with him.

And on another page the following:

In endeavoring to help a child attain the security he has lost or never had, the foster mother needs, of course, to provide all the conditions that have previously been lacking in his life. She needs, above all, to be reliable—a person who is there when needed, not merely in a physical or literal but in a spiritual or metaphorical sense. To stabilize a drifting universe for another human being is a job probably beyond the power of any individual; but a foster mother who is stable and dependable can make a great contribution to that end.

Part II consists of case stories which are interesting and emphasizes very well many of the problems in foster care of children. One who has done a great deal of case work always feels the difference between case stories cited by one who has taken them from somebody else's records and those which are out of the writer's own experience. The latter, of course, are preferable. Many of us, however, who do a great deal of case work cannot write.

Having grumbled somewhat about this book, I am bound to say that it is a fairly good book. In general it represents a simple, readable style which the average person can understand. It is sound. It is thought-provoking and I can see some of our foster parents as well as social workers reading it with interest and profit. It is good antidote to *The Adopted Child*. It still leaves for somebody the task of writing a book on foster care of children which grows slowly out of a profound reflection over extended work in the field, —a book that grows up out of experience rather than down out of theory.

C. C. J.

THE ROAD TO REUNION: 1865-1900. By Paul H. Buck. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1937. 320 pp. \$3.25.

Professor Buck's *Road to Reunion* is history of a kind that should make a very definite appeal to sociologists. Here is the history of a tremendous social process in operation over a generation—the process of reconciliation between the sectional North and the sectional South. To realize how real was this process and how far it had to go, one needs but recall Wendell Phillips' comment on Washington College's choice of a president: "If Lee is fit to be president of a college, then for Heaven's sake pardon Wirz and make him professor of what the Scots call the humanities." To realize how different is this volume, one has but to compare it with the conventional studies of reconstruction as a legal and political process.

Here the emphasis is all on changing attitudes, an excursion into the social psychology of how two hostile sections again become a nation. And if documentation is difficult in this field, it makes the search all the more fascinating. From angry recriminations over Confederate prisons and Sherman's tactics, Buck traces the trend from estrangement to reconciliation in social, economic, cultural, and literary life.

In a search like this, changes in institutions and movements must stand as indicative of changes in the spirit of peoples. Dr. Buck thus gives us accounts of veterans organizations, the rise of Memorial Day, Acts of Amnesty, the return of flags, the national effect of the deaths of Lee, Grant, and Davis, and of the speeches of Lamar, Grady, and Charles Francis Adams. Most interesting is the contrast between the speedy admission of Lee to the galaxy of American heroes and the attitude toward Davis whom "the North in time ceased to revile but never came to admire." There came a time when waving the bloody shirt was a political liability instead of an asset, when reconciliation no longer

seemed the cheap staple of the Democratic party's aspirations for power, when Northern churches no longer looked on Southern areas as missionary territory nor expected their brethren to return in repentance. The author points out how much better it was that the Republican party should have the burden of defending the Compromise of 1877. Industry is seen as the connecting link and we are given a picture of the cartoonist Nast as he turned from waving the bloody shirt to depict business accomplishing work usually reserved for angels.

Shrewd, realistic, and penetrating, the study is written in the best of spirit. Unlike A. E. Cole's recent *Irrepressible Conflict* the volume is itself a gift on the altar of sectional reconciliation. Good history and good sociology, the book shows that restoration of the union was a moral as well as a legal and political process, that the definition of Americanism as synonymous with the traits of the victorious section was but part of the solution of force, that a "valid nationalism could be premised only upon respect for and conservation of properly integrated variations in regional culture." Only in respect to the Negro has Buck taken a distinctly pessimistic turn. Favorable as is his volume to the Southern view, Professor Buck must realize that sections of both the national Democratic party and of Southern thought have gone beyond the old point of view. There are those who feel that the time is not far distant from the fuller participation of the Negro in Southern life and culture.

RUPERT B. VANCE.

University of North Carolina.

NEUTRALITY FOR THE UNITED STATES. By E. M. Borchard and W. P. Lage. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937. 380 pp. \$3.50.

This long awaited volume by one of the most distinguished of American interna-

tional lawyers offers the reader a brief against a change in neutrality policy rather than an appraisal of the problem of keeping out of another war. Professor Borchard's position is well known; he is an exponent of the doctrine of maintaining neutral rights against belligerent attrition. He has been an active and persuasive opponent of recent attempts to change our neutrality laws. He has argued before committees of the Senate and the House in favor of the maintenance of our traditional policy of "freedom of the seas." He has been particularly opposed to any efforts at American participation in a program of collective security. Somewhat grudgingly he accepts such changes in the law as are applied impartially to all belligerents.

After an introduction surveying briefly the evolution of the doctrine and practice of neutrality before and during the Great War, he devotes over one-half of his book to an analysis of American neutrality 1914-1917. This part of his study is perhaps the most thorough, and certainly the most adequate, discussion of the legal considerations involved that has yet appeared. With meticulous and searching care he has explored and compared the legal passages at law between the United States and the various belligerents against the background of what actually was taking place in terms of searches and seizures, blockades, submarine sinkings, losses of American lives, vessels and property. His analysis disposes pretty completely of the myth that we went into war to protect those lives or property. For instance, he makes a comparison between our losses and those of the Scandinavian belligerents and Holland which shows how far greater absolutely and, of course, relatively their losses from belligerent action were—despite which they were not drawn into the War. Altogether, it is a sound and

scholarly presentation of an intricate and difficult subject. No one who writes hereafter will be able to escape the logic of his argument.

The second main section of his study is a less happy—because it is less impartial and a good deal more intemperate—analysis of post-war efforts to modify our existing neutrality legislation. Professor Borchard's position has been noted above, perhaps the period of our neutrality in the Great War was "the golden age of rhetoric and phantasy." But there are various inferences to be drawn from that experience. The implications of Professor Borchard's argument are that we should avoid entanglements. His formula suggests attempting to maintain our "rights" in the face of belligerent exigencies. But there is another solution and that is that we should emphasize "duties" rather than "rights." That might mean self-denial in terms of the profits to be derived from neutral trade. The dilemma he sees, but does not face. In his final paragraph (page 350) he says, "There is no improvised formula to ensure abstention from war and yet maintain national dignity." But national dignity is after all a very intangible asset. However, it is measured in the profits of traders, it means obviously a sizeable bill for the maintenance of rights by latent force. There is another dignity which may in the long run be not only less expensive but provide a more certain assurance against involvement in war. The present neutrality legislation, however defective it may be, is nevertheless an attempt to adumbrate such a policy. Professor Borchard's rather cavalier dismissal of the effort itself and still more of the spirit which motivated it hardly does credit to his real acumen or to the quality of his presentation of the problem between 1914 and 1917. If it were hopeless to attempt to stay out of war, perhaps na-

tional dignity would be worth preserving at the cost of American lives and wealth, but that is hardly a demonstrable fact despite his somewhat violent attack upon all the other formulas but his own. And it is perhaps indicative of the partisanship of his presentation that he nowhere cites directly nor analyzes the arguments of such authorities as Mr. Charles Warren and Professor Philip C. Jessup whose knowledge of the field is certainly equal to his own, but whose inferences drawn from the same experience which Professor Borchard describes are almost diametrically opposed.

PHILLIPS BRADLEY.

Amherst College.

LIBRARY TRENDS; PAPERS PRESENTED BEFORE THE LIBRARY INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, AUGUST 3-15, 1936. Edited with an introduction by Louis R. Wilson. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1937. 388 pp. \$2.00.

The modern library demonstrates as do few other institutions the close interrelationships of present-day society. The popular conception of the library and the librarian living sheltered existences apart from the hurlyburly of everyday life, uninfluenced by and with little influence on social forces around them, belongs to another and remote era. If there are lingering remnants of this delusion *Library Trends* should effectively dispel them. Here is probably the most comprehensive view available within the covers of a single book of the multiple factors reacting upon the library of today. The volume is a compilation of twenty addresses, by authorities in various fields, given at the 1936 University of Chicago Library Institute. The editor, Dr. Louis R. Wilson, Dean of the Graduate Library School of the University of Chicago, contributes a stimulating introduction which in effect synthesizes the findings of the whole group.

For practical purposes the work may

be divided into two approximately equal parts. First is a detailed consideration of certain movements in society helping to mold the library from without. The implications for libraries of current social trends, regional planning, recent developments in municipal government, investigations in rural sociology, advances in adult education, and changes in the general field of education are here presented by such well known leaders as William F. Ogburn, J. H. Kolb, Howard W. Odum, Carleton B. Joeckel, Thomas H. Reed, Charles H. Judd, Edward S. Robinson, Floyd W. Reeves, Henry M. Wriston, William S. Gray, and Ralph W. Tyler. Touching even more directly on problems which are, or should be, of primary concern to the librarian is a second group of papers by Helen G. Steward, B. Lamar Johnson, Paul Vanderbilt, Douglas Waples, Leon Carnovsky, Franklin F. Hopper, and others, dealing with techniques for measuring adequacy of library service, investigations of reading materials and reading habits, the mobilization and reproduction of materials for research, and library school curricula.

There is not space here even to summarize the variety of ideas and suggestions thrown out by these several experts. One unifying note, stated or implied, runs through J. H. Kolb's "Library Service for Rural People," H. W. Odum's "Regional Planning," Thomas H. Reed's "Metropolitan Area," Carleton B. Joeckel's "Realities of Regionalism," and Helen G. Stewart's "Regional Library Development." This theme is the need for larger units of library service. All would abandon the narrowly limited, inadequately supported, local organization for something more broadly based in outlook, service, and support. It is obvious that petty local and provincial considerations must be thrown overboard if efficient and

complete library coverage, as well as other desirable social objectives, are to be achieved. Combinations of cities, counties, and states can carry on successfully many activities at which any one of them working alone would fail or at best function in a mediocre way.

Some revealing facts are brought out in another section devoted to reading and measurements of library service. The old-fashioned librarian believed that his job was finished when he had made available to the public what he considered the best classical and current literature. Whether books selected for purchase were best for his particular clientele was for the most part a hit or miss affair. The scene is changing. For the past several years there has been appearing a series of scientific studies of reading problems, largely emanating from or inspired by the Chicago Graduate Library School. These have sought to determine such points as: What do people want to read about? What makes a book readable? What makes a book difficult? How can difficult books be simplified for the less well prepared reader? What books are most suitable for various groups and occupations within the population? To what types of reading matter is the public exposed in and out of the library? and, in general, How effectively is the library meeting the needs of the public it attempts to serve? Practical application of methods designed to answer these and similar questions has been made in a number of communities large and small. Full reports both of techniques and actual surveys are contained in the present volume. Some extremely fruitful fields for library service are being opened up by these investigations, and they may enable the librarian to reach elements of the population hitherto untouched.

Of special interest to the research worker are two reports by Robert C. Binkley and

Paul Vanderbilt. The first relates to the multiplication of rare materials through microfilm, hectograph, mimeograph, multigraph, photo-offset from typescript, and other reproductive methods now being perfected. (*Library Trends* is itself an offset reproduction of typescript.) Mr. Vanderbilt's paper on union catalogs, with particular reference to the ambitious Philadelphia project, illustrates another rapidly growing device for locating and making accessible research materials of every variety. The evolution of the microfilm and union catalog will mean that a scholar of the future can secure easily, cheaply, and quickly copies of the scarcest and most valuable items wherever they may be found.

Each of the papers is accompanied by a brief up-to-date bibliography. There is also a good index.

ROBERT B. DOWNS.

University of North Carolina

THREE YEARS OF THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION. By Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis and John D. Black. Brookings Institution, 1937. 600 pp. \$3.00.

In a very fine sense, this study is outstanding and unique. A few years earlier, it would have been impossible even to have considered the initiation, let alone the execution, of such a study. Both social and physical scientists may well consider carefully the merits and possibilities of the methodology involved. Here is an instance, not of a well known social scientist lending and linking his name with one or more juniors and publishing a joint study, nor even of two outstanding social scientists joining forces. Rather, the three leading agricultural economists of the United States pooled their efforts, studied the greatest planned effort of recorded history to aid a major industry, and evaluated the results achieved.

Unusual in such a joint study each author, broadly speaking, belongs to a different school of economic thought. These basic differences of belief do not contribute to smoothness of presentation. Usually, agreement of a sort is reached, but at times each author feels compelled to take exception and to express a different view from what may be termed the majority view expressed in the study. It is truly remarkable, however, that three such outstanding authorities, with very different viewpoints and philosophies in many important particulars, could so submerge their personalities as to join in the preparation of so worthwhile an evaluation of a major experiment in planned economy in the sphere of economic activity of major interest to each.

Of the study itself, not a great deal need be said. For libraries and references generally, it will prove invaluable and, on this basis, should receive wide sale and distribution. Neither the style nor purpose is such as to cause the study to enjoy wide popular appeal. Occasional dogmatic expressions, to be expected from strong-willed, opinionated persons, are offset somewhat by other expressions of dry humor in the most unexpected places, as, "so far as we can observe it, through dust of the drouth."

Carefully and thoroughly a review of occurrences and developments under the AAA is presented in the first eight chapters. This review is particularly well done and was made possible by the six earlier studies of each commodity program and of marketing agreements under the AAA also made under the direction of and published by Brookings Institution, and reviewed in the December, 1936, issue of *Social Forces*. In the ninth chapter, there is presented a review of administrative problems, both internal and external, and how they were handled. In the next

four chapters, the effects of the AAA program upon farmers and other groups are considered. In the concluding chapter, the philosophy of the AAA is viewed in the light of experience, while in the immediately preceding chapter, the contributions of the AAA to general recovery are evaluated. One of the most interesting and profound parts of the study is a lengthy appendix prepared by Harold B. Rowe in which the methods used in ascertaining the benefits and burdens of the AAA programs are described. This section will doubtless prove to be of vital interest to students of research methodology. In a second appendix, two significant talks made by Secretary Wallace and Administrator Tolley are presented.

Outstanding, meritorious, and unique are terms applicable to this study. The study deserves a good reception, and Brookings is again to be complimented for rendering a distinct social service for furnishing the public with vitally useful information.

CLIFTON J. BRADLEY.

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THE ECONOMICS OF CONSUMPTION. By Charles S. Wyand. New York: Macmillan, 1937. 550 pp.

Symptomatic of the greater attention which the consumer is receiving nowadays from economists is this thorough and systematic treatment of the economics of consumption by Professor Wyand of Pennsylvania State College. Although intended and most suitable as a textbook in the field, it is so fluently and cogently written as to be of interest to a wide circle of readers who never have been to college.

Part I (80 pages) treats of basic characteristics, motivation, and certain recent tendencies in our economic system which make attention to the consumer's rôle more important now than in the past.

Part II defines the consumer, consumption goods, and consumer choice and the rôle of each in the functioning of our economic system. Part III, which occupies 270 pages, deals with the various physical, biological, and institutional factors affecting choice—in short with everything affecting when, what, and how much the consumer purchases. Public spending and consumer cooperatives are especially considered under this heading. Part IV deals with planes, standards, and "norms" of living. At the end, Oscar Cox's proposed enabling act for a Department of the Consumer is printed as an appendix.

Probably the most valuable feature of the book is the clear portrayal of the various ways in which producers are enabled to manipulate consumer choice to the advantage of aggressive and dishonest salesmanship and at the expense of quality in production and real satisfaction in consumption. He shows how the long-run interests of both producer and consumer have been sacrificed to the interests of the salesman and advertiser, and indicates possible remedies. If the teaching of home economics could be based on his approach and proposals, it seems likely that it would improve its standing as a substantial and valuable branch of applied science.

There are several minor defects, such as the statement of opposing views as to the degree of competition in our economic system without a careful correlation of these views to each other. Also I would suggest that, instead of trying to change the definition of cost of living from the conventional one, he use high psychic cost of living or "low real income" as the more suitable term for his concept. However, these defects are so few and so unimportant compared with the well-rounded, clear, and cogent treatment of the whole field that the book may be unhesitatingly

recommended as one of the best standard texts in the field of consumption economics.

FRANCIS S. WILDER.

Shorter College.

THE MODERN ECONOMY IN ACTION. By Caroline F. Ware and Gardiner C. Means. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936, 224 pp. \$1.60.

The old economy under which many think we are living and the new economy which largely dominates our living are analyzed, contrasted, and evaluated in this volume, *The Modern Economy in Action*. The old economy evolved from the face-to-face market-place; its theories were systematized by Adam Smith, being based on three assumptions: (1) that individuals act on the profit motive, (2) that all men are equal in bargaining power, and (3) that prices respond automatically to the supply and demand. Modern industry and its accompanying economic organization have produced a set of conditions that have placed the control of the supply in the hands of relatively few and at the same time given these few control over prices. Prices therefore are the result, not of free forces that automatically operate, but of administrative organization. Thus the price of Chevrolets is not the result of free competition among many automobile manufacturers but rather what the directive heads of General Motors decide. Moreover, one-half or more of the gainfully employed in America are in industries in which the power is so concentrated that free competition in the sale of products is stifled.

The result of the present administrative organization in industry is that we purchase goods, the prices for which are largely fixed and inflexible. Prices of steel rails, aluminum, tractors, plows, fall into this category. The manufacturer produces, but, if goods in the groups just

mentioned do not sell, production stops, but the prices do not fall. The production of agricultural implements might drop 80 per cent but the price only 15 per cent, though the prices of agricultural products that the individual farmers raise may drop 80 per cent and production not at all. This control of prices frequently results in exorbitant profits. For example, the salaries of the executives and earnings of the stockholders in the four largest tobacco companies in the country exceeded the total amount the tobacco farmers received for their tobacco crop in 1932. The consumer has no power; the small producer, such as the tobacco farmer, is at the mercy of the large corporation.

A fundamental problem in today's life is to keep a balance between that which remains of the old economy and the powerfully organized new. The individualist farmer is helpless before the organized farm machinery producer or farm products purchasing corporation. Thus in the so-called cyclical price fluctuations the small man suffers. Extreme maladjustments exist because these two systems exist side by side; they are not complementary to each other. What can the individual householder do respecting the price for telephone service? The American Telephone Company tells him what he must do if he uses a telephone; the company dictates the price for use of the telephone.

The critical problems that have crystallized in the depression revealing the more potent difficulties inherent in the modern economy are: (1) the proper supply of money, (2) the volume of savings and the creation of capital goods, (3) price and production policies, (4) economic relations of nations, and (5) economic security.

The amount of money available for use generally operates just the opposite direction from that needed. Banks by simple

bookkeeping processes may greatly increase the amount of money in circulation, and at present, the banking system has no adequate control over the volume of money. Closely related to the volume of money is the problem of balancing savings with the demand for new capital. In this as in other respects the maintenance of the balance between savings and creation of capital goods there exists a fundamental problem, a resultant of the inflexible price system.

The new economy with its price fixing inherently operates on the principle of scarcity. The ideal for industry, viewed from the standpoint of adequate and wholesome standards of living, is operation to full capacity. The attainment of this ideal seems to rest in changing our industrial policies which may take one or more of several directions.

America is not without experience in formulating industrial policies in the form of government ownership, such as schools, hospitals, and water works; government control without ownership, as in the case of the railroads during the War; commission regulation as with public utilities; purchasing a certain policy as in the case of the AAA benefit payments; determining of key policies by a representative body, collective bargaining and cooperative efforts. And in all this the government may have varied functions as in international relationships.

The authors have in this volume analyzed the nature of present-day economic organization and at the same time offered suggestions for remedying the maladjustments. One hardly knows whether this book has been written for the general reading public or a text book. In that lies its value. The old classical theories are recognized as explaining certain aspects of our economic organization, but the realities of other and conflicting elements in our organization are given the predominant place. As a so-

ciologist I am not an economic determinist but in explaining group action economic forces and economic groups must be recognized. I think if I were again teaching sociology I would make use of *The Modern Economy in Action* partially as a backlog in explaining modern group and societal actions and processes.

BRUCE L. MELVIN.

Works Progress Administration.

MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION. By Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937. 604 pp. Trade price, \$5.00. Probable text price, \$3.75.

This re-study of Middletown is part of what seems to be a trend in bringing into contemporary focus some of the standard community surveys of earlier years. This trend is perhaps to be expected of a maturing social science involving the study of culture. *Middletown* spanned the interval 1890-1925, a period of sociological scrutiny of life and labor in agriculture and industry, when novelists and scientists looked into the anatomy and functioning of rural and urban communities, explored Main Street, the West Side, and the areas across the tracks. No factual study of the community has received quite the acclaim accorded to *Middletown*. Even though its authors doubt if a hundred Middletowners have ever read it thoroughly, thousands of students here and abroad are better informed than they otherwise would be about life in the American small city. (The preface of the new book ought to stimulate sales of the old book among Middletown Methodists and others).

Middletown in Transition deals with the boom and depression years between 1925 and 1935. This re-survey is, if anything, more interesting than the earlier study. Similar in plan and format, the contents of both books can be readily compared. Considerable emphasis is placed upon

beliefs and attitudes that delineate themselves against the background of business depression and political digression from accustomed ways. This time also the narrative is reinforced by footnotes and appendix data that validate and clarify.

Middletown in transition is America in transition; it is a mid-land vantage point from which we can discern portentous trends ruralward and cityward, leftward and rightward, in a nation vexed by dilemmas. Those who would understand our typical city life amid changes that are derived from cultural sources beyond its control, will own this book, will study it, and will encourage others to do so.

LEE M. BROOKS.

University of North Carolina.

ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY. By Knight Dunlap. St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Co., 1936. 499 pp. \$3.00.

This book is in essentials a revision of the author's *Elements of Scientific Psychology*, published in 1922; and it is marked by the same sorts of inclusions and exclusions. There reappear here some of the materials that marked the earlier book with originality of interpretation or of presentation. For instance: the clean-cut analysis of how a child's perception of an object (orange) is developed (pp. 195 ff.); unusually effective photographs showing factors in visual perceiving of distance (Figures, 47, 48, 51, and 52); the schematic reduction of associative sequences of syllables to kinesthetic linkages (pp. 294 ff.); based thereon, the reduction of thinking processes either to actual minimal muscular activities or to a short-circuiting mechanism (pp. 298, 284 ff.); and the somewhat similar analysis of imagery (pp. 429 ff.). And Dunlap now adds his theory of the successful use of negative practice, developed since the earlier book was written (pp. 377 ff.).

But we have glaring omissions—if a

book entitled *Elements of Psychology* may be expected to be a presentation of elements from the whole general field of psychology as we know it today. The cavalier treatment of Pavlov's experiments, which "have so far thrown no light on the fundamental learning problems, physiological or psychological," is a characteristic dismissal of a whole set of major problems that are occupying a number of able psychologists and at least four of the best laboratories. There is no mention of the Wever-Bray phenomenon and theories in the relatively inclusive chapter on the Senses; and—still more striking—the reader gets no hint of the very rich field of investigative results on memorizing, from Ebbinghaus to McGeoch. As for social psychology, in spite of the fact that Dunlap has put out a book on that topic, he gives the reader of the book before us no acquaintance with any problems or any research in those lines at all. There are other omissions.

Clearly, the scope of the book is determined not by the character of courses being taught in American colleges taken collectively, nor by the directions of contemporary research in psychology laboratories and reported at psychologists' meetings; nor is it determined by the actual factual status of the science today. The scope of the book represents the predominating interests of the particular author.

Concerning the style in which the book is written two points stand out. Clarity marks Dunlap's expositions throughout so that what he does say is said effectively. But a strong penchant for multiplying classifications and technical terms (e.g., on pp. 52-53 and through the text) is likely to deter the reader. One figure is printed upside down (p. 67); but the publishers have used excellent paper stock, type face, and binding.

J. F. DASHIELL.

University of North Carolina.

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

- SOME AMERICAN PIONEERS IN SOCIAL WELFARE. SELECT DOCUMENTS WITH EDITORIAL NOTES.** By Edith Abbott. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1937. 189 pp. \$1.00.
- MATERNAL CARE. THE PRINCIPLES OF ANTEPARTUM, INTRAPARTUM, AND POSTPARTUM CARE FOR THE PRACTITIONER OF OBSTETRICS.** Edited by Dr. F. L. Adair. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1937. 93 pp. \$1.00.
- AFTER FIVE YEARS. THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM OF THE TRANSIENT UNEMPLOYED. 1932-1937.** New York: Committee on Care of Transient and Homeless, May 1937. 12 pp. \$1.00.
- MEMORANDUM ON RESEARCH IN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION.** By Gordon Allport, Gardner Murphy and Mark A. May. New York: Social Science Research Council, April 1937. 389 pp.
- THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS. ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1936.** Washington: The American National Red Cross. 172 pp.
- THE CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHIATRY TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF MODERN SOCIETY. A SYMPOSIUM.** By Alfred Adler, Franz Alexander, et. al. The American Journal of Sociology, May, 1937, 187 pp. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY.** By Harold H. Anderson. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1937. 253 pp. \$2.00.
- RUNAROUND.** By Benjamin Appel. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1937. 320 pp. \$2.50.
- AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD.** By Harry Elmer Barnes. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937. 790 pp.
- INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. (Revised Edition).** By Walter Greenwood Beach under the editorship of William F. Ogburn. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1937. 370 pp. \$2.25.
- MANUSCRIPT AND PROOFS.** By John Benbow. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937. 118 pp. \$1.50.
- SUPERIOR CHILDREN.** By John Edward Bentley. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1937. 331 pp. \$2.25.
- BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS EMERGENCY RELIEF COMMISSION, COVERING THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1934 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1936.** Chicago: Illinois Emergency Relief Commission. 233 pp.
- MANUAL ON METHODS OF REPRODUCING RESEARCH MATERIALS.** By Robert C. Binkley. Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1936. 207 pp. \$3.50.
- SOCIOLOGIE INTELIIGENCE.** In. Arnošt Bláha. Nakladatelství "Orbis", Praha XII. Cena K č 50. 396 pp.
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- THE BOARD MEMBER. A GUIDE TO THE DISCHARGING OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SOCIAL WORK.** New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936. 46 pp.
- AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINOLOGY.** By W. A. Bonger. Translated by Emil Van Loo. London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1936. 178 pp. 6s. net. (With six diagrams.)
- THE AMERICAN PLAY-PARTY SONG WITH A COLLECTION OF OKLAHOMA TEXTS AND TUNES.** By Benjamin Albert Botkin. A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate College in the University of Nebraska in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of English. Lincoln, Nebraska, 1937. 400 pp.
- THE NEGRO GENIUS.** By Benjamin Brawley. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, Inc., 1937. 366 pp. \$2.50.
- MANUAL FOR SOUTHERN REGIONS TO ACCOMPANY SOUTHERN REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES.** By Lee M. Brooks. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1937. 194 pp. \$1.00.
- PHYSICIANS AND MEDICAL CARE.** By Esther Lucile Brown. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1937. 202 pp. \$75.
- RURAL TRENDS IN DEPRESSION YEARS. A Survey of Village-centered Agricultural Communities 1930-1936.** By Edmund deS. Brunner and Irving Lorge. New York: Morningside Heights, Columbia University Press, 1937. 387 pp. \$3.25.
- A WORLD VIEW OF RACE.** By Ralph J. Bunche. Washington, D. C.: The Associates in Negro Folk Education, 1936. 98 pp. 1 to 10 copies, 25 cents each; 10 to 50 copies, 20 cents each; over 50 copies, 15 cents each.
- HUMAN CONFLICT: A BIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION.** By Trigant Burrow. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. 435 pp. \$3.50.
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- STATE ADMINISTRATION IN LOUISIANA. By R. L. Carleton. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1937. 270 pp. \$2.00.
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- NEWCOMERS AND NOMADS IN CALIFORNIA. By William T. Cross and Dorothy Embry Cross. Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1937. 149 pp. \$1.50.
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- PUBLIC MEDICAL SERVICES. A SURVEY OF TAX-SUPPORTED MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES. By Michael M. Davis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1937. 170 pp. \$1.50.
- AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. (Revised Edition) By Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1936. 870 pp. \$4.00.
- THE TAIL OF THE COMET. By Mary Cable Dennis. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1937. 189 pp. \$2.50.
- THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES. By Albert Deutsch with an Introduction by William A. White. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1937. 530 pp. \$3.00.
- STORY OF KING COTTON. By Harris Dickson. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1937. 309 pp. \$2.50.
- CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN. By John Dollard. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937. 502 pp. \$3.50.
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- GOOD HOUSING FOR AMERICA. Social Action, Volume III, Number 5, March 1, 1937. New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1937. 31 pp. 10 cents.
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- A HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By Walter Phelps Hall and Robert Greenhalgh Albion with the collaboration of Jennie Barnes Pope. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1937. 989 pp. \$4.60.
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- RECENT CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF FARM FAMILIES IN NORTH CAROLINA. By C. Horace Hamilton. Raleigh: The Agricultural Experiment Station of the North Carolina State College of Agriculture and Engineering and The North Carolina Department of Agriculture, May, 1937. 180 pp.
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- SHOULD LABOR UNIONS BE REGULATED? By Hubert Herring and Harold Hatcher. Social Action, Vol. III, No. 10. New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1937. 31 pp. \$.10.
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- WHO GAVE THE WORLD SYPHILIS. By Richmond C. Holcomb. New York: Froben Press, 1937. 189 pp. \$3.00.
- OUT OF THE TEST TUBE. By Harry N. Holmes. New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1937. 301 pp. \$3.00.
- SOCIAL ACTION IN BOMBAY. THE NAGPADA NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSE. By Arthur E. Holt. Social

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- NEW AMERICANS IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY. By Mary E. Hurlbutt. New York: The New York School of Social Work, 1937. 114 pp. \$.75.
- HURRICANES 1935. Washington: American National Red Cross, 1937. 20 pp.
- WOMAN'S PRIME OF LIFE. By Isabel Emslie Hutton. New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1937. 150 pp. \$2.00.
- I SEE BY THE PAPERS. Prepared by Newspaper Survey Committee. 59 pp.
- THE IMPROVEMENT OF EDUCATION: ITS INTERPRETATION FOR DEMOCRACY. Washington, D. C.: The Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association of the United States, 1937. 328 pp. \$2.00.
- GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. (Revised and Reset). By Claudius O. Johnson. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1937. 735 pp. \$4.00.
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